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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to explore whether statewide geography influences a 
candidate’s electoral position. More specifically, what role does geography play in 
candidate emergence and success on the statewide level? Conventional wisdom holds that 
geography does matter in candidate emergence and success. Beyond the anecdotal, 
however, there has been little research in this area. I theorize that general attitudes about 
rural identity and, conversely, urbanity affect electoral outcomes based upon the 
population composition of the state. To explore these questions, I created a typology 
characterizing states as rural or urban, based upon an index capturing rural cultural and 
physical attributes of each state, and as concentrated or dispersed, a measure of the 
proximity of urban areas within a state.  I coded the hometowns of candidates from 1948-
2008, including a classification as to whether their home county was rural or urban on a 
relative scale. Using this data, I implemented a negative binomial regression to consider the 
likelihood of candidate emergence. In this model, I found that rurality is not a negative 
predictor of candidate emergence in most state types, with urban states being the 
exception. I then implemented a logit model to estimate the likelihood of winning with the 
traditional predictors of candidate success and within my theoretical framework. Relative to 
senate races, if candidates can get into the race, the negative effects of hometown lose 
significance. In gubernatorial races, coming from a rural area actually increases the 
likelihood of getting elected in rural, concentrated, and dispersed classified states. In sum, 
political geography matters and has implications on both candidate emergence and success. 
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These findings and the use of this typology add an important component for future 
research.  Simply put, geography should not be ignored in politics.  
Keywords: rural, urban, candidate emergence, candidate success, political 
geography, senate elections, gubernatorial elections, localism, hometown 
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CHAPTER 1 
Upon meeting someone, inevitably, the conversation turns to the question, “Where 
are you from?”  This is one of the essential gauges of “getting to know someone.”  It is an 
indication of one’s personal traits and character; one makes assumptions about a person, in 
a general sense, based upon where he or she is from.  There are certain qualities attributed 
to a person based upon his or her geographic identity, defined as the place that one spent 
most of his or her childhood.  For example, if a woman claims Piedmont, Missouri (a small, 
Midwestern town), as her hometown, then presumptions are made about her.  Why is this?  
It is because we all draw upon geographic stereotypes.  Further, does it matter to whom she 
is giving this information?  If she is telling someone born and raised in Chicago, he may draw 
different conclusions than if she was telling someone from Paducah, Kentucky.  The Chicago 
native may perceive her as backward and unsophisticated, while the Kentuckian assumes 
she is hardworking and trustworthy.  Everything is relative, but it is clear that geography 
does matter because of the attributes that it inevitably attaches to an individual, simply by 
virtue of being from a place.  How, though, does geographic identity impact one’s electoral 
position?   
 Consider the case of Claire McCaskill, currently the senior U.S. Senator from 
Missouri, who clearly understands the implications, and attached connotations, of the 
question, “Where are you from?”  Senator McCaskill spent much of her childhood in the 
small Missouri towns of Houston and Lebanon; eventually, her family moved to Columbia, a 
mid-sized college community during her high school years.  While a product of outstate 
Missouri, McCaskill’s adult life has been spent in Jackson (home of Kansas City) and St. Louis 
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Counties, both urbanized counties within the state.  This, though, is not something that is 
apparent upon meeting Senator McCaskill.  She knows that politically it is not advantageous 
to promote her Kirkwood residence, a rich suburb of St. Louis, or her marriage to a wealthy 
real-estate developer.  Catering to rural interests in Missouri was an early political lesson for 
McCaskill.  During her gubernatorial race against Republican Matt Blunt in 2004, McCaskill 
acknowledged that she lost the race “because she ignored rural voters to focus on more 
liberal Kansas City, her political base, and St. Louis” (Stone 2006).  In Missouri, one cannot 
attach herself to the urban centers of Kansas City or St. Louis if she wants to be successful 
because, in this Midwestern state, St. Louis and Kansas City are pitted against each other 
electorally leaving candidates dependent upon rural interests of the state.  Is the impact of 
geography in this locale an anomaly, or could geography have some sort of systematic 
effect on the electoral landscape?  Would McCaskill’s 2004 strategy have been successful if 
the state’s geography was more like Illinois, where there is one major concentrated urban 
area (Chicago)?  This is something that has not been fully considered by those studying 
electoral behavior. 
Thus, I argue that there is a missing piece within the candidate success literature: 
the impact of geography.1  It is something that few scholars explicitly consider when 
discussing why candidates win or lose; however, in many cases, there is more to candidate 
success than simply money, resources and incumbency.  I argue that one needs to consider 
the effect of geographic context, namely the composition of urbanity within a state and the 
                                                          
1
 Geography is essentially the interpretation of place and the relationship between various places; “human 
beings still locate themselves in places, fixed, contiguous, distinctive.  Places mold actors, structuring their life 
chances, providing them with identities and traditions of social and political action…Places are strategic sites 
of action…” (Therborn 2006).  
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overall impact it has on the culture of the state.  In statewide elections, the candidate’s 
geographic identity matters (Black and Black 1973, Tatalovich 1975, Lewis-Beck and Rice 
1983, Rice and Macht 1987, Holbrook 1991, Gimpel and Schuknecht 2004, Key 2006 [Sixth 
Printing]: 37, Gimpel, et al. 2011).  For some, it is a character flaw if you were born and 
raised in a city.2  For others, the impact of an urban geographic identity is unimportant.  It is 
something that most candidates understand, causing them to underemphasize or, 
depending upon the state’s geography, exaggerate their roots.  Furthermore, I argue that 
geographic distribution of urban contexts throughout the states influence candidates’ 
success.  I hope to provide some evidence that one’s geographic identity affects the 
likelihood that he or she will, or will not, be elected.   
In my view, the distribution of urban areas is a determining factor in candidate 
success; in concentrated urban states (where there is one urban center), it is predicted that 
the negative perceptions coming out of this urban-rural divide are less severe.  Thus, the 
likelihood of urban candidate success will increase.  Conversely, in a state where there are 
several dispersed urban areas, it is electorally damaging to have an urban geographic 
identity.  Take, for example, a comparison of Missouri and Illinois.  Missouri has two major 
metropolitan areas, St. Louis and Kansas City.  They are located on opposite sides of the 
state, on the eastern and western border respectively.  Illinois, on the other hand, has one 
major urban area, Chicago, in the northern part of the state.  In both states, there are 
common stereotypes of the statewide electoral landscape.  Both are also very good 
counterexamples because of Missouri’s affinity to rurality and Illinois’ association with 
                                                          
2
 The reader may notice that there is an anti-urban bias; this is also noted in urban politics literature (Frank 
2004a, 2005a, Judd and Swanstrom 2005, Bartels 2006b). The merits of this perspective will be discussed later. 
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urbanity, due to Chicago’s undeniable influence.  In Missouri, for instance, most urban 
candidates understand that there is little advantage to claiming St. Louis or Kansas City 
because rural interests rule, or are at least prominent within the electoral arena.  This is 
based out of a statewide culture that perceives rurality to be more honest and more 
representative of the population.  Urbanity is associated with corruption and deceit.  One 
would think, given any knowledge of Illinois history with political corruption, namely in 
Chicago, that the state would repel any statewide electoral candidate from the 
metropolitan region.  On the contrary, though, the state seems to more often than not rely 
upon this region for electoral candidates.  Chicago candidates typically overshadow any 
efforts of those outstate.  
With that said, when one looks at the electoral outcomes for governor races since 
1948 to the present, there is some indication that geography needs to be considered in 
statewide candidate success.  The last successful urban gubernatorial candidate from 
Missouri was Joseph Teasdale from Jackson County (Kansas City) in 1976.  The last 
successful urban gubernatorial candidate from Illinois was its current governor Bruce 
Rauner, raised in a suburb of Chicago.  This is a state that could, arguably, be called Chicago 
and outlying regions.  What distinguishes statewide electoral success from state to state?  I 
argue it is more than simply party identification or resources; electoral success is also a 
byproduct of geography.  In Missouri, it is a disadvantage to be an urban candidate, while in 
Illinois it is nearly a necessity to be classified as such. 
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The Central Question 
 The central question of this dissertation is:  What role does geography play in 
candidate emergence and success on the statewide level?  Can, and do, some candidates 
use geography (inevitably tied to cultural perceptions) to gain some sort of electoral 
advantage?  Conventional wisdom holds that geography does matter in candidate 
emergence and success.  For example, political parties will consider hometown origin 
before courting candidates to run for office and such candidates do make conscious 
decisions about where to tell voters they are from to garner a personal connection and 
drive up vote totals.  In short, it seems logical that geography matters.  Beyond the 
anecdotal, however, there has been little research in this area.  Thus, I will examine the 
actual relationship between geography and electoral actions and outcomes. 
Expectations: Theoretical Underpinnings 
Defining political geography3 is a very complex question that is considered from a 
multitude of vantages and fields, as seen in geography’s intersection in fields from 
economics to engineering.  For my purposes, though, I will focus upon the aspects of 
geography that could affect candidate emergence and success on the state-level, those 
driving my theory: geographic placed-based voting—later referred to as concentrated 
versus dispersed—and rural versus urban constructs.  
                                                          
3
 What is political geography?  From a strictly definitional perspective, it is “…having a particular political or 
cultural (for instance, religious) history… central or peripheral, large or small in social space; or on a continuum 
of social density, of rurality and urbanity, or of communication, from centrality to isolation” (Therborn 2006: 
512).  Clear as mud, right?  Political geography is moves beyond just the general term geography by including 
cultural and electoral considerations into the discussion.  It is more than topography; it is an examination of 
politics and place. 
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  Geographic place-based voting is a very simple theory where electoral decision-
making is purely a matter of distance/location: the closer one lives to a candidate, the more 
likely he or she will be to support that person.  In this line of thinking, a candidate would 
simply want to come from the most populous area, the place with the most votes, because 
that location would garner the most votes.  I argue that there is more than simple distance 
calculations related to electoral success because it is crucial to consider the geographic 
makeup of the state, the urban concentration or dispersion, because this consideration can 
impact the electoral viability of the candidate.  Do not forget the example of Missouri, as 
previously discussed, where urban identity is not necessarily used for electoral advantage, 
but, rather, seems to be a clear disadvantage.  In Missouri, and arguably states like it, urban 
candidates cannot be trusted and therefore are not elected.  Thus, the relationship 
between geography and candidate success moves beyond simple place-based voting 
models.  Context must be considered. 
The next geographical considerations relate to the conception that there are cultural 
and political differences in rural and urban areas.  Generally speaking, notions surrounding 
the concepts of “rurality” and “urbanism” are quite confusing, and even at times 
contradictory.  Rural areas are perceived to be highly conservative and traditional, 
especially in relation to moral values, while, at the same time, backwards and close-minded.  
Urban areas, on the other hand, are noted as rarely concerned with traditional values and 
preoccupied with progressive trends.  These perceptions, whether based in reality or not, 
drive the urban-rural divide that is often alluded to in the American political landscape.  
Thus, the relative influence of these two cultures on each other is unclear.  I argue that 
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candidates consider the conservative nature of rural areas, and try to use it to their 
advantage if a significant portion of the state’s population is classified as rural or if the 
urban regions of the state are not geographically concentrated.  The lack of urban 
concentration can inhibit urban collaboration, essentially giving the rural agenda more 
political power.  I argue that these urban-rural considerations are important to the electoral 
strategy of statewide candidates and can, therefore, impact electoral outcomes. 
Geographic Factors in Candidate Success:  Why Geography Matters 
 The current literature on candidate emergence and success gives little attention to 
the notion that geography matters.  If any attention is given regarding geography, it is 
related to the theory of localism.  Localism, also known as “friends and neighbors,” is the 
theory that a candidate will have higher electoral support in his or her home county (or 
respective geographic unit) when certain conditions are met: it is a one party system (no 
competition between two parties) and there are no factions.  Basically, it is the idea of 
hometown advantage.  V.O. Key was the first to elaborate on this theory in his work, 
Southern Politics, where he found that proximity, or distance, does impact support levels, as 
noted in his findings related to Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, South Carolina, Georgia and 
Mississippi; he argues, “…localism justifies a diagnosis of low voter-interest in public issues 
and a susceptibility to control by the irrelevant appeal to support the home-town boy” 
(2006 [Sixth Printing]: 37).  In other words, people will support those who they feel like they 
are most closely tied to, a local candidate.  Again, this is found under the presumed 
conditions. 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to move beyond the traditional understanding of 
localism, a theory directly tied to one’s origin, where support decays as distance increases, 
to argue that candidates will use geography in a different way:  A candidate will use, or, 
more accurately, sell the characteristics of his or her hometown, his or her geographic 
identity, to citizens of the rest of the state.  If the theory of localism explains candidate 
behavior, then all candidates would advertise themselves as urban; they would be products 
of the most populated areas since that would logically produce the most local support.  
Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe argue that more densely populated areas produce a larger share of 
electoral candidates.  They measure home county not as that of birth or childhood 
residence, but as the county a candidate lived most of his or her adult life (2011).  They find 
that most successful candidates come from urban counties.   
These findings are not surprising given their classification of the term hometown.  A 
more insightful examination would use the county that a candidate spent most of his or her 
childhood and likely the county that he or she portrays as his or her hometown; again, 
consider Senator Claire McCaskill.  Her online biography cites that McCaskill’s “first home 
was Houston, Missouri, where her father William worked at the McCaskill feed mill.  Later, 
the family moved to Lebanon, hometown of Claire's mother, Betty Anne, where her 
mother's family ran the corner drugstore in town,” implying one of these small towns, 
Houston or Lebanon, is her hometown, not St. Louis, her current residence (McCaskill 
2009).  It seems that the findings would not be supportive of the urban thesis if the 
hometown classification were reformulated to correctly capture a candidate’s true 
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hometown or, at the least, the hometown the candidate would like voters to perceive since 
voter perception is the crux of this and related studies.  
The Typology 
To highlight my point regarding the impact that I believe geography has on 
statewide candidate success, I will compare four states that fit within my four-category 
typology.  I will expand this typology to US states over time in the forthcoming analysis, as is 
noted in Table 1.1.4  My theory regarding the impact of geography has two dimensions: 1) 
whether the state is culturally rural or urban, and 2) the concentration, or dispersion, of 
metropolitan areas within each respective state.5   
Urban versus Rural State Classifications 
Urban and rural statewide classifications are largely dependent upon the overall 
culture of the state.  To briefly summarize what will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 
3 and 4, states were categorized urban or rural based upon an index that was created to 
capture the rurality of a particular state.  The variables included in this index trying to 
capture the measure of rurality were restrictions on abortions, conservatism score for the 
state’s House delegation, percentage mass public conservative, percentage of households 
with guns, public support for gay rights issues, vote for Bush in 2000, percentage of 
frequent churchgoers, percentage living in metropolitan area, population per square mile, 
and per capita energy consumed, BTU.  These variables were chosen as they were highly 
correlated and were a proxy for the concept of ruralism.  In Chapter 4, the methods for 
                                                          
4
 Please consider Chapter 4 for further details on the state typology.   
5
 The classification of metropolitan will be a relative measure.  For instance, an “urban” region in Montana will 
not have the same population as an “urban” region in New York.  Perceptions of such regions will thus vary 
from state to state and, so too, must the classifications. 
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classification are discussed in more detail; however, please consider the Rural-Urban index 
correlations in Table 1.2.   Table 1.3 shows the State-by-State categorizations. 
Concentrated versus Dispersed State Classifications 
Concentration and dispersion measures are essentially the measure as to whether or 
not the urban, or metropolitan, regions of the state are found within proximity of one 
another, concentrated, or whether they are scattered across the state, dispersed.  Urban 
classified counties are those counties within the state that had at least five percent of the 
state’s population. Table 1.4 highlights the urban classified counties for each state.  
Concentrated states were those that had a visual clustering of a majority of the urban 
classified counties in one region, as opposed to a dispersed classified stated where the 
urban classified counties were spread throughout the state.  Figure 1.1 highlights 
concentrated and dispersed urban states, while Figure 1.2 shows concentrated and 
dispersed rural states.   There are four categories of states: urban-concentrated, urban-
dispersed, rural-concentrated, and rural-dispersed; again, reference Table 1.3, which 
outlines the categorization of each state and Table 1.4 indicates the urban classified 
counties in each state.  One will note that the urban states are on the coast, whereas the 
rural states are in middle America.  Further, most of the urban states are Democratic 
dominated and most rural states are Republican dominated.  No rural states are Democratic 
dominated.    
Highlighting the State Types 
To highlight the different categories of my typology, I consider the hometown 
locations, where they spent the majority of their childhood, for gubernatorial candidates 
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from 1948-2008 in Illinois, Washington, Oklahoma, and Missouri;6 this brief analysis 
provides a basic understanding of the categories, as well as a glimpse into the trends driving 
this dissertation.  First, reference Figure 1.3, the state of Illinois, which is classified as an 
urban concentrated state.  This figure shows the winner versus loser count comparison 
where there is a less consistent pattern of urban-based candidates, with a back and forth 
over time between urban and rural geographic identity for successful candidates; clearly, 
though, most of the state’s gubernatorial candidates come from the Chicago metropolitan 
region (upper right hand corner of the maps).  Thus, there seems to be some advantage to 
being from the urban metropolitan area of Illinois.  Even in terms of candidate emergence, 
though, there are just generally more candidates coming out of the Chicago area.  It seems 
to be the wellspring of statewide political candidates for the state. 
Secondly, consider the state of Washington noted in Figure 1.4, an urban dispersed 
state, we see that most of the gubernatorial candidates, winning and losing, come from the 
western portion of the state.  This seems to indicate that, in states where there is a county 
with a large proportion of the population, like, in this case, King 29% and Pierce 12%, even if 
there are other urban classified counties not in proximity to this larger urban region, voters 
do not feel torn between counties.  This could be indicative of my urban county threshold 
being too low or may say something about urban states in general.  There were no non-
native winning candidates.  It is important to note that, like Illinois, most of winning and 
losing candidates emerge out of urban classified counties. 
                                                          
6
 I chose these states because they are pointed examples of my proposed schema, as highlighted in the 
research design section.  Again, the full analysis will examine all fifty states over time, as detailed in the 
research design section.  This is a cross-section of things to come. 
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Next, consider Figure 1.5, which highlights the rural concentrated classified state of 
Oklahoma.  In Oklahoma, a couple of things are evident upon first glance:  most of the 
successful candidates come from either the Oklahoma City or Tulsa area, or a county in the 
metropolitan area.  Many of the losers were from outstate Oklahoma (six) or were 
nonnative (five).  It seems, from this example, that in concentrated rural states, there is a 
pattern of support for the metropolitan region.  Is there something about urban 
concentration that generates trust in the citizenry?  Is there a higher tendency to be trustful 
if there is not geographic separation of metropolitan areas?  If so, is this simply because 
geographic separation causes a competition of sorts, as may be noted in the example of 
Missouri? 
Finally, the rural dispersed classified state of Missouri, as noted in Figure 1.6, shows 
that there have been many losers from the St. Louis and region, but barely any winners 
from metropolitan areas.   It should be noted that there has not been a governor from an 
urban county in Missouri since Joseph P. Teasdale, a Kansas City native, who was elected in 
1976, by defeating Kit Bond.  Kit Bond, a Mexico, MO native, subsequently defeated 
Teasdale in 1980.  While Teasdale outspent Bond, $2.7 million to Bond’s $1.7 million, 
Teasdale was portrayed “as a captive of the ‘web of privilege’…[and] out of touch with the 
common man” ("Kit Bond Turns Table on Teasdale"  1980).  This is a fine illustration of the 
possible impact that geography may be having on candidate success.  Did the election of 
rurally based governors for the past thirty years in Missouri occur simply by chance?  Or is 
something else driving this type of relationship?  Does the tension between the two urban 
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regions of Missouri, Kansas City on one side of the state and St. Louis on the other, cause 
voters to choose outstate candidates? 
The purpose of this study is to fill in the gap of what role geography plays in 
statewide elections, beyond that of localism, based upon the notion that different 
geographic contexts beget different electoral outcomes.  Candidates can sell geographic 
origin as a positive character trait, to create a connection with the voter, and to, ultimately, 
increase electoral advantage.  It is important to better understand whether different 
geographical contexts (i.e. urban concentrated versus urban dispersed) affect how 
successful candidates are in the electoral arena.  Do political parties consider geography in 
their selection process?  Is it possible that geography can give one candidate a significant 
upper hand over another?  These are important questions to explore. 
Reformulating Rural and Urban 
 Clearly, as the proceeding sections highlight, there is confusion surrounding the 
nature of what is or is not classified as rural, urban, or something else.  The mystification of 
these concepts is reminiscent of the discussions surrounding obscenity; the notion of, “I 
know it when I see it” comes to mind (Stewart 1964).  Is it as simple as “I know rurality 
when I see it?”  Can such concepts be really operationalized?  These are all important 
considerations for my research goals; basically, I need to consider how I will capture these 
elusive concepts.  Can we move beyond the “I know it when I see it conceptions?”  I believe 
so. 
 For me, rurality is not just proximity from an urban area, as calculated with some 
proxy like commuting time or urban influence, but is rather a general sentiment, a cultural 
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idea (Walsh 2012).  For some rurality is tinged with negative conceptions, rurality is marked 
by a communities that uphold backward stereotypes and that are living fifteen years behind 
the times.  They are areas lacking culture and sophistication.  For others, rurality is a 
romanticized way of life.  It is a picture of neighborly kinship, of small town festivals and a 
slower, more appreciated, pace of life.  In these places, one can feel safe and people can be 
trusted.  So, where, then, lies the truth?   
From my vantage, rurality is defined by the general attitudes of the people in a 
general area.  While it may be true these places are generally far from urban areas, it is not 
always the case (Ching and Creed 1997).  Thus, the term is relative and will vary from state 
to state.  You may have some communities that are only twenty minutes away from a 
state’s largest city that see themselves as rural in nature.  Conversely, you may have a town 
that is an hour from a populated area that is particularly tied to the identification of 
urbanity.  Further, it is important to note that perceptions of rurality may vary from state to 
state in terms of what the general belief that rural is; so, for example, identified rural 
citizens in Arkansas may be completely different from identified rural citizens in California.  
Does this then make one group more or less rural?  I believe not.   
Now, back to how this confusion relates to my study.  I theorize that general 
attitudes about rurality affect electoral outcomes based upon the population composition 
of the state.  For example, in a state where the general sentiment about rurality is generally 
positive, the romanticized version, then the citizenry will be less likely to support an urban 
classified candidate (one that was raised in a city, an urban hometown), especially if the 
urban regions of the state are dispersed.  If, though, the state is urban concentrated, even if 
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it is a rural classified state, then it is more likely that urban, or nonnative, candidates will be 
elected.   
In terms of the relative nature of rurality, it is important to consider the overall 
nature of the state.  Is the state classified as rural or urban overall?  And, further, why does 
this matter?  The typology of rural versus urban states is important to this discussion 
because it gives acknowledgement to the relative nature of rurality.  In a rural classified 
state, the overall sentiment towards rurality, and the positive attributes of such, will 
outweigh urban sentiments.  Thus, I expect to find more rural-based candidate support 
overall in these states, relative to urban classified states, due to a lower threshold of urban 
influence.  The opposite is true for urban concentrated states.  Urban dispersed states, 
though, are a bit more difficult to classify since the ability of candidates to pit urban areas 
against each other will be advantageous in getting rural support overall.   
As with all academic endeavors, one always returns to the questions, “Who cares?” 
or “Why does this matter?”  By delving into a greater understanding of the impact that state 
geographic variances may have on statewide elections, not only am I adding to the 
literature, which, to this point, hardly addresses the impact such may have, but also, from a 
practical vantage, gives candidates a better understanding of how they should market 
themselves to voters.  This investigation will add to political behavior and geography 
literature, as well as add insight to the extensive Red versus Blue state debates that 
continue.  Finally, since history has shown us that most presidential candidates were 
previously governors or senators, understanding if there are geographic influences uncovers 
new lessons about the United States’ highest office. 
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Dissertation Plan 
  I hope to follow a logical path in my quest to better understand how exactly 
geography impacts candidate success.  Chapter 2 will be a discussion on non-geographical 
indicators of candidate success; basically, the line of reasoning used by most scholars in 
explaining why and how candidates win.  Next, Chapter 3 will focus on rural and urban 
definitions, as well as the impact that geography has on candidate success, including a 
discussion surrounding the measurement of rural culture.  It would be misguided of me to 
present this dissertation without a close examination of the different ways scholars, 
journalists and pundits have tried to capture the illusive concepts of “rural” and “urban.”  I 
argue that, while illusive, we can attempt to capture the differences in these communities 
through a more detailed variable.   
 The discussion of my methods will be found in Chapter 4 where I lay out, not only 
the design of my study, but also the way I plan to operationalize my key variables and 
measure outcomes.  In this discussion, I will explain why my method is an attempt at 
uncovering relationships that are often overlooked, or under examined, in related pieces of 
literature. 
 Chapter 5 is where the real substance of this discussion will be found, the statistical 
analysis.  I will place my typology into the context of the Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe piece 
(2011).  Does my typology impact the findings regarding geographical influences on 
candidate emergence?  My results indicate that statewide geography does influence 
candidate emergence.  Candidate emergence from rural is less likely in urban classified 
states than for rural and dispersed states for senatorial nominees.  In gubernatorial races, in 
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urban classified states, candidates simply do not come from rural counties.  There is no 
significance in the other state types.  The nuances are discussed further in Chapter 5. 
 Chapter 6 will take Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s basic formulation and consider it 
within the context my data on a candidate’s hometown (2011).  Simply put, does 
considering the candidate’s hometown as where the candidate was born and raised instead 
of where he or she lived for the majority of their adult live affect the results on related to 
candidate emergence?  I also explore the likelihood of winning based upon my theory of 
state typology. 
 My final chapter, Chapter 7, will be a discussion of the major findings uncovered in 
my analysis and how this relates and adds to the existing candidate emergence and success 
literature.  At this point, suggestions for subsequent research plans will also be outlined.   
 Now, onto a look into the depths of the candidate success literature:   What is the 
general consensus as to why some are elected, while others are not?  Do non-geographic 
variables fully capture why one wins?  I do not agree, but readers can judge for themselves 
following the discussion of non-geographic indicators related to candidate success. 
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CHAPTER 2 
NON-GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
 What distinguishes a candidate from everyone else?  What factors enable foster 
candidate emergence?  Moreover, what distinguishes a successful versus an unsuccessful 
candidate?  Is there something fundamentally different from these respective groups?  
Much of the literature in the discipline focuses upon why voters vote the way that they do, 
with less emphasis on what makes a candidate successful.  I argue that these are two 
distinct discussions.  While the two considerations are indisputably intertwined, the factors 
impacting candidate success, I believe, are much more nuanced.  They are less reliant upon 
individualistic considerations, and more conscious of aggregated preferences. 
Before I can consider the impact of geography on candidate success, I need to 
outline what is already known about candidates.  Why do they emerge?  What makes them 
successful?  Essentially, I am embarking on a discussion focused on the non-geographic 
factors impacting candidate behavior and, ultimately, electoral outcomes.  Central to the 
discussion of this dissertation is what variables impact candidate emergence and success.  
Accordingly, I will consider the non-geographic model, in terms of both candidate 
emergence and candidate success, before moving onto a more exhaustive consideration of 
the impact geography may have and the electoral process.   In terms of candidate 
emergence, I consider the role of incumbency, institutional factors, party influence, 
demographic, and idiosyncratic factors on potential candidates.  Relative to candidate 
success, I consider incumbency, economic conditions, partisanship levels, presidential 
approval (as it relates to the candidate’s party), and other idiosyncratic factors, like 
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candidate personality.  It is the hope that this discussion will give a strong foundation for 
the discussion focused upon geographic factors impacting candidate success that will follow 
in Chapter 3. 
Candidate Emergence 
 To begin, what distinguishes a candidate from everyone else?  Or, rather, what 
motivates one to run for public office?  Incumbency, institutional factors, party influence, 
demographic, and ambition factors are all influences on whoever decides to enter the 
electoral arena.   
Incumbency 
The literature on candidate emergence is largely focused on the impact of 
incumbency.  The rational model holds that candidates calculate the utility of running for 
office by considering the probability of winning, the benefits of the office, and the cost of 
running.  If an incumbent is deemed ‘weak,’ then stronger challengers will be more likely to 
emerge.  Studies have shown that incumbents have about an 8-percentage point advantage 
for high-level statewide and federal offices (Erikson 1971, Mayhew 1974b, Gelman and King 
1990, Krashinsky and Milne 1993, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002, Hirano and Snyder 2009).  
This advantage is no secret; thus, many qualified candidates are deterred from even 
entering the race (Kazee 1983, Banks and Kiewiet 1989, Cox and Katz 1996, Gordon, et al. 
2007).  Essentially, it is not rational for one to enter a race where the likelihood of winning is 
so low, so, often, the parties will push a ‘losing’ candidate into a race that they know he or 
she cannot win (Krasno and Green 1988, Fowler and McClure 1989, Canon 1993).  The 
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economic advantages of incumbency, such as is noted by large war chests, are also a 
deterrent to high quality challengers entry to the electoral race (Box-Steffensmeier 1996). 
Hollibaugh, Rothenberg and Rulison indicate that incumbency can even overcome a 
fundamental difference in opinion with the voters; simply put, incumbency may overcome 
accountability (2013).  Groseclose provides an excellent overview of the valance factors, 
including incumbency, that advantage candidates (2001).  Thus, incumbency is quite a 
powerful indicator indeed, causing candidates to think twice before making the decision to 
run. 
Institutional Factors 
 From an institutional perspective, scholars have considered how the type of 
electoral system may affect who decides to run.  Candidates are more likely to run in states 
where there is a runoff system (Lazarus 2007).  Sanbonmatsu (2006) argues that seat 
competition, increased legislative professionalism, and less active state and local party 
systems should increase recruitment levels by legislative party leadership.  She finds that 
competition is a strong indicator of legislative party recruitment, but is less conclusive about 
the interaction between legislative party and state and local party leadership.  Further, 
more professionalized states are more likely to have the institutional structures that 
encourage candidate recruitment.    
Candidates are also, logically, more likely to emerge when there is an open seat and 
if the incumbent is facing a political scandal (Prinz 1993, Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994, 
Welch and Hibbing 1997, Wrighton and Squire 1997, Gaddie and Bullock 2000).  
Institutional factors are the general framework from which candidates emerge.  What 
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cannot be uncovered are the many institutional factors throughout the citizenry that may 
fundamentally remove the idea that one could or should run for political office.  These 
institutional barriers are hard to capture and quantify, but do deserve a mention.  This is 
indirectly alluded to in studies discussions of the “politicized upbringing expectation,” or 
rather how family may be the medium for transference of political efficacy (Fox and Lawless 
2005). 
Party Influence  
Studies related to how political parties recruit potential candidates are somewhat 
limited.  What has been shown, though, is that partisan attachments help to bring citizens 
into the political arena (Verba and Nie 1972).  Political parties also work to recruit 
candidates and people who are approached by parties are more likely to run (Lawless and 
Fox 2010).  Party influence is also noted in the consideration candidates make in the 
likelihood of making it through the primary stages of the election (Stone and Maisel 2003).  
Stone and Maisel also find that “…districts that are balanced in their partisan makeup may 
experience competitive elections because potential candidates see their prospects as 
relatively good, and are therefore more likely to run” (Stone and Maisel 2003: 975).   
Demographic Factors 
 The resource model for deciding to run is normally the foundation for discussions 
related to the demographic factors to emerging as a candidate.  Simply put, a primary 
consideration is does the individual have the time, money and civic skills to throw his or her 
hat into the race (Verba, et al. 1995).  There are also demographic factors influencing the 
likelihood of a candidate to emerge.  As was previously mentioned, family ties and name 
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recognition increase the likelihood for a candidate to emerge (Flanigan and Zingale 2002, 
Fox and Lawless 2005).  You do not have to look much beyond the familial ties of our 
highest office to see the impact that family can have on elections.  Political socialization also 
most certainly impacts whether or not individuals run for office (Almond and Verba 1963, 
Beck and Jennings 1982, Verba, et al. 1995), as does trust (Hetherington 2005).  
Hetherington states, “Trust can act as a simple decision rule for supporting or rejecting 
government activity” (2005: 51).  Logically, once could assert this carries to the decision to 
enter the public arena.  Presumably, one will not run for office if they do not feel that 
gaining such a position could produce change.  
 The literature has shown that many traditionally excluded groups, such as minorities 
and women, are less likely to run for office; although, efficacy in these groups does rise 
when living in an environment where politicians are “like them” (i.e. female, African 
American, etc.) (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, Burrell 1996, Burns, et al. 2001, Moncrief, et al. 
2001, Lawless 2004, Fox and Lawless 2005, Lawless and Fox 2010).  
 Furthermore, Gaddie (2004) finds that younger candidates have more energy to 
enter the political arena and Fox and Lawless (2005) find that increased income levels 
correlated with increased interest in running for office.  
Ambition 
 Maestas, Fulton, Maisel, and Stone (2006) show the impact that ambition has on the 
likelihood to run for office.  They describe political ambition as a two-stage process.  First, 
the candidate has the ambition to run and, then, he or she decides to run.  They cite 
Schlesinger (1966), Black’s (1972), and Jacobson and Kernell (1983) pieces which contend 
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candidates emerge when they think it is actually possible to win and add to this theory by 
arguing, “…opportunity alone is insufficient to create ambition.  Instead ambition for higher 
office stems from a combination of factors, many of which are personal assessments about 
the costs and benefits of moving.  These costs and benefits affect ambition, rather than the 
immediate decision to enter a particular race.”  They argue it is “…not about whether to 
run; it is a choice about when to run” (2006: 197 [emphasis in original]).  Interestingly, their 
findings regarding ambition are tied back to institutional influences particularly that 
candidates are more likely to run for higher office when originating from professional 
legislatures, as professional legislatures have more developed campaign resources and 
campaign networks.   
 Fox and Lawless add to the discussion surrounding political ambition by finding that 
a variety of circumstances impact a person’s decision to run for office, including nascent 
ambition and expressive ambition factors, and that these circumstances change over time 
(2005, 2011).  They find that ambition goes beyond Lasswell’s original notion of the 
“political type,” a person who is a “…power seeker…devoting themselves to the capture and 
use of government” (1948: 20) by considering the one’s “…nascent ambition—or the 
inclination to consider a candidacy” (Fox and Lawless 2005: 644).  Aside from factors serving 
as proxies for individual feelings, like political efficacy, they find that this nascent ambition, 
including childhood socialization, and adult recruitment are important factors in a person’s 
political ambition.  Interestingly, they found that having a party member “suggest” that he 
should run increased the likelihood of considering running by 40% (Fox and Lawless 2005: 
651). 
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Candidate Success 
The non-geographic model of candidate success includes the following factors on 
the state level:  incumbency, economic conditions, partisanship levels, presidential approval 
(as it relates to the candidate’s party), and other idiosyncratic factors, like candidate 
personality (Crew, et al. 2002).  Moving on from the question of why people choose to run, I 
will now examine the factors impacting why people win.  These are two very important 
distinctions and, while some influences are congruent from emergence to success, there are 
some additional considerations for candidate success. 
Incumbency 
As Jacobson (2004) notes, since the 1960s, the candidate-centered electoral arena 
has produced an environment where it is a seemingly insurmountable feat to unseat an 
incumbent.  Incumbents have many advantages including name recognition, party support 
and official resources, such as staff, travel funds, access and support by political action 
committees and increased communication resources via franking privileges and connections 
to media sources (Erikson 1971, Cover 1977, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002, Hirano and 
Snyder 2009).  Further, already holding office allows “members to take the ‘right’ positions, 
making pleasing statements, and bring[ing] home the bacon while avoiding responsibility 
for the collective performance of Congress” Jacobson 2004: 32.  Mayhew (1974a) describes 
how, at least for congressional seats, the decentralized nature of the institution allows 
members to specialize in areas that are most suited to their constituents’ needs.  
Undoubtedly, these committee assignments, and related benefits, are conveyed to voters 
during reelection campaigns further incentivizing voting for him or her (Fiorina 1989).  
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Further, incumbents have the advantage where there is a decline in partisanship; as Fenno 
highlights, “Members of Congress run for Congress by running against Congress” (1978: 168 
[emphasis in the original].  Voters are more likely to trust in a particular candidate than in 
the institution itself (Ferejohn 1977, Fiorina 1977).  Further, the fact that in most states the 
incumbent may play a role in the process of redistricting allows him or her to, essentially, 
hand pick the voters they desire making the seat at hand less competitive (Grofman and 
Brunell 2010).7 
Jacobson’s most recent article chips away at the strength of incumbency by showing 
that incumbency advantage has decreased as congress has become more polarized (2015).  
Essentially, he finds that there has been a rise in straight-ticket voting, which ultimately is 
harmful to incumbents of the rival party.   
Economic Conditions  
Many scholars have considered if, and how, voter use appraisals of current 
conditions, namely the economy, on vote choice (Downs 1957, Key 1966, Kramer 1971, 
Fiorina 1981, Erickson, et al. 2002, Vavreck 2008).  In relation to economic conditions, 
Atkeson and Partin (1995) find that voters differentiate “functional responsibility” for 
senators and governors; essentially, they hold that senatorial voting is based upon 
presidential approval, while gubernatorial voting is in response to state economic 
conditions.  They find that neither race is contingent upon national economic trends, or 
individual economic circumstances. 
                                                          
7
 There is some debate as to whether redistricting may, in fact, hurt incumbents.  For further discussion, see 
Desposato and Petrocik (2003), which provides a very good background discussion and analysis on incumbent 
advantage varying based upon context.  
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Partisanship Levels 
Carsey and Wright respond to Atkeson and Partin’s study finding support for their 
hypotheses that both gubernatorial and senatorial voting is responsive to presidential 
approval ratings (1998a).  King (2001) also finds support for the relationship between 
presidential approval and gubernatorial support, as well as prior gubernatorial support on 
future open races.  Further, they find that senate elections are related to evaluations of 
national economic trends.  They concur with Atkeson and Partin in their finding that voting 
for governor is reliant upon state economic conditions.8   
Moreover, scholars using a multidimensional scaling method have shown that the 
effect of partisanship has changed over time.  This approach essentially argues that 
candidates are plotted on an axis, where similar candidates are close together and 
dissimilar candidates are further apart (Rabinowitz 1975, Weisberg 1980, Jacoby 1986, 
1988, McCarty, et al. 2006, Jacoby 2010).  As Jacoby summarizes, “From the 1960s on 
through the first presidential elections of the twenty-first century, one of the dimensions 
has always corresponded closely to a general liberal-conservative continuum” (2010: 270).  
The second dimension, though, has shifted from “specific issues” to “mass perceptions of 
candidate credibility or electability” (Jacoby 2010: 270).  Or, put more aptly, whether to 
electorate likes and/or trusts the candidate enough to vote for him or her.   
In a more simplistic view, though, parties enable voters to attach labels, those that 
can help relate to or judge candidates.  Some scholars contend that voters use values and 
                                                          
8
 The contrary conclusions found in the studies of Atkeson and Partin (1998) and Carsey and Wright (1998a) 
are based upon differences in model specification, as outlined by the rejoinder provided by Carsey and Wright 
(1998b). 
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preferences, which are most like their own to choose their “best” candidate (Abramowitz 
1988, Green, et al. 2002, Abramowitz and Saunders 2006).  Others argue that voters will 
punish or reward candidates or parties by considering past performance and using this as a 
predictor for future success or failure (Downs 1957, Key 1966, Fiorina 1981).  This view that 
values and/or characteristics are associated with candidates is in the same vein as much of 
the political polarization literature, which is tied to the geographic influences on candidate 
success.  This perspective will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Presidential Approval 
Lowry, Alt, and Ferree (1998) find that, independent of incumbency, coattails, term 
limits and macroeconomic conditions, fiscal accountability is stronger under unified party 
control.  This is somewhat contingent upon which party is in power.  For Republican 
controlled states, gubernatorial candidates lose votes if there were unanticipated increases 
in the state budget, while this effect is the opposite for Democratically controlled states.  
Fundamentally, they believe that this is due to the differing expectations for Democrats, 
bigger spenders, versus Republicans, the party of small government.  So, when voters are 
able to identify who is to blame—which is easier in unified government—they will punish or 
reward respectively.   
Idiosyncratic Factors 
Studies deriving from The American Voter, consider the impact that evaluations, like 
candidate background and personality, have on voter identification with and, as a 
consequence, support for candidates (Campbell, et al. 1960, Bartels 2002, Jacoby 2010, 
Fridkin and Kenney 2011, Kam and Zechmeister 2013).  While these studies are interesting, 
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it is quite difficult to untangle the linkage between whether a candidate won because of his 
or her specific personality trait versus whether they won because of partisan loyalties. 
The Missing Piece 
 While there is a well-developed and continuing discussion regarding why candidates 
emerge and why candidates win, I believe there is still something missing from the overall 
framework.  The majority of studies relative to political behavior and electoral success treat 
all elections the same or are working from the assumption that voters from different places 
will vote the same based solely upon their political affiliations and demographic factors.  
Geography is missing.  Place matters and impacts voter preferences.  Elections vary from 
state to state and outcomes cannot be evaluated solely upon these individualist factors 
without a consideration of where these voters come from.  In the next chapter, we will 
explore the geographic factors related to candidate success in order to get a broader 
understanding of voter behavior. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
 The substantial value to be gained from this dissertation is the discussion and 
exploration of the impact that geographic factors may have on candidate emergence and 
success.  It is a rare day—even more so on election years—when one does not hear news 
commentators discussing the geographic divide in the United States.  There is a perceived 
cultural difference between rural and urban areas, as noted in the red versus blue state 
discussions that are prominent in media circles.  This dichotomy will be discussed further 
shortly. 
 Chapter 2 outlined the non-geographic factors impacting candidate emergence and 
success, but there is more to the story of why candidates win.  It cannot be coincidental that 
statewide candidates often stand in front of barns, instead of high rises, while in campaign 
ads.  Thus, this chapter will discuss the current perspectives on the impact of geography 
from the theory to a more concrete discussion of effects.   
Theoretical Perspectives 
Defining political geography 
 While defining political geography, on its face, may seem simple, there is some 
ambiguity of what the term actually means and some questions by political geographers as 
to the discipline of political science’s place in this subfield (Kofman 2003, Mamadouh 2003, 
Toal 2003).  Beginning in the next section, I will discuss the various theories within the 
discipline, such as localism and the rural/urban divide, that are noted for their place based 
components, but readers should remember political geography lies within a larger 
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consideration of how geography impacts influence actors.  Or, rather, that “…contemporary 
politics is best understood by identifying and considering the historical layers of political 
geographies and how they interact to provide constraints and opportunities for actors” 
(Flint 2003: 619).  Through the consideration of geography’s possible impact on political 
behavior, we are gaining a broader understanding of the context within which voters and 
politicians act.9  Political geography is aptly defined by Agnew, Mitchell and Toal, in their 
text, A Companion to Political Geography,  
“…political geography is about how barriers between people and their political 
communities are put up and come down; how world orders based on different 
geographical organizing principles (such as empires, state systems, and ideological–
materialist relationships) arise and collapse; and how material processes and 
political movements are re-making how we inhabit and imagine the ‘world political 
map” (as cited in Toal 2003: 653).   
The world is not a vacuum, certainly not the political world that is tinted with interactive 
biases and cultural nuances.  Geographical context adds the piece missing from traditional 
political behavior theory.  In moving onto the discussion of theories within political science 
addressing the impacts of geography, we see there are some competing theories regarding 
the factors impacting candidate emergence and success. 
Geographic Place-based Voting   
This theory is very simple:  Candidates hope to originate from populous areas, the 
places with the most residents, because those locations garner the most votes.  It is a 
                                                          
9
 For more discussion on the implications related to macro analysis and spatial structuring, please consider 
Darmofal (2006). 
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simple distance calculation in that the closer one lives to a candidate, the more likely he or 
she will be to support that person.  Under this theory, the successful candidate would be 
the candidate from the most populated area because he or she would be the closest to the 
most people.  Funds and campaign activities are also concentrated in urban areas.  
Geographic placed-based voting is the basic building block for localism.  They are, though, 
not the same theory as localism, which builds upon the simple distance calculations and 
includes a consideration of context and a calculation of support based upon such factors.  
Simply put, localism is more complex than place-based voting because it includes other 
factors that may speed up or slow down distance decay. 
Localism 
Localism is the theory that a candidate will hold an electoral advantage in his or her 
hometown, or respective geographic unit.  This is his or her hometown advantage.  V.O. Key 
was the first to seriously examine this theory (Key 2006 [Sixth Printing]).  While the 
literature on localism is not extensive, the examination of the topic has revealed that there 
is still support for the general idea that candidates do better in their home county or state, 
ceteris paribus.  Again, as previously stated, this is different from geographic placed-based 
voting in which local ties are inconsequential, as it is a simple distance measure.  In terms of 
the literature related to sub-state examination, Black and Black were among the first to 
further test Key’s findings related to his theory of localism where they considered the 
geographical nature of Wallace’s support in Alabama.  This rudimentary approach simply 
provided a dummy variable for Wallace’s home region, seven contiguous counties; not 
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surprisingly, support for “friends and neighbors” was found in this model (Black and Black 
1973).   
Tatalovich built upon the findings of Key, extrapolating eight hypotheses related to 
the theory “friends and neighbors” (Tatalovich 1975:809).  Essentially, he contends that this 
phenomenon is more prevalent in low information elections where opponents are not from 
similar geographic regions, where there is no incumbent and in lower prestige offices.  His 
findings are mostly supportive of the hypotheses, with the exception of office prestige.  
While Tatalovich hypothesized that low information elections would provide more rationale 
for localism, his findings are supportive of the opposite, that the Senate race provided more 
evidence of “friends and neighbors” than that of the lesser known office of Lieutenant 
Governor (Tatalovich 1975: 813).   
 Rice and Macht build upon these findings by considering gubernatorial and senate 
races in 46 states from 1976 to 1982 to determine if a candidate’s home county vote totals, 
that county in which a candidate was born and raised,  supported the notion of localism 
(1987).10  They found that localism was prevalent in over two-thirds of the cases, with a 
hometown advantage, on average, of 3.7 percentage points, when controlling for 
incumbency, population and party support.  They find that this advantage will increase in 
smaller populated counties, the advantage will be greater for Democrats than Republicans, 
                                                          
10
 Hometown advantage, H,  was measured by considering “the deviation of a candidate’s actual percentage of 
the vote in his or her home county (Ca) from the candidate’s expected vote share in that county (Ce), adjusted 
for the candidate’s statewide percentage of the vote (Sa) relative to how well candidates of his or her party 
normally do in contests for that office (Se)”  This formulation is noted  in the following equation:  H= (Ca- Ce) –
(Sa-Se) (Rice and Macht 1987: 449). 
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and, finally, that incumbents will have less home county advantage since their name 
recognition will be more dispersed.   
 More recent examinations have also given credence to the “friends and neighbors” 
hypothesis.  Kjar and Laband consider precinct-level data for Alabama’s 1998 third district 
congressional election and find strong support for the localism hypothesis (2002).  Gimpel 
et al. (2007, Gimpel, et al. 2008) implemented a GIS examination of the localism hypothesis 
and measured support through a continuous measure.  While controlling for political 
competitiveness, partisanship, median income, percent born inside the state (local tenure), 
percent minority (black and Hispanic), population density and total population, they find 
that, for both Democratic and Republican candidates, support levels drop as they move 
away from their home counties.11  Importantly, though, the decline stops once a certain 
distance is reached and Republicans seem to do better when an area is geographically 
isolated, or further from their candidate’s home county (assuming there is not still 
Democratic advantage distance wise).   Gimpel et al. argue that the reason Republicans do 
better with these isolated locations is because the Republican party pulls candidates from a 
“greater diversity of locations” and, thus, causing their party loyalists to  be “less sensitive 
to place-of-origin” when voting (2007: 23).  In short, Democrats are more suited to the 
localism hypothesis. 
 Localism has also been considered at the state-level through the examination of the 
impact of home state advantage in presidential races; findings indicate that such an 
advantage does exist (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983, Garand 1988, Holbrook 1991, Mixon and 
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 They define home county as the county in which candidates has lived during their adulthood, mainly after 
college, not where they were born and raised.   
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Tyrone 2004).  This concept has also been extending beyond simple voting behavior, as 
noted in Thielemann’s piece which finds support for localism in the area of judicial 
campaign finance.  A consideration of a judicial race is particularly informative, as such 
elections are notably low-information in that the voters are generally uniformed regarding 
the nominee’s background, showing that “…home county means a great deal while 
neighboring counties do not”   (Thielemann 1993: 476).   
 Geography is more than just localism.  Geography’s impact is more than the simple 
evaluation of distance from a candidate’s origin.  Gimpel et al.  argue that, based upon the 
notion of localism, “Elections then become conflicts cleaved by territory, and are not 
expressions of political preference anchored in well-considered polity considerations” 
(2007: 2).  While the general crux of this statement may be true, “elections … become 
conflicts cleaved by territory,” localism may not accurately explain these considerations.  
The broader understanding of state geography—how rural/urban counties identify with 
other rural/urban counties—may have far-reaching implications to electoral emergence and 
success for potential candidates.  It matters how a candidate sells himself to the rest of the 
state.  If he primarily talks about his rural roots, even though he may live in an urban area, 
this action has meaning and indicates the he understands that such personal framing may 
garner an electoral advantage.   
Rural-Urban Cultural/Political Divide 
The juxtaposition between urban and rural values and lifestyles is often noted in 
political discussions.  There is a general belief that these places are different; there are 
distinct cultural and political attributes tied to each area.  For example, people see rural 
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places as “racially prejudiced, resistant to change, expressive of Christian zealotry, anti-
Semitic, morally intolerant, backward and culturally isolated” (Gimpel and Lay 2002: 2) .  On 
the other hand, there is a sense that such communities are “examples of civic vitality, to be 
held up as models for the rest of the country on how to produce a truly enlightened political 
community” (Gimpel and Lay 2002: 2).  Thus, the political culture of the region will vary 
based upon the degree of rurality.  Political culture defined is “the attitudes, values, and 
beliefs that people hold towards government” (Radin, et al. 1996: 86). 
Beyond the perceived cultural differences in the two areas, there is evidence that 
rural voters behave differently than their urban counterparts.  Recent literature has focused 
upon the political conservatism of rural America.  Thomas Frank and Larry Bartels debate 
the true motivation driving Republican rural voters; essentially, whether they vote based 
upon morals or economics.  While Frank felt rural voters voted against their personal 
economic interests, which would have been better suited to the Democratic Party, due to 
their backlash against the Democrat’s socially liberal ideals, Bartels felt they were true to 
their personal economic interests (Frank 2004b, 2005b, Bartels 2006a).12  Gimpel and 
Karnes entered this debate arguing that rural constituents are not voting based solely upon 
moral or economic issues, but rather relate with the Republican Party due their strong 
individualistic and entrepreneurial self-image.  This explanation depends upon local culture 
                                                          
12
 Thomas Frank, a journalist, argues in What’s the Matter with Kansas the typical theme running through rural 
cultural and political studies that rural American resents the influence and air of superiority of urban America, 
is alive and well.  Due to this, working class Americans have developed a “backlash spirit” and have, therefore, 
voted against their economic interests in favor of the Republican Party (2004b).  For Frank, these citizens, are 
often live in rural or small town America, cast their ballots based the premise that “values matter most,” even 
more than economic interest.  Larry M. Bartels disputes the premise put forth by Frank, using NES election 
data, which he argues show that working class voters do vote based upon economic interests, rather than 
social; For Bartels, Frank did not accurately measure such inclinations.  Bartels essentially disagrees with the 
entire notion that “conservatives won the heart of America.” 
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combined with an economic ideals perspective; it holds rural constituents are not 
dissatisfied with their economic situations enough to revolt from the party that supports 
their personal economic beliefs, like low taxes (2006).     
Somewhat tied to the discussion of political participation in rural America, especially 
within the context of the Frank and Bartels debate, there has been some focus on the 
urban-rural divide within America.  While past pieces were explicit in the differentiation 
being between urban and rural communities (Baker 1955, Hahn 1971), much of the current 
work reframes the issue into a red versus blue state culture war.13  In Culture War, Fiorina 
et al. essentially argue that the cultural divisions, based upon geographical and partisan 
lines, are overstated and most Americans “are ambivalent and uncertain, and consequently 
reluctant to make firm commitments to parties, politicians, or policies” (Fiorina, et al. 2006: 
ix).  From this perspective, the divisions that many journalists and politicians highlight are 
elite driven and are not as extreme as portrayed.  As they argue, “Although there are some 
real differences between Red and Blue America, there is no fundamental conflict.  There 
may be cracks, but there is no chasm” (Fiorina, et al. 2006: 56).   
Conversely, Abramowitz and Saunders dispute the claim put forth by Fiorina et al. 
arguing that there are “deep divisions between Democrats and Republicans, between red 
state voters and blue state voters, and between religious voters and secular voters…they 
are likely to increase in the future as a result of long-term trends affecting American 
                                                          
13
 There has been little scholarship that has traced the movement within the discipline from the use of the 
term rural-urban to more contemporary references, and even the shift from placing rural first in the rural-
urban conjunction to moving it behind urban, a more recent shift.  The language used affects the framing of 
the issue and is of consequence.  It should be noted, though, that many of the references made by these 
authors are not explicitly considering rural versus urban issues, but such is clearly implied in the substance of 
the material. 
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society” (2005: 1; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008).  Much of the dispute between these 
two pieces is based upon methodological differences; basically, they measured various 
concepts differently and Abramowitz and Sauders contend the measures used to capture 
ideological polarization by Fiorina et al. is not accurate because it does not accurately 
capture the voter’s concern regarding an issue or his or her knowledge on such.  
Abramowitz and Sauder’s 2008 piece disputes Fiorina et al.’s five claims of moderation, 
partisan polarization, geographical polarization, social cleavages, and voter engagement and 
participation.  The relevant piece for this discussion, geographic polarization, Abramowitz 
and Saunders show that, contrary to Fiorina et al’s claim that there has been little increase 
in geographical polarization, the evidence shows that red state and blue state voters are 
quite divergent on a number of measures, including both social and political attitudes.  They 
also highlight that fewer states over the hour decades have been classified as electoral 
battleground states (Fiorina and Abrams 2008: 348-9).   It is evident that the topic of the 
urban-rural divide is becoming both a timely and relevant issue.   
McKee (2007) discusses the marked shift of rural voters to the Republican Party in 
the 2000 and 2004 presidential contests.  While he is unclear on the measurement of rural 
versus urban, he does find that there are significant differences in voting patterns between 
the two subsets of voters.  Rural voters, not surprisingly, are more likely than urban voters 
to be “value voters” and, therefore, supportive of the Republican Party.  He finds that 
“candidates who share the characteristics and/or values of rural voters are much better 
positioned to gain their support” (McKee 2007: 22).  McKee finds that the “Clinton Fatigue,” 
the dissatisfaction with President Clinton, was much more pronounced in rural America 
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where these voters moved more significantly to the Republican Party; essentially, 
candidates do have the power to identify with rural citizens and draw support.  If they do 
not make these connections, the power of rurality may be neutralized, as was noted in 
Clinton’s tenure.   
Finally, Sauerzopf and Swanstrom (1999), using a narrower conception of urban 
defined as central cities, create an index of difference to compare the vote totals of cities 
versus the remainder of the state from 1920-1996 for twelve cities; in this index zero would 
indicate no difference where 200 would indicate complete difference where the Democratic 
vote is representative of the urban vote.  They find that there is a decline in the electoral 
influence of cities both due to suburbanization and because of the demobilization of the 
urban electorate.  They highlight the need for candidates, namely Democratic ones, to court 
suburban and rural voters to garner enough votes, although completely dismissing urban 
needs is not fruitful.  As a caveat, Sauerzopft and Swanstrom do note that the largest 
metropolitan areas do still hold incredible power in the respective states.   This article 
highlights how important it is for candidates to carefully consider their electoral strategies 
geographically since these contextual considerations can hold implications for success or 
failure. 
Rural-Urban-Suburban Definitions 
Much of the confusion surrounding the study of urban and rural politics lies in the 
uncertainty over its definition, or rather how does rurality fit into the spatial and 
geopolitical landscape of the United States?  First of all, one must consider the unit at which 
past scholars have studied these communities, since rurality has been considered on various 
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units of analysis, from municipal to regional. 14   Studies using the state level of analysis have 
used the proximity to urban areas, the percentage of the state which is urban or the 
amount of electoral votes held by the state as the delineation between rural and urban 
(Bryan 1981, Okinaka, et al. 2007, Stambough, et al. 2007).15  Regional studies have also 
considered rurality by looking specifically at the characteristics specific to a geographic area, 
like the South or the Midwest, and provide readers a broader understanding of the 
problems facing larger areas.  Regional studies also provide a glimpse into the increasingly 
codependent nature of local communities and states in a globalizing world (Key 1949, 
Fenton 1957, Lockard 1959, Havard 1972, Sofranko 1991, Falk, et al. 2003).   
 Of the studies using local governments as the unit of analysis, there have been both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses performed.  Numerous cases studies have examined 
specific rural communities’ social structure, political organization and cultural context.16  Of 
the quantitative studies, many—especially older studies—kept the definition of rural in line 
with the one provided by the Census, which historically defined a community as rural if it 
had no more than 2,500 residents.  Some scholars, though, were displeased with this 
                                                          
14
 The lack of regular discussion related rurality among political scientist holds considerable implications for 
the overall understanding of the American context for these communities inhabit a large geographically area 
and a hold significant population size; the latter considerations are debated since there is some confusion 
surrounding the definition of rurality.  For a more detailed understanding of the distinctions between rural-
urban, which can become quite cumbersome, one should consider the briefs provided by the Rural Policy 
Research Institute (Miller 2006). 
15
 Bryan defines rural states as those having more than 56 percent of the population not living in cities or 
suburban areas (1981: 47).  Okinaka et al. defines states as rural if they have less six electoral votes (Alaska, 
Arkansas, Idaho, Maine, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming), while Stambough et al. 
defines rural as a state that has fifty percent or less urbanized (Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming) (2007: 124, 
2007: 229). 
16
 While there are too many case studies to cite every  article or book written on rural communities, see 
(Davidson 1996, Tilton 1998, Duncan 1999, Vidich and Bensman 2000) for a glimpse of some this work.  Most 
of this work has been pursued by rural sociologist or rural historians.   
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classification, so the Census, in recent times, created a new classification of urbanized, 
which defines communities with over 50,000 people urban which allows scholars to make a 
new class of communities, small towns, those with between 2,500 and 50,000 residents 
(Aguiar 2007).  The entire situation becomes even more confusing and cumbersome due to 
the differences and overlapping nature of urban versus rural counties (using the traditional 
above/below 2,500 residents benchmark) and metropolitan versus nonmetropolitan areas 
(can including one, or more, counties).  Simply put, some counties are classified as rural and 
metropolitan and vice-versa.  John Fraser Hart found that “in the United States as a whole 
one of every seven residents of metropolitan areas in 1990 was classified as rural, and more 
than two of every five rural Americans lived in a metropolitan area” (1995: 74).  The Office 
of Management and Budget urged scholars and policy-makers to be aware of these 
distinctions during the development of studies (Miller 2006).  Clearly, the establishment of a 
rural unit of analysis is not easy to sort out, and there is some disagreement among scholars 
about which measures capture rurality best, but using any of the previously mentioned 
units provide substantial size and variance for study.   
There have been, though, questions raised as to the usefulness of the conception of 
rural in today’s highly mobile and integrated society; basically, the question becomes 
whether rural communities are distinct from urban and suburban areas because if they are 
not, then there is not need for specific study of rural communities.  Some question whether 
there are things still to learn from rural communities or if should they be viewed, as Pierce 
Lewis does, as extensions of urban areas forming “galactic cities?”  In other words, are rural 
communities simply satellite extensions of urban areas?   (Lewis 1995).  As noted with 
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Lewis’ commentary, the need to legitimize the study of rural politics is of concern.  One way 
to consider the usefulness of the study of rural communities is to do a more comprehensive 
review of the differences between the various measures of rurality and compare such to 
suburban and urban areas and how these concepts have changed over time.  If it is true, as 
Lewis suggests, that rural communities are no longer a distinct entity, then there should not 
be significant differences in economic, social and political characteristics.  Chapter three of 
my dissertation will explore the definitions of urban-suburban-rural, and whether it is 
important to consider each in evaluating electoral behavior. 
Trait Ownership 
Somewhat related to the notion of rural versus urban conceptions is the idea that 
voter decision-making processes are affected by candidate traits.  While much of the 
literature links issue ownership, as related through party identification (Petrocik 1996, 
Hayes 2005), it may be that one party takes on the representation of rural or urban causes.  
The theory of trait ownership finds that people “being only minimally attentive to politics 
[form impressions]…by using information shortcuts to make candidate assessments” (Hayes 
2005: 910).  If this is true, then, it could be extrapolated, that voters note certain individual 
traits based upon the personal representation a candidate gives, based out of his or her 
background.  Simply put, are there certain characteristics that voters will give a candidate 
based upon his or her hometown?  And, further, do these characterizations impact 
candidate success? 
Now that we have considered both the non-geographic and the geographic factors 
related to candidate emergence and success, this knowledge will serve as the foundation 
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for my theory of how political geography may impact electoral outcomes.  Chapter 4 will 
discuss the research design, while Chapter 5 will evaluate my typology relative to a related 
theory candidate emergence.  Chapter 6 allows us to consider how a new definition of 
hometown may impact the initial findings, as well as a consideration of the typology on 
candidate success.  Finally, we will consider what lessons can be gained, both in terms of 
the non-geographic and geographic factors, of candidate emergence and success. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this chapter, I will outline the overall research design and discuss my rationale for 
my measurement determinations.  I will also outline the types of data collected, the sources 
of such, as well as an overview of this data.  This will provide readers with an understanding 
of the basic research design prior to the quantitative analysis occurring in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Overall Design 
 As I briefly outlined in Chapter 1, my research design centers upon the classification 
of each state as urban, rural, concentrated or dispersed and then a combination of those 
categories.  Before moving onto a discussion of the models I consider, Table 1.1, which 
shows the basic framework for considering the impact of geography on candidate 
emergence and success (Table 1.3 outlines how each state fits within this typology).  For the 
candidate emergence considerations, I will replicate the study by Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe 
(as I will discuss more in Chapter 5) to consider if my framework (urban, rural, concentrated 
or dispersed) influences the likelihood of candidate emergence (2011).  For the candidate 
success models, I will expand upon their model and consider the likelihood of winning using 
the typical political behavior measures, such as incumbency and party support, within the 
framework of my state typology.  First, though, one should consider how I determined 
which states should be defined as rural versus urban and how I made the determination as 
to the concentrated nature of each state. 
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Defining Rural and Urban States 
 As Chapter 3 highlighted, measuring rurality is a difficult exercise.  Rurality goes 
beyond a simple place explanation where one just counts the population and calls it rural or 
urban.  Rurality is relative, which is why I created an index to better capture the rural nature 
of a state, as is noted in Table 4.1.  My index includes the following variables in an attempt 
to capture both place-based measures (i.e. being isolated) and cultural indicators (i.e. views 
on gun control and abortion): 
1) Number of restrictions on abortion, 2000 
2) Conservatism score for the state’s House delegation, 2000 
3) Percent of state population that is conservative, 2000 
4) Percent of households with a gun, 2000 
5) Metropolitan Area, %, 2000 
6) Public support for gay rights issues (summary of 8 issues), 2000 
7) Vote for Bush in 2000 
8) Percent Frequent Church Goers, 2000 
9) Population per Square Mile, 2000 
10)  Per Capita Energy Consumed, BTU (1991) 
 
While there is no universal answer for the indicators of rurality, these variables were 
chosen after a consideration of cultural studies on rurality, including, but not limited to 
Frank (2004a), Florida (2008), Bishop and Cushing (2008) and Chinni and Gimpel (2010).  
Gun ownership and religiosity are regularly associated with Republican leaning voters, as is 
exemplified with books like Deer Hunting with Jesus: Dispatches from American’s Class War 
by Joe Bageant (2007).  Much like gun ownership and religiosity, strong negative feelings 
towards gay rights and abortion are noted in conservative leaning states.  When considering 
the overall rurality of a state, one must also consider the overall geography of the state, 
which is captured with the percent metropolitan, population per square mile and per capita 
energy consumed. 
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Cronbach’s alpha provides us with the reliability measure for the index and “…is 
defined as the square of the correlation between the measured scale and the underlying 
factor” (Weesie 2013).  The alpha score is related to the factor analysis of the variables.  
Ideally, the factor loadings should be equal showing they are holding the same weight on 
the overall index.   When considering Table 1.2, it is noted that the abortion, church 
attendance, metro area, and percent energy consumed measures have a low item-test 
correlation.  However, because I feel that these measures are necessary to capture rurality 
and because the alpha measure of reliability is 0.91, I did not drop them from the index.  A 
reliability score of 0.91 is acceptable score (Nunnally and I. H. Bernstein 1994 as cited in 
Weesie 2013). 
Table 4.1 provides the index score for each state, based upon the above listed 
variables.  It shows Rhode Island being the most urban state on the index with a score of -
1.61, followed by Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York.  Idaho is classified as the most 
rural with a score of 1.11, followed by Wyoming, Mississippi, and Louisiana.   Michigan and 
Ohio are the two states in the middle of the index.  Interestingly, battleground states in 
presidential elections are found in the middle of the index.  The hope is that this index 
better captures the rural nature of a state and is, at a minimum, a more accurate indicator 
than simply using population size or distance from a metropolitan area. 
Defining Concentrated and Dispersed 
A key component is how to delineate the concentration, or urban counties, within 
states.  It is important that this be a relative measure because, clearly, an “urban” county, 
or rather the concentrated areas, will differ from state to state.  For example, urban area in 
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Montana would not been seen as such in New York because those living in New York have a 
different standard of evaluation.  This, though, does not diminish the relative value of that 
urban region in Montana; it just means that my measure should account for state-to-state 
differences.   
 Given that this analysis will be conducted on the county level, concentrated areas 
will be defined as counties where least five percent of a state’s population resides.  This 
means, for example, that California’s urban counties will include Los Angeles, Orange, San 
Diego, Santa Clara, San Bernardino, and Riverside, while North Dakota’s urban counties 
include Cass, Burleigh, Grand Forks, and Ward.  For a breakdown of county classifications in 
each state, please consider Table 1.4.  Concentration and dispersion measures are 
essentially the measure as to whether or not the urban, or metropolitan, regions of the 
state are found within proximity of one another, concentrated, or whether they are 
scattered across the state, dispersed.  These classifications were made through a visual 
analysis of each state type and the examination of the maps to see where concentrated 
populations were located in each state.  
The Models 
Replicating Gimpel, Thorpe and Lee’s Model Related to Candidate Emergence 
 Replication of Gimple, Thorpe and Lee’s model of candidate emergence was made 
easier because their data was shared with me (2011).  The first model I ran was a 
consideration of Gimpel et al.’s model within my state typology:  Urban, Rural, 
Concentrated and Dispersed states.  This analysis was performed to see if my predictors of 
candidate emergence vary by state type.  This model is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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 In Chapter 6, I expand Gimpel et al.’s model by including my data.  So, while Gimpel 
et al. only explored elections from 1996-2006, I was able to consider data from 1948-2008.   
Models Capturing the Likelihood of Winning 
 In Chapter 6, I also explore the likelihood of winning by, first, replicating Gimpel et 
al.’s model, but using the counts of winning candidates as the dependent variable.  Moving 
beyond this examination, I consider winning and losing on the individual level and am able 
to incorporate the impact of incumbency and party influence.  In Chapter 6, I expand the 
state typology to include not only urban, rural, dispersed, and concentrated classified 
states, but also urban-concentrated, rural-concentrated, urban-dispersed, and rural-
dispersed classified states.    
Expectations 
State Type Urban expectations:  I expect most candidates will come from urban regions and 
there will be a higher number of non-native candidates.  Urban areas hold more financial 
and political resources, so it is quite logical that more candidates would come from these 
localities.  Metropolitan regions have a more transient population, so it would be logical for 
non-native candidates to be more successful in these locations than they would be in rural 
classified states. Also, non-metro rural areas are ignored more in urban and concentrated 
states, where political power emanates from urban areas.  
State Type Rural expectations: I expect that most candidates will come from urban counties, 
more so than urban classified states.  In rural states, the influence of urban areas (political 
and economic resources) are more acutely noted, thereby increasing the success of urban 
candidates in these rural states.  
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State Type Concentrated expectations: I expect that candidates will come from urban 
regions.  In concentrated states, much of the support will be concentrated in one urban 
area, so separate urban regions will not need to compete over political resources.  Thus, 
logically it would follow that urban areas would likely be more successful. 
State Type Dispersed expectations:  I expect that most candidates will come from urban 
counties; although, to a lesser degree than in concentrated states.  Again, the power of 
political resources in urban areas is hard to negate.  However, I believe the impact of urban 
success will be less strong in these state types since there may be some competition 
between urban regions in dispersed states.   
State Type UD expectations: In these states, candidate emergence and success will be more 
sporadic, in terms of geographic origin; although, since the state is urban, urban based 
candidates still be highly likely.  Because the overall state classification is urban, it less likely 
that politicians will be able to use the urban personification against the candidate, as is 
suggested in RD states. 
State Type UC expectations: In these states, it is expected that more urban candidates will 
emerge and be successful.  Also, it is expected that there will be a higher frequency of non-
native candidates.  In these states, much of the economic drive and many political resources 
are in one regions, which really provides the jumping board for urban candidates.   
State Type RD expectations:  In these states, it is expected that it would be more difficult for 
urban-based candidates to emerge and be successful because urban areas would compete 
against each other to produce statewide candidates.  In these states, it is expected that 
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urbanism will more likely be used against the candidate because the urban regions will be 
competitive for resources of the state and outstate parties will use this to their advantage. 
State Type RC expectations:  In these states, it is expected that most candidates will come 
from the concentrated urban classified region.  Much like UC states, urban candidates will 
have an advantage over rural candidates; however, I believe this impact will be lessor than 
UC states due to the overall rural nature of the state itself.  
The Data 
Sources 
Table 4.2 outlines the data sources for this research.  Much of my data was derived 
from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research where I was able to 
utilize the Candidate and Constituency Statistics of Elections in the United States, 1788-
1990, which provided candidate names, parties, and vote totals for elections from 1948-
1990.  This was the jumping off point for the data that I personally collected, which included 
all candidate voting data from 1991 through 2008; there were approximately 1,040 new 
observations added, producing a total of 3,835 candidates.  I also coded the party support 
variable for all candidates.  The party support variable was the vote total for the candidate’s 
party in the previous presidential race measured as a percentage of the total vote.  Please 
see Table 4.3 for variable descriptions.   
I considered the home county classification, the county in which candidate spent 
most of his or her childhood and likely the county that he or she portrayed as his or her 
hometown, for gubernatorial and U.S. senate candidates for 48 of the U.S. states, from 
1948-2008.  Alaska and Hawaii will not be included in this analysis due to the unique 
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geographic and cultural nature of these states.  To code the hometown for each candidate, I 
first had to research the place where the candidate spent most of his or her childhood.17  I 
relied heavily on Biographical Directories of the Governors in the United States and other 
online sources, such as newspapers and political biography pages for various candidates.  
Once I determined the location, I coded it based upon its unique FIPS, Federal Information 
Processing Standards code.  For those candidates not born in the state where they were 
running, they were coded as “alien” and I associated two unique FIPS codes, one being the 
place where they were living when they ran (as classified in tables as ADULT) and the place 
where they were raised (as classified as RAISED).  I also coded unknown and non-us native 
candidates.  There were 23 unknowns and 18 non-us candidates.  These candidates were 
coded in the ADULT category, if possible, but were will not be noted in the RAISED data.  My 
geographic considerations will be based around my urban-rural/dispersed-concentrated 
state typologies; I will be looking for a pattern of success and/or failure.  I will only consider 
those candidates who received at least ten (10) percent of the vote total.  I am considering 
only general election candidates. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4.3 provides a full listing of the variables utilized in this study.  The 
independent variables for my county level models are: electoral concentration (percentage 
of population relative to the state), percentage high income relative to the state, 
percentage self-employed, non-metro counties with fewer than 10,000 people, a state 
capital control, number of counties per state, number of elections per election period, party 
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 Note that Gimpel, Thorpe, and Lee (2011) coded the candidate’s hometown as the county they spent most 
of their adult life prior to running for office. 
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support, and percentage black.   For the individual data, I added in the following 
independent variables:  incumbency, non-native status, and my rural designation (less than 
5% of the state’s population).  The dependent variables are the count of candidates 
emerging from a county or the county of winning candidates (collapsed and not collapsed) 
for both senate and governor races. 
Note that there are two broad categories, county level data and individual level 
data.  The county level data, with the exception of party support, was provided by Gimpel et 
al (2011).  The party support variable was pulled and entered directly relying upon David 
Leip’s Atlas of Elections website.  Table 4.3 highlights that there is little variation in the 
independent variables when collapsed by ADULT versus RAISED.  While there was  
consideration to only consider ADULT, and not RAISED, as the correlation between the two 
measures is .77, I felt it was instructive to consider the impacts of each.  Particularly since a 
RAISED consideration may be relevant in the candidate emergence models.  In looking at 
the data from a RAISED perspective, we are better able to see the counties were candidates 
are produced (even if they do not run for office in their home county’s state).  Whereas, I 
would argue ADULT may be a better model for capturing winning in losing, since it does not 
place some candidates in states where they did not actually run (it just takes the lead from 
Gimpel et al. and codes them as where they were living when they ran). 
 With a better understanding of the variables impacting emergence and success, as 
well as better understanding of my research design, Chapters 5 and 6 will test my 
predictions to discover if geography does indeed influence candidate emergence and/or 
success. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GROWN-UP HOMETOWNS: AN ANALYSIS of GIMPEL, LEE, and THORPE’S MODEL 
 Geography has been glaringly absent from the study of electoral trends on the 
statewide level.  There have been discussions, in broad sense, about how rural interests 
versus urban interests influence the overall political structure.  However, there has been 
little consideration of the impact that interstate geography, urban versus rural in a relative 
sense, has on that state’s political outcomes and, consequently, on the national political 
landscape.  This chapter will examine one of the main influential studies that has broached 
the topic of how a candidate’s geographic origins affect voter perceptions and, ultimately, 
electoral outcomes, Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s piece, “The wellsprings of candidate 
emergence: Geographic origins of statewide candidacies in the United States” (2011).  I will 
explore the outcomes using their definition of a candidate’s hometown as the place where 
he or she has spent most of one’s adult life—grown-up hometowns, if you will—and test 
whether the findings are affected by running the model in differing state classifications. 
In the long search for credible and noteworthy studies related to the study of the 
impact of political geography on statewide political success, I was most strongly drawn to 
Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s piece (2011).  They find that “… aspirants virtually never emerge 
directly out of rural areas or small towns.  Serious contenders may have some family ties to 
out-of-the-way places, but they must commonly move to more urban locations to launch 
successful careers” (Gimpel, et al. 2011: 26).  Gimpel and associates define hometown as “… 
‘home counties’ not necessarily as the location of birth or childhood residence…but as the 
county the candidate resided in and ‘called home’ during their adult life prior to running for 
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statewide office” (2011: 28).  This very valuable piece provides an excellent foundation for 
the discussion of geographical impacts on candidate emergence.   
It seemed only logical to begin my empirical quest by examining my typology 
through the lens of Gimpel’s model.18  In the next chapter, I will discuss the implications of 
how one defines hometown and explore how a new definition influences electoral 
outcomes.  For now, though, I will consider how their results are impacted by simply 
breaking the data into my typology of Urban versus Rural Dominated States and 
Concentrated versus Dispersed states.  To reiterate, rural versus urban states were chosen 
based upon the rural index, which is detailed in Chapter 4, but essentially aims at capturing 
the rurality of a state.  Concentration and dispersion measures whether or not the urban, or 
metropolitan, regions of the state are found within proximity of one another, concentrated, 
or whether they are scattered across the state, dispersed.  One would not expect to find 
much differentiation in outcomes, if their theory holds true.  I believe, though, that the type 
of state, urban versus rural or dispersed versus concentrated, will impact the emergence of 
candidates for statewide office.  I have outlined my expectations below: 
1. Non-Metro Rural (counties with fewer than 10,000 residents):  I would 
expect that candidate emergence from urban counties is much less likely in 
rural and dispersed states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections.  
This hypothesis is based around the dispersion of power in rural and 
dispersed classified states.  In these states, it is less advantageous to claim 
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 This would not have been possible if not for the generosity of Dr. Jim Gimpel, who provided his dataset to 
me, no questions asked and with no expectations of reciprocity.  His words of advice and support are so 
appreciated.   
Myers, Cassie, 2015, UMSL, p. 54 
 
urban associations or ties.  Concentrated power would be noted in urban and 
concentrated classified states.  Gimpel et al. found that, for Senate races, 
there is a very low likelihood that candidates will emerge from non-metro 
rural areas.  This effect will be weaker in rural and dispersed states.  I believe 
this will be parsed out more clearly when considered in the frame of state 
classifications.   
2. Electoral Concentration (a county’s population size relative to the state):  I 
expect there will be more candidates coming from more populated counties 
in rural states, than for urban states, and for dispersed states than for 
concentrated states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections; 
however, I do anticipate that for all state types an increase in population will 
increase the likelihood of candidate emergence.  I believe the impact will be 
more significant in rural and dispersed classified states because there county 
size has more of an impact in these types of states.  This may be the largest 
finding from Gimpel et al.’s study; they found that the more electoral 
population increases, the more likely candidates are to emerge.  More 
specifically, for a one percent increase in relative population size, there was 
an expected increase of Senate nominees of 36% and a 29% expected 
increase for gubernatorial candidates.   
3. Percent Self-Employed in unincorporated businesses:  I would expect that as 
the percent self-employed increases, there will be an increase in candidates 
emerging from rural states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections.  
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This expectation comes out of rural culture that supports small business 
ownership.  I believe for urban and concentrated states, there will be a 
negative impact of percent self-employed.  So, as percent self-employed 
increases in a county for urban, concentrated and dispersed states, I 
anticipate that there will be a reduction of candidates emerging from those 
counties.  Gimpel et al.’s findings suggest that political candidates rarely 
emerge from counties controlled by small businesses.  For both races, a one 
percent increase in the percentage of self-employed (keep in mind 
population is controlled here) will result in a drop of the expected count of 
candidates by 8%. 
4. State Capital:  I would expect that for all state types, being from a state 
capital would increase the likelihood of candidate emergence.  I do believe 
this impact will be the largest in rural and dispersed states, as state capitals 
may hold more weight in rural states where there may not be many large 
urban areas and dispersed states where the capital may hold more 
relevance.  Gimpel et al. found that, while the impact was higher in 
senatorial races at 391% than for gubernatorial races at 288%, state capitals 
in either race increases the likelihood of candidate emergence.   
5. Percent High Income (percent earning over $150,000 relative to the state 
average):  I would expect that more candidates would come from counties 
with higher income in urban and concentrated states than for rural and 
dispersed states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections.  Although, I 
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think that there will be a positive impact on all state types because, as much 
of the political behavior literature highlights, concentrated money equates to 
political power.  Gimpel et al. found that percent high income increases the 
expected count of candidates for senate and gubernatorial candidates, 27% 
and 16% respectively, holding all else equal.   
In the next chapter, I will more fully consider the impact that various geographical impacts 
may have within each of these typologies by modeling on the candidate’s hometown, as 
defined by where the candidate spent most of his or her youth, on candidate emergence 
and—to take that a bit further—candidate success.  Let us first explore the impact that the 
deconstruction of my state typology has on Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s data.  If Gimpel, Lee 
and Thorpe’s theory holds strong, it should not be impacted by this deconstruction because 
the typology of a state would not matter. 
Findings 
I will again briefly summarize the main findings of Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s model.19  
Not surprisingly, they find that both successful and unsuccessful candidates for statewide 
office disproportionately emerge from the most densely populated areas in their respective 
states.  They find that, for all Senate nominees, a one percent increase in local population of 
a county increases the number of nominees from that county by 36 percent, while, for 
gubernatorial nominees, a one percent increase of the relative size increases the number of 
nominees from that county by 29 percent.  As previously outlined, I do not find this 
                                                          
19
 The authors use a negative binomial regression where the dependent variable is the count of Senate or 
gubernatorial candidates emerging from each of the nation’s 3140 counties.  The time period considered is 
1996 through 2006.  The models are estimated using maximum likelihood.  
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outcome surprising, since it is advantageous for candidates to reside in urban areas, for 
both economic and political reasons.  They also find that candidates emerging from 
wealthier counties are favored.  A 27 percent increase in the count for Senate nominees is 
related to a one percent rise in the relative wealth of a county; this association is 16 percent 
for gubernatorial candidates.  They find that counties with a high percentage of self-
employed businesses are not conducive to increasing the expected counts for either office, 
suggesting that candidates are reliant on big business support rather than main street 
economies.  Also not surprisingly, a county having the state capital increases the counts for 
both Senate and gubernatorial candidates.  This impact is less impactful for gubernatorial 
candidates than for those running for Senate; however, it is quite large for both types of 
races.   
Let us now consider the impact of running Gimpel, Lee et al.’s model on my state 
typology classifications.  Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the outcomes of running the models on 
urban versus rural classified states and concentrated versus dispersed states.  Gimpel, Lee 
et al.’s model should be consistent, even if I break the data down into these typologies.  To 
begin, consider the outcomes if we run the models on urban and rural states.  For a 
refresher of the state classifications, please consider Table 1.3, State-by-State 
Categorization.   There are a total of 22 urban states and 26 rural states.   
In both instances, senate and gubernatorial elections, there are some noteworthy 
outcomes when broken down by urban and rural state classification.  I think the first, and 
the most significant consideration, is the big variation between the outcomes of Gimpel, 
Lee et al. and urban/rural states models in the rural non-metro location and electoral 
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concentration variables.  There is also some variation for percent self-employed, the state 
capital control, and percent high income.  This holds true for both senate and gubernatorial 
considerations.  Please note that for all of these models, we are controlling for relative 
population size.  This control allows for a closer examination of the actual impacts that rural 
versus urban locations may have in this case.   
To begin, let us consider the impact of rural non-metro locations on candidate 
emergence.  For urban states, the impact of non-metro rural areas is stronger than when 
considering all states whereas the impact of non-metro areas is less impactful for rural 
states.  Relative to senate nominees, Gimpel et al. found that candidate emergence is about 
90 percent lower in rural locations than in urban areas, whereas this finding is 100 percent 
lower for urban-classified states and 88 percent lower for rural states.  Simply put, for 
senate races, candidate emergence from rural areas is more likely in rural than urban 
classified states; although, it should be noted that for both urban and rural states candidate 
emergence is less likely to occur in rural than urban areas.  For urban states, there are 
essentially no candidates emerging from rural areas.  This is unsurprising based upon the 
way Gimpel and associates coded the locations of candidates; however, it is interesting 
that, even with this classification, we find differences between urban and rural states.  
While there are a handful of states, such as Connecticut, where the majority or all (as in the 
case of Rhode Island) of the counties are urban classified, in most states there are less 
urban than rural classified counties.  Again, an urban classified county, for the purposes of 
this study, is a county with at least five percent of the state’s total population.  With this in 
mind, please reconsider Figures 1.1. and 1.2, which highlight urban and rural classified 
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states and the urban classified counties therein.  It is noted that these urban classified areas 
are, for the most part, a very small part of the overall landscape of most states.  Consider 
that, the results related to non-metro location, indicate that candidates will likely only 
emerge from those few urban classified counties, leaving large parts of the state where 
candidates seemingly have no hope of emerging. 
This impact is also noted in urban-classified states relative to gubernatorial 
nominees.  Gimpel and associates found no impact on candidate emergence relative to 
rural locations in their model, whereas when the model is reconsidered on urban states, the 
finding is that candidate emergence from rural areas is 100 percent less than for urban 
areas (it is predicted that no candidates would emerge from non-metro counties in urban 
classified states); for rural states this variable has no impact on candidate emergence.  Thus, 
in gubernatorial races, it holds that more candidates will emerge from urban areas in urban 
states; this finding, though, is not noted in rural classified states.   
When considering the impact of non-metro locations on senate nominees for 
concentrated versus dispersed classified states, an impact is noted only in dispersed states.  
As a reminder, concentration versus dispersion measures are essentially the measure as to 
whether or not the urban, or metropolitan, regions of the state are found within proximity 
of one another, concentrated, or whether they are scattered across the state, dispersed.  In 
dispersed states, senate candidate emergence is 92% less in rural classified counties.  This 
variable has no impact on gubernatorial candidate emergence. 
Moving onto a consideration of the impact of electoral concentration measured as a 
county’s percentage of the state’s total population on candidate emergence, holding all else 
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constant.  It should be noted that any impacts on urban classified states will not matter 
because, as was previously discussed, in these states, there is no chance for a candidate to 
emerge from a rural county.  Thus, electoral concentration would not matter as much in 
those states.  Electoral concentration discussions are only relevant in discussions related to 
rural, dispersed and concentrated states.  This relationship is noted in the consideration of 
Figures 5.120 and 5.2, where the probability of zero candidates emerging is essentially a 
horizontal curve at 100% in both senate and gubernatorial races in urban classified states.   
These figures really show that increases in county population have more of an impact in 
rural dominated and dispersed states than in urban dominated and concentrated states.   
There is some variance of the impact of electoral concentration in the other state 
types, though.21  First, in rural classified states, given a one percent increase in local 
population as a percent of state population, the count of nominees increases 57%, for 
concentrated states this increase is 22% and dispersed states it is 53%, holding all else 
constant.  For gubernatorial nominees, breaking it down by state type, the count of 
nominees for rural classified states the increase is 44% for a one percent increase in 
electoral concentration, for concentrated states it is 18% and dispersed states it is 42%, 
holding all else constant.  For urban classified states, as the population increases from the 
1st percentile to the 99th percentile, the expected probability of no candidate emerging 
decreases from .96 to .81 (again, a moot discussion as noted in the statement regarding the 
                                                          
20
 I was unable to include urban states in my graph for senatorial data because there are not enough 
observations; however, the expected outcomes are nearly identical to concentrated states; please refer to 
Table 1.3, which shows a coefficient for urban states at .21 and concentrated states at .20, both with .05 
significance level.  
21
 Overall, for senate nominees, Gimpel et al. found for a one percent increase in local population as a percent 
of state population, the count of nominees increases by 36% and 29% for gubernatorial races, holding all else 
constant 
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impact noted in the non-metro variable); for rural states this decrease is from .96 to .61; for 
concentrated states this decrease is from .96 to .87 and for dispersed states this .96 to .63.  
In rural states there are more counties (2,266) versus urban states (844).22  When looking at 
the gubernatorial data, candidates in rural states come from 461 counties versus 218 
counties in urban states.  In the senatorial data, candidates in rural states come from 427 
counties versus 224 counties in urban states.  What these descriptive statistics imply is that 
in rural states, candidates come from a larger and more diverse set of counties than in 
urban states.  An important take away from this discussion is that, in rural and dispersed 
states, electoral concentration is more important than in urban and concentrated states 
because urban classified counties in rural and dispersed states are not the only option for 
candidate emergence.  
In terms of the measure of percent self-employed, a measure of local economic 
resources, Gimpel et al. expected that the rate of candidate emergence would be smaller in 
cities where small business are more pivotal to the local economy.  In both senatorial and 
gubernatorial, a one percent increase in the percentage of self-employed businesses drops 
the expected count of candidates by 8% in Gimpel et al.’s model.  When breaking this 
variable down by my topology, it is noted that, for senate nominees, in urban states, there 
is an 11% drop in expected count of candidates, and in concentrated states, a 17% drop.  
There was no impact found in rural or dispersed states.  For gubernatorial nominees, there 
is no impact on urban states.  For rural states the outcome is identical to Gimpel et al.’s 
finding of an 8% drop, while there is a 15% drop for concentrated states.   
                                                          
22
 Please note that the sum of rural and urban states does not add to 3140, the number of US counties.  This is 
due to the exclusion of Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington DC. 
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Finally, for senatorial nominees under Gimpel et al.’s model, if a county is state 
capital, we expect there to be a 391% increase in the count of nominees over all other 
locations.  For urban states this increase is lower at 297%, for rural states 289%, and for 
concentrated states 258%.  The only state type that had a large impact on count due to 
state capital impact was dispersed states at 410%.  For gubernatorial nominees under 
Gimpel et al.’s model, if a county is state capital, we expect there to be a 288% increase in 
the count of nominees over all other locations.  For urban states, this increase is lower at 
238%, for rural states 208%, and for concentrated states 198%.  The only state type that had 
a large impact on count due to state capital impact were dispersed states at 357%.   
Finally, there are some nuanced findings when considering the percent high income 
(percent earning more than $150,000 relative to state average).  For Gimpel and associate’s 
model, we see that for Senate races, a one percent rise in relative wealth is associated with 
a 27% increase in the count of Senate nominees, all else being equal; the increase is 16% for 
gubernatorial nominees.  It should be noted that all of the state typologies do hold 
significance in the variable and most impacts are quite similar to GImpel et al.’s initial 
finding; however, I do see a 6% drop (21%) for Senate nominees in concentrated states and 
a 3% drop (13%) in gubernatorial nominees in rural states.   
Discussion of Findings 
To begin, overall, I did find that there are differences in outcomes when Gimpel, Lee 
and Thorpe’s data is deconstructed by my state typology.  Generally, this indicates that 
statewide geography does influence candidate emergence.  Let us consider these impacts in 
the framework my previously outlined expectations. 
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First, I expected that, for urban and concentrated states, candidate emergence from 
non-metro locations to be less likely than for rural and dispersed states for both senatorial 
and gubernatorial elections.  My expectation that candidate emergence from rural areas 
would be less likely in urban classified states over rural and dispersed classified states holds 
true for senatorial and gubernatorial nominees.  While the likelihood of candidate 
emergence is less likely in rural areas than metro areas for all state typologies for senatorial 
nominees, for urban states the impact is greater.  This impact in urban states is also 10% 
greater in urban states than in Gimpel et al.’s model (-90%).  Thus, for senatorial nominees, 
it is difficult for any candidate to springboard from any rural region, but is basically 
impossible in urban classified states.  This impact is even more notable in the gubernatorial 
comparison, where the only impact is noted for urban classified states at -100%.  So, for 
gubernatorial nominees, in urban classified states, you are 100% less likely to emerge from 
a rural area than an urban area meaning that candidates simply do not come from rural 
counties.  There is no impact for gubernatorial nominees in my other classifications or in 
Gimpel et al.’s model. It is truly remarkable that we see, especially for Senate candidate 
emergence, very few candidates coming out of rural areas, especially in urban classified 
states.  The impact is less for gubernatorial candidate emergence, where the impact is only 
noted in urban classified states.   
I do not find the difference between senate and gubernatorial nominees’ emergence 
from non-metro counties surprising.  The senate position is more removed from the voters 
than that of the governor, so voters may not put as much emphasis on the value of rural 
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versus urban context, or, conversely, the internal thresholds for making it to this level of 
office may be more closely tied to internal partisanship rather than electoral considerations.   
Moving onto the consideration of concentrated versus dispersed states, please note 
that all typologies relative to the non-metro location drop significance meaning there is no 
impact with the exception of dispersed states for senate nominees.  In that case, candidate 
emergence is 92 percent lower in rural locations than in urban locations.  It is quite 
interesting that emergence from a rural location has an impact in dispersed states for 
senatorial nominees. While rural emergence does not have an impact in concentrated 
states for Senate nominees, there is an impact in dispersed states.  This may indicate that in 
large statewide races where the votes will be split across the state (think Missouri’s Kansas 
City and St. Louis split), there is no room on the ballot to include candidates from rural areas 
because they need to foster the local base.  It is very interesting to note rural emergence 
does not negatively or positively influence gubernatorial nominees, as the variable falls 
from significance for all, but urban states.  It seems that, overall, if one was a rural based 
nominee, one would be better off running in a gubernatorial rather than a Senate race (with 
the exception of urban classified states, which in both cases it is highly disadvantageous for 
rural candidates). 
The next consideration is electoral concentration, where I expected more candidates 
to come from more populated counties in rural and dispersed states than for urban or 
concentrated states for both election types.  Relative to Gimpel et al.’s finding of 36% 
increase in senatorial candidate emergence, we see a drop of 13% (23% actual) for urban 
states and 14% (22% actual) for concentrated states and an increase of 21 points (57% 
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actual) for rural states and 17 point increase (53% actual) for dispersed states.  The findings 
are as expected; electoral concentration matters more in rural and dispersed states because 
in those states the possibility for emergence from both rural and urban counties exists.  
Senatorial candidates emerge at higher levels in rural and dispersed states.  This finding is 
less pronounced, but similar in fashion when considering the gubernatorial candidate 
emergence.  It is evidence that electoral concentration will increase the likelihood of 
candidate emergence, especially so in rural and dispersed states.  This may mean that 
candidates need to gravitate to more populous areas in rural and dispersed states, whereas 
it is less necessary in urban and concentrated states.  Alternatively, it could just be a 
function of the way the authors characterized the candidates’ hometown classification. 
The next consideration is the percent self-employed, where I expected that as the 
percent self-employee increases, there will be an increase in candidates emerging from 
rural and dispersed states for both types of elections.  For senate emergence, the only state 
types where this variable had an impact were urban states and concentrated states, where 
we see that as the percent self-employee increases the likelihood for candidate emergences 
decreases, by 11% and 17% respectively.  For gubernatorial races, we see that the impact is 
only found in rural and concentrated states, a drop of 8% and 15% respectively.  This seems 
to indicate that in the cases where self-employed does have an impact, it depresses the 
number of candidates emerging.  This seems to highlight the impact that large business may 
have over candidate selection and grooming, especially in senate nominees.  This is not 
indicative of good things for small business political clout.  Is this because in places where 
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small businesses are the majority are not able to unify behind candidates or such places are 
not concerned with statewide or national politics?  Or something else?   
I expected that for all state types being from a state capital would increase the 
likelihood of candidate emergence.  This seemed like no brainer, especially considering the 
way the hometowns of these candidates were classified.  I though this impact would be 
greatest in rural and dispersed states, as state capitals may hold more weight where there 
may not be large urban areas and in dispersed states where the state capital may hold more 
relevance.  Interestingly, the impact of the state capital is most pronounced in dispersed 
states for both election types.  This may indicate that in places were the population is 
dispersed, voters more heavily rely upon the political capital gained through resources in 
the state capital. 
Finally, I expected that more nominees would come from counties with higher 
income in urban and concentrated states for both election types.  While the impact overall 
is greater for senatorial than gubernatorial elections, in that increased income has a greater 
impact in the former than the latter, there is little variation between the state types other 
than a slight drop in nominees for concentrated senate (6% drop from Gimpel et al.’s 
finding of 27%) rural gubernatorial (3% drop from Gimpel et al.’s finding of 16%).  We see 
that relative wealth impacts all senate races more so than gubernatorial.  Wealth has the 
least impact on rural state gubernatorial races.   
I would like to add one comment regarding my expectations versus the actual 
outcomes.  Again, I would like to emphasize that the way the candidate’s hometown was 
coded may matter.  As we will see in the next chapter, outcomes differ when the hometown 
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of the candidate is driven by where he or she spent most of his or her childhood, rather 
than where he or she spent most of their adult life prior to running for office.  The 
outcomes discussed in this chapter may not fully account for and measure public 
perceptions of the candidate’s origin.  Let us move onto Chapter 6, where I will evaluate the 
impact of classifying candidates on their hometown, as defined as where they spent most of 
their childhood on candidate success.  Once we have these findings, it would be fruitful to 
make a comparison to this chapter’s findings on candidate emergence.  Does it truly hold 
that definitions do matter? 
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CHAPTER 6 
CHILDHOOD HOMETOWNS:  DOES THE DEFINITON OF HOMETOWN MATTER? 
 Accurately measuring the impact of a candidate’s background, in terms of 
geography, may depend upon how one defines this variable.  This chapter will explore if the 
construction of a candidate’s origin matters.  I will explore if my definition of hometown, 
the county where the candidate spent most of his or her childhood, modifies initial findings 
about the predictions if candidate origins influence electoral success or failure.  Simply put, 
can a candidate’s hometown increase his or her likelihood of being elected?  If so, is it 
affected by the geographical context of the state the candidate is running in? 
Often it is difficult to define where a candidate is from, or rather the place she 
identifies as her hometown.  To my knowledge, there is no national study asking candidates 
the place they consider as their hometown, so there is no consensus on the “correct” way 
to define hometown.  In Chapter 5, I explored the impact that breaking down Gimpel, Lee 
and Thorpe’s model by my state typology of urban versus rural dominated states and 
concentrated versus dispersed states has on candidate emergence.  Again, please note the 
distinction between my data and Gimpel et al. (2011) is that they defined hometown as the 
county the candidate lived for most of his or her adult life.  Some interesting findings 
resulted.  First, candidate emergence is less likely in rural areas for all state types in 
senatorial races, especially for urban classified states.  This impact was also noted for 
gubernatorial nominees in urban classified states.   In sum, if one was a rural based 
nominee, one would be more likely to run running in a gubernatorial rather than a Senate 
race (with the exception of urban classified states, which in both cases it is highly 
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disadvantageous for rural candidates).  With regard to electoral concentration, more 
candidates emerged from populated counties in rural and dispersed states than in urban 
and concentrated states; although, it should be noted that electoral concentration will 
increase the likelihood for candidate emergence in all state types.  Generally speaking, the 
percent self-employed (when significant) depresses the number of candidates that emerge.  
Coming from a state capital does increase candidate emergence, especially in dispersed 
states, and wealthier counties produce more candidates in all state types.   
While Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s treatment of the candidate’s hometown is different 
than mine, their definition does not diminish the advantages of place that they discuss 
(2011: 27); in many ways our models are similar.  I agree that campaign donors are highly 
concentrated within wealthy, urban areas and that it does help if you can get to know these 
donors by, say, living amongst them.  I concur that much of the local media is centralized in 
city locations and that much of the coverage targets those in close proximity.  With all of 
these premises, I find no fault.  In fact, I find no error in the argument that many—no, 
most—candidates live in urban areas.  Gimpel et al. did indeed highlight this in their article 
(2011).  What I do find fault with is their notion that 1) candidates rarely come from rural 
areas and 2) that the voters are more likely to trust those living close to them, in urban 
areas, leading to an ill-informed conclusion that they do not trust rural-born candidates.   
Further, I find Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s explanation of the “favorite-son” effect to 
be disingenuous and not the intent of the actual creators of the term (see also Gimpel, et al. 
2008).  They seem to tie electoral support strictly based upon the proximity of where the 
candidates currently reside, with no consideration to the background of the candidate.  I 
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find that the creators “favorite-son,” also known as the “hometown boy,” definition tied the 
bump in electoral outcomes to the actual distance they are from where the candidate was 
from, not where the candidate currently lives.   
The creator of the localism, as known as, friends-and-neighbors, V.O. Key, Jr., in his 
groundbreaking piece, Southern Politics in State and Nation, at times defines the home 
county as where the candidate was raised and where the candidate currently lives.  In some 
discussions, he only considers were the candidate’s home county, without a clear 
explanation if that means where the candidate was raised or where he currently lives or 
both (2006 [Sixth Printing]).  This concept was later expanded upon by Black and Black 
(1973), Kjar and Laband (2002), Rice and Macht (1987), and Tatalovich (1975). 
Black and Black (1973) found support in the candidate’s home and surrounding 
counties is beyond what would be expected just considering race and occupation, 
supporting the notion that the candidate’s shared locality did impact voter preference.  In 
this study, Black and Black were considering the friends and neighbors impact of George 
Wallace’s origin from Barbour County, Alabama.  I would like to clarify that this measure 
captured where Wallace was born and raised, not a county where Wallace may have later 
lived (Black and Black 1973).  Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe do not clarify that their definition is 
not in line with the original definition because they classify locality as the county where 
they lived longest as adults.  
Further, another of the studies cited by Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe is that of Kjar and 
Laband (2002).  In Kjar and Laband, the candidates used to highlight the friends and 
neighbor effect include Bob Riley of Clay County, Alabama and Joe Turnham of Lee County, 
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Alabama (2002).  Please note that both candidates were born and raised in these respective 
counties.  Also, in Rice and Macht hometown considerations were defined as, “the county 
that the candidate was born and raised in, or otherwise calls 'home"  (1987: 449).  
Tatalovich defines the candidate’s local county as where he or she lives; however, he does 
not touch upon whether or not this is the candidate’s actual hometown county, as in where 
the candidate grew up.  The time period analyzed is 1943-1973 and the author is 
considering the implications of Black and Black’s discussion of Wallace, so there may have 
been an assumption that the hometown is the same as the current county in which the 
candidate resides (Black and Black 1973; Tatalovich 1975).  It cannot be confirmed, though, 
since the author never clarified his reasoning.  Based upon these considerations, using the 
term “favorite son,” as link to where the candidate may currently reside, not taking into 
account his hometown roots, does not accurately capture the historical development of the 
term and, I would argue, is a misrepresentation of the term itself.23  In order to conceive of 
a new conceptualization of what the context of friends and neighbors, an explanation of 
why the old definitions are no longer relevant is needed. 
I do concur with Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe that hometown advantage is a “personal 
vote” for many; however, I see it differently than they do (2011: 27).  For example, it is 
personal insofar as the voters’ values make it personal.  It is personal to the voter that the 
candidate was raised in a farming community, where trust and honesty are the 
                                                          
23
 Gimpel, Karnes et al. also modify the term “Friends and Neighbors” in their 2008 article.  In this article, they 
also define hometown as where the candidate spent much of his or her adult life.  This, in my opinion, does 
not truly represent the historical development of the term.  The authors do not provide foundation for the 
reader, as to why the shift in definitions was warranted or how it may impact the relationship to the previous 
“Favorite-Son” considerations (2008).  
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cornerstones.  You rarely hear from a candidate that he or she lives in an expansive 
suburban home because this would not make things personal to many voters.  What makes 
things personal is the foundation from which these candidates emerge.  Many voters 
themselves came from outlying areas, or have ties to those idealized spaces, so they can 
make a connection with rural born candidates.  In states with large numbers of immigrants 
and migrant populations, it would not be considered a fault for a candidate to be a 
transplant (from another state) or even fault her from emerging from the urban core.  It 
would make sense that, in these urbanized states, there is an increased return from the 
long-lasting relationships built in during their youth.  It would seem such networks would be 
strengthened by living and working in the urban centers for longer periods of time.  I do 
agree with Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s statement, “Barriers to political ammunition are 
rooted in the geographic and social milieu of rural areas.”  However, I disagree with the 
proceeding sentence that “Given the relative disadvantages they face, we should expect 
disproportionately few nominees for major statewide offices to originate straightaway from 
the more remote reaches of the state” (2011: 27).  Yes, I could understand that a candidate 
living and working outside of a state’s urban core would make things more difficult, in terms 
of garnering political capital.  I do not, though, associate this disadvantage with the 
individual being raised outside the city, namely in states were rural values are cherished.  In 
states where “ruralness” is not valued, it may actually harm a candidate to be from a rural 
area.   I would argue, though, that devaluation is not due to the lack of resources, but, 
rather, a conflict of values.   
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 Gimpel et al. discuss the negative stereotyping of rural populations that work against 
candidates.  They discuss the literature, which highlights rural citizens as being “…not only 
viewed as unsophisticated and provincial, but unintelligent” (2011: 27).  The authors agree 
with the idea that a “pro-urban bias has become the objective norm, an invisible 
preference, which relegates rural dwellers to a second-class status” (Gimpel, et al. 2011: 
28).  I disagree with their assessment, in part.  Yes, I concur that there are a great many 
voters holding pro-urban biases, but I argue there are many voters who have a pro-rural 
bias believing rural people are humble, reverent, loyal, and hardworking (Frank 2004a: 20-
7).   
Katherine Cramer Walsh puts a new spin on the source of seeming biases in voters 
by considering the impact of group consciousness (2012).  She ties the set of ideas held by 
the type of geographic place one is from (in this case rural areas) to their shared beliefs and 
the biases against political elites in urban areas.   To summarize, she found that 
“…identification as a rural resident was more than a geographic reference for many…It was 
imbued with perceptions of inequalities of power, differences in values and also inequalities 
of resources” (Walsh 2012: 522).  This study attempts to uncover how Walsh’s “rural 
consciousness” may impact electoral outcomes.  In my view, rurality will not someday be 
extinct because rural identification matters.  As Walsh highlights, those places that are less 
urban and now considered rural from a relative standpoint, create a collective identification 
that has political implications.  Rurality, or at least the perception of such, is here to stay, as 
are the collective biases resulting from this rural consciousness. 
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I argue these underlying biases ultimately influence the way candidates sell 
themselves and the way that voters cast votes.  This is an important distinction from 
Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe (2011) because they do not take into account the impact that 
hometown roots may have on electoral outcomes, nor do they try to capture rural identity 
in any other fashion.  The way they frame their study automatically dismisses any causation 
that one’s hometown may have on his or her electoral success.   
While I do agree that it seems logical for candidates to move to urban centers, as do 
many Americans (Jacobs 1969, 1984, Bishop and Cushing 2008, Florida 2008, Lambert 
March 26, 2012, Toppo March 27, 2014), because that is where jobs and opportunities may 
lie, it does not mean that these candidates are “from” those urban areas.  For those who 
have watched a campaign commercial in Missouri recently, it is clear candidates, at least 
from a state like Missouri, do not campaign on their “urbanism.”  Actually, it is quite the 
opposite.  Most commercials are filmed in front of barns, with picturesque scans of cattle 
grazing in rolling fields in the background; these shots clearly identify the candidate’s rural 
roots.  On initial review, it would seem that Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s perceptions related to 
candidate success and statewide political geography are polar opposite to my theory; such a 
conclusion is unfair on its premise (2011).  Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe simply choose to define 
their model in a different manner.  As previously discussed, they categorized the candidates 
based upon where they were currently living versus where they grew up.  This may be a 
small distinction for many; however, I argue this is an undeniable facet of the urban-rural 
divide.  I would further suggest that viewpoint is not lost upon political consultants across 
the country.   
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My purpose here is to test their presumptions and provide (or attempt to do so) 
empirical evidence that geographically tied roots matter.  Roots, whether urban or rural, 
provide the basis for many campaign slogans and networking connections.  Electoral 
success is not random, but has been fine-tuned by political parties and machines over time.  
In my view, academics have yet to fully appreciate the impact that rural versus urban 
politics may have on statewide electoral success.  Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s presumptions in 
their article highlight the misconstruction of the rural-urban divide that is often portrayed 
within the discipline.  I argue that definitions do matter.  It does matter where you were 
raised and the geographical context of the state does matter; grown-up hometowns are an 
oxymoron.  For most Americans, hometowns are the place from which they associate their 
childhood, not their adulthood.  These foundations are the framework by which candidates 
connect with voters.  
In this chapter, I will examine Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s (2011) findings by evaluating 
whether their conclusions hold when placed in my framework, urban versus rural and 
concentrated versus dispersed, and when modifying the data on a candidate’s hometown.   
I will consider the outcomes of candidate emergence when hometown is defined as where 
the candidate spent most of his or her childhood, rather than where one spent most of his 
or her adult life (Gimpel et al.’s definition).  Quickly, to recap, rural and urban states were 
coded based upon the rurality index, as is outlined in Table 4.1, an attempt at capturing the 
overall culture of the state, that I created (please reference Chapter 4).  Concentrated states 
were those states where counties with over 5% of the population, urban counties, cluster 
together, where in dispersed states these urban counties were scattered across the state 
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(again, please consider Figures 1.1 and 1.2).   I will also consider whether the candidate’s 
hometown affects his or likelihood of winning, within the context of my framework and 
how this may be influenced by the coding of hometown.   
Testing the New Definition of Hometown on Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s Model 
After examining the impact of emergence using Gimpel et al.’s general framework, I 
will consider the likelihood of winning or losing within the context of my typology of states, 
as is noted in Table 1.1.  Simply, what impact does breaking the data down by state type, 
urban concentrated, urban dispersed, rural concentrated or rural dispersed have on the 
predictors of success?   
ADULT versus RAISED 
Before moving onto a discussion of the findings using Gimpel et al.’s model with my 
data where hometown is where the candidate live the majority of his or her childhood, I 
must first clarify a couple of issues pertaining to the coding of the candidate’s hometown.  
As you will note when you begin to consider the findings, there are two classifications for 
the candidate’s hometown, ADULT24 and RAISED.  The central reasoning behind the need 
for two separate classifications is the “alien” candidate, more specifically those candidates 
who were not raised in the state in which they are running for election.  The models labeled 
ADULT classifies these candidates’ hometown as where they were living when they ran; one 
should note this is the way that Gimpel et al. coded all of their candidates.  All other “non-
                                                          
24
 Both ADULT and RAISED classifications are based upon the candidate’s FIPS code.  FIPS is the accepted 
abbreviation for Federal Information Processing Standards, which provides a unique code for states and 
counties.  For example the FIPS code for Cook County, IL is 17031, the state FIPS being 17 and the county FIPS 
being 031. 
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alien” candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they spent 
the majority of their childhood.   
The RAISED classification somewhat spins the ADULT classification on its head.  It 
codes the “alien” born candidates to their birth state and county.  All other “non-alien” 
candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the county where they spent the 
majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification.  Coding RAISED in this manner 
will really capture from which counties candidates emerge.  For example, in New York 
County (Manhattan borough only), we see that there are 62 candidates, of which 39 are 
“aliens.” Keep in mind that this does include incumbents, meaning there will be 
duplications, but it does highlight that New York City is a hotbed for candidate emergence 
and just for the state of New York.  In the forthcoming discussion, I will be comparing 
outcomes based upon both ADULT and RAISED.  Please note that the correlation between 
the coding of home county, ADULT and RAISED, is .77, enough of a difference to justify a 
closer examination.   
Tables 6.1a and 6.1b provide an overview of the number of “alien” candidates, those 
candidates that are non-native to the state, by state type, by ADULT and RAISED, and by 
senatorial and gubernatorial elections.  The tables also include winning percentage of alien 
candidates for each state type.  To begin, for both election types and for both classification 
scheme for home county, the lowest number of total candidates emerge from rural 
concentrated states, while the highest numbers come from urban concentrated states.  In 
general terms, there are more “alien” candidates emerging from urban than rural states and 
from concentrated than dispersed states.  Tables 6.2a and 6.2b also show the breakdown of 
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the number of alien candidates as a percentage of all candidates.  In rural concentrated 
states, only two percent of all candidates are “aliens” for both types of elections, indicating 
that it is very unlikely that non-native candidates state will run in that state type.    
These tables make it quite clear that, in both senatorial and gubernatorial elections, 
“alien” candidates are more likely in urban than rural states and in concentrated than 
dispersed states.  It is notable that in both of the races, nearly 30% of candidates in urban 
states are “alien” candidates, whereas the average is closer to 14% for rural classified 
states.  Overall, though, when you consider “alien” candidates in the context of all 
candidates, the highest percentage is urban states at 14%.  Simply put, we see more non-
native candidates in urban classified states than in the other state types.  In terms of the 
state types where “alien” candidates are more likely to win, we see that, generally speaking, 
RAISED candidates are more likely to win in senate elections and ADULT candidates are 
more likely to win in gubernatorial elections.  When comparing apples to apples, or rather, 
ADULT to ADULT models, we see that non-native candidates are more likely to win in 
gubernatorial races than senate races (Tables 6.1a and 6.1b).  A comparison of RAISED 
models, we see that “alien” candidates are more likely to win urban dispersed gubernatorial 
races and rural concentrated senatorial races.  It would be instructive for future studies to 
consider the context, which allow for and/or develop “alien” or, rather, non-state native 
candidates. 
Candidate Emergence Findings using ADULT and RAISED on Gimpel, Lee, and Thorpe’s 
Model, 1948-2008 
 
Non-metro rural. Consider Tables 6.3-6.6 to explore the differences in outcomes 
overall between Gimpel et al.’s model and my two models, using ADULT and RAISED to code 
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hometowns.  First, let us consider the impact of candidate emergence from non-metro 
locations from 1948-2008.  I hypothesized that candidate emergence from rural counties 
would be much less likely in urban and concentrated states than for rural and dispersed 
states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections.   For gubernatorial emergence, the 
only state type holding any significance is urban states using the RAISED coding.  In urban 
states, using the location where all candidates were raised, we expect that, if the county is 
rural, holding all else constant, there will be a 64% drop in candidate emergence.  Compare 
this to Gimpel et al.’s overall model, which predicted a 90% drop and his model for urban 
states a 100% drop in emergence if the county is rural.  It is interesting to note that using a 
new definition of hometown causes this variable to drop in significance for all other state 
types in gubernatorial races.  This would make sense, as more of the candidates would be 
coded outside major metropolitan areas whereas in Gimpel et al.’s model where they were 
currently living and running for office.  A consideration of the data shows that there is a 
larger distribution of the data in the RAISED model versus the ADULT model.  For 
gubernatorial races, there are 681 counties producing candidates in the RAISED model 
versus 630 in the ADULT, and 654 and 610 respectively for the senatorial races.  Using this 
new definition of hometown seems to indicate that rurality is less of a detriment to 
emergence than originally predicted by Gimpel et al. 
The story is a bit more complex when one considers the variances in models related 
to candidates emerging from rural counties in senatorial races.  Be reminded that when 
Gimpel et al.’s model is not deconstructed by my state typology, the non-metro rural 
variable is not significant.  When I broke his model down by my typology, emergence was 
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expected to decrease 100% for urban classified states, 88% for rural classified states, and 
92% for dispersed states if the county was rural (Tables 6.3 and 6.5).  There was no 
significance on this variable for concentrated classified states.  Considering Table 6.3, please 
note that the overall model for RAISED, there is no significance in this variable and we only 
see significance in urban states were we expect candidate emergence to drop 56% from 
rural counties in urban classified states.  For the ADULT model overall, we do see 
significance; there is a 35% decrease in the likelihood of candidate emergence from rural 
counties for all states.  For urban states, it is a 57% expected decrease; for rural states a 
31% decrease; and for dispersed, a 36% decrease using the ADULT data for senatorial 
candidate emergence.  Again, as with Gimpel’s data, there is no significance on this variable 
for concentrated classified states.   
To reiterate, I hypothesized that candidate emergence from rural counties would be 
much less likely in urban and concentrated states than for rural and dispersed states for 
both senatorial and gubernatorial elections.   For gubernatorial elections, as is noted in 
Table 6.4, the only significant state type is urban classified using ADULT coding.  Otherwise, 
coming from a rural county holds no significance one way or the other.  In senatorial races, 
it is noted that coming from a rural county does negatively impact emergence for urban, 
rural, and dispersed state types using ADULT coding.  The impact is more notable for urban 
states than for rural or dispersed states.   For the senatorial RAISED coding, like the 
gubernatorial candidate emergence, only urban states hold significance.  This is quite 
instructive when one considers that, when you consider where all candidates were actually 
raised, which would remove some of the skew that is inevitable with the ADULT coding due 
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to candidates living in state capitals or urban areas, for three of the state types non-metro 
locations now do not hold significance.  Thus, a major take away is that, growing up in a 
rural area (RAISED coding) is not a negative predictor for candidate emergence in most state 
types, urban states being the exception.   
Electoral concentration.  Moving onto the consideration of electoral concentration, 
there are not any huge differences when comparing the results of Gimpel et al.’s models 
and my ADULT and RAISED models.  The results do indicate a slightly larger impact on 
candidate emergence from populous counties in both the overall ADULT and RAISED models 
at 48% and 46% respectively, when compared to Gimpel et al.’s overall model’s result of 
29%.  It is worth noting that for all categories there is significance in a positive direction.  So, 
simply put, no matter how you slice it, the more populous the county, the more candidates 
one would expect to emerge.   
Further, we see that the alpha coefficient is higher in my models versus Gimpel’s 
models, indicating that there is more overdispersion in my models.  This makes sense given 
that I have more data points than Gimpel et al. and given that I coded the hometown of 
individuals, whereas Gimpel et al. coded where they were currently living.  This means there 
is more variance in my models than in their models; so, in other words, there are more 
counties considered (less zeros) in my models than theirs.  In Gimpel et al.’s senate model, 
there were only 203 counties were candidates emerged.  In my senate models, there were 
654 (RAISED) and 610 (ADULT).  In Gimpel et al.’s gubernatorial model, there were only 187 
counties were candidates emerged, as compared to 681 counties total in my RAISED model 
and 630 in my ADULT model.  Please note that the time period, 1948-2008, for my data is 
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much more extensive than theirs, 1996-2006, which would explain some of the variance 
between the alpha coefficients; however, I think much of the difference is due to coding. 
Percent self-employed.  For the next variable, percent employed in unincorporated 
business, I expect that as the percent self-employed increases, there will be an increase in 
candidates emerging from rural states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections.  
Gimpel et al.’s data showed that as this variable increased by one percent, we could expect 
a drop in candidate emergence, for both senatorial and gubernatorial races, of 8%.  For 
senate races, the overall models for both ADULT and RAISED, lost significance; although, 
there was significance for urban and concentrated states for both ADULT and RAISED 
models.  There was no significance for rural or dispersed states of any senatorial model.  
While the impact is negative for these models, it is less impactful for the ADULT data than 
for Gimpel et al.’s or for the RAISED model.  It is interesting that rural and dispersed hold no 
significance in the senatorial race, which may indicate small businesses hold more political 
influence in these state types, or at a minimum are not a determent to candidate 
emergence.  Alternatively, it may imply that strong senatorial candidates can be developed 
in places where small businesses thrive in rural and dispersed state types.   
Percent high-income.  In considering impact of percent high income (relative to the 
state average), I would expect that more candidates would come from counties with higher 
income in urban and concentrated states than for rural and dispersed states for both 
senatorial and gubernatorial elections.  Although, I think that there will be a positive impact 
on all state types because, as much of the political behavior literature highlights, 
concentrated money equates to political power.  There are some interesting findings, 
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especially with regard to gubernatorial candidate emergence, here.  In the overall models, 
those not broken down by typology, we see that Gimpel et al.’s model predicts a one 
percent rise in relative wealth is associated with a 27% increase in the count of Senate 
nominees, holding all else equal, while the RAISED model predicts a 9% increase and the 
ADULT model a 6% increase.  This is quite a significant drop from Gimpel et al.’s estimate.  
Further, when I broke Gimpel et al.’s data down into my state typology for gubernatorial 
elections all state types were significant.  As we would expect, as it has certainly been 
shown repeatedly, money equals political power.  When using the ADULT and RAISED data, 
though, significance drops for rural states in both cases and concentrated states for RAISED 
and dispersed states ADULT.  This seems to indicate that, in those state types, money may 
not equal political power, at least in terms of grooming and producing candidates. 
In considering the senatorial emergence and percent high income, Gimpel et al.’s 
estimate is less divergent from the ADULT and RAISED estimates (16%, 10% and 11% 
respectively).  Unlike the gubernatorial models where nearly half lacked significance, we see 
that all but one (Concentrated-ADULT) are positively significant.  There is quite a range on 
the predicted impact of percent high income on the expected count of emerging 
candidates, holding all else constant.  On one extreme, you have concentrated states using 
RAISED at 7% expected increase and at the other extreme, there is Gimpel et al.’s rural 
states at 28% expected increase.  Overall, though, the ADULT and RAISED estimates are 
lower than Gimpel et al.  This again highlights that the measure of hometown used by 
Gimpel et al. may be exaggerating the influence of wealthy areas on the courting and 
grooming of homegrown candidates.   
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State capital.  In the last chapter, it was quite clear that being from a state capital 
greatly supports candidate emergence, which is what I expected.  While this trend 
continued with both the ADULT and RAISED models, the impact was to a lesser degree, 
especially for senatorial races.  Overall, in both races using the RAISED data, the impact of 
being from a state capital was less impactful.  This does seem quite logical since both the 
ADULT data and Gimpel’s data would likely have larger numbers of candidates residing in 
state capitals, whereas the RAISED data is indicative where the candidate was raised (less 
likely to be a state capital).  
Lessons on Candidate Emergence 
Before moving onto my discussion of how one’s hometown may impact the 
likelihood of winning or losing in the context of my typology, what are the main lessons 
learned regarding candidate emergence using Gimpel et al.’s model on my definition of 
hometown?   
 “Alien,” non-native to the state candidates, are more likely to emerge in urban 
than rural states and in concentrated than dispersed states.  In both senatorial 
and gubernatorial races, nearly 30% of urban candidates of urban states are 
“alien” candidates, whereas the average is closer to 14% for rural classified 
states.  Using the RAISED model, “Alien” are more likely to win in senate 
elections and, in the ADULT model, candidates are more likely to win in 
gubernatorial elections.  When comparing the ADULT models, we see that non-
native candidates are more likely to win in gubernatorial races than senate races.  
A comparison of the RAISED models, we see that “alien” candidates are more 
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likely to win urban dispersed gubernatorial races and rural concentrated 
senatorial races. 
 Coding matters because the examination of childhood hometowns reveals a 
wider distribution of candidate origins.  While my data did cover a longer time 
period, the difference in the number of counties candidates emerged based 
upon the coding of hometown was quite notable.  The suspicion that Gimpel et 
al.’s coding would be more concentrated was validated. 
 Non-metropolitan area candidate emergence is unlikely in urban classified states 
where, for rural classified counties, holding all else constant, there is a significant 
predicted drop in candidate emergence.  This was the case for all models that 
were tested.  Generally, the negative impact of candidates from rural areas is 
more evident in senatorial races than in gubernatorial races. 
 Electoral concentration’s impact on candidate emergence is straightforward.  
The more populous a county, the more candidates that are expected to emerge.  
All models were statistically significant and the estimates from each of the state 
types were closely aligned.  In short, this variable was consistent across the 
various models.  Overall, electoral concentration is less impactful in urban and 
concentrated states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections.  It should be 
noted that the impact of this variable had a larger impact when using my coding 
for candidate hometown. 
 Percent self-employed’s impact on candidate emergence is more nuanced.  The 
models indicate that for senatorial races, in rural and dispersed states, this is not 
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a predictor of candidate emergence.  Alternatively, for both urban and 
concentrated states, there is a negative relationship on the expected counts of 
candidates.  For gubernatorial races, self-employed is significant for all RAISED 
states, while it drops significance for rural and concentrated ADULT state 
models.  Overall, Gimpel et al.’s original estimates were higher than those that 
resulted in the significant models for both ADULT and RAISED.  This indicates 
that, while self-employed may, in some cases, depress candidate emergence, it is 
not to the degree initially characterized.  
 Percent high income’s on candidate emergence is mostly as expected.  
Generally, as a county’s percent high income relative to the state average 
increases, the expected count of candidates to emerge also increases.  For all 
state type models that were significant, which was most, there was a positive 
relationship.  As with the percent self-employed, Gimpel et al’s estimates seem 
to be inflated when compared to the ADULT and RAISED estimates.  It should 
also be noted that this variable seems to hold more weight in senatorial 
elections, where all but one state type was significant, versus gubernatorial 
elections where ADULT and RAISED drops significance in rural states and drops 
significance in RAISED concentrated states and ADULT dispersed states. 
 State capital continues to have a strong predictive value in my ADULT and 
RAISED models; although, it is to a lesser degree than noted in Gimpel et al.’s 
model. The only model in which this variable drops significance is Rural RAISED.  
Overall, RAISED models, while continuing to have a positive predictive value on 
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candidate emergence, in all cases it was lower than both ADULT and Gimpel et 
al.’s models.  Generally, though, the take away is that being candidate 
emergence is more likely from counties where the state capital lies. 
Does Your Hometown Origin Influence Your Likelihood of Winning? 
 Moving on from the consideration of the likelihood candidates will emerge from a 
particular county, let us now consider whether geography impacts a candidate’s likelihood 
of winning, based upon state type.  Before moving onto a consideration of individual 
likelihood of winning, please consider Tables 6.7 and 6.8, which replicate Gimpel et al.’s 
model, but use the counts of winning candidates, instead of candidate emergence, as the 
dependent variable by state type and by both ADULT and RAISED.  Again, the time period 
for my data is 1948-2008. 
 First, in considering the likelihood of winning by county, for both ADULT and RAISED 
in senatorial races (Table 6.7), the results for electoral concentration, percent self-
employed, state capital number of counties and number of elections are not substantively 
distinct from those found in Tables 6.3 and 6.5, which highlight the likelihood of candidate 
emergence.  What is, though, of consequence is that, for most of the state types, percent 
high income falls from significance, as does the measure for rural counties.  The income 
measure is only significant for urban states, ADULT and RAISED, and dispersed classified 
states, RAISED only, holding all else constant.  The measure for rurality is only significant in 
rural classified states, ADULT only, holding all else constant, supportive of my initial 
hypothesis that rurality would be a detriment in rural and dispersed classified states.  These 
findings indicate a couple of interesting outcomes: 1) the impact of income relative to 
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winning rarely is of consequence and 2) if a candidate can make it to the race (i.e. emerge), 
in nearly all cases, rurality is not harmful in  senatorial races.  Electoral concentration, 
though, does still have a large effect on the number of winners, which is related to rurality. 
 Table 6.8 shows the likelihood of winning in gubernatorial races, again, using Gimpel 
et al.’s model, by state type and ADULT and RAISED.  Much like the senatorial comparison, 
there is little difference in outcomes relative to the emergence findings noted in Tables 6.4 
and 6.6.  In the win/loss model, the only significant state type was urban classified states by 
RAISED for the rural indicator, meaning that this was the only state type where rurality 
mattered, in terms of winning.  In urban classified states, the likelihood of winning 
decreases by 76%, holding all else constant, in rural counties.  Also, the self-employment 
measure was only significant in urban and concentrated (RAISED only) classified states, not 
in rural or dispersed states, indicating that in urban and concentrated states higher levels of 
self-employment reduces the likelihood of winning.  This is supportive of my hypothesis that 
there would be a negative impact on winning for counties where small business ownership 
is highest. 
The most important takeaway, though, for both races, is that if you can get into the 
race as a general election candidate, the impact of your hometown status loses significance 
in most cases.  Moving onto a consideration of a logistic model for winning; please see 
Tables 6.9-6.12.  Again, the time period for this examination ins 1948-2008 and I use 
individual level data for incumbency and non-native status, but variables are the same as 
those used in Gimpel et al.’s model.  I also added my rural designation, which was distinct 
from Gimpel et al.’s because it is a relative measure; rural being defined as a county with 
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less than five percent of the population.  The dependent variable for this model, though, is 
whether the candidate won or lost.  So, while most of the data collected did not have 
individual attributes, an examination of the likelihood of winning is still instructive.    
Again, the dependent variable is winning versus losing and the independent controls 
are: incumbency, alien or non-native to the state candidate, party support (percentage of 
the presidential vote of the candidate’s part in the previous presidential election), percent 
black, percent high income relative to the state average, percent self-employment, non-
metro rural, state capital, number of counties, number of elections per election period, 
dummy if the county is classified as rural (under the 5% threshold) or urban (over the 5% 
threshold).  The expectations for those variables pulled from Gimpel et al.’s piece (percent 
high income relative to the state average, percent self-employment, non-metro rural, state 
capital, number of counties, number of elections per election period), the expectations are 
as outlined in Chapters 4 and 5.  I also expect that incumbency will have a strong positive 
impact on winning, as will non-native status.  I used race as a control, but do not believe it 
will have an impact on the likelihood of winning and I expect that coming from an urban 
county will increase your likelihood of winning in urban concentrated, urban dispersed, and 
rural concentrated states, while coming from a rural county will increased your likelihood of 
winning in rural dispersed states (please again consider the discussion highlighting the state 
types in Chapter 1).  I will consider this model for both senatorial and gubernatorial races 
for rural, urban, concentrated, dispersed, urban-concentrated, rural-concentrated, urban-
dispersed, and rural concentrated classified states.   
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Before I begin, there is little variation between ADULT and RAISED models, so I will 
just discuss ADULT outcomes henceforth.    First, when considering the findings, for 
senatorial elections, the only variables influencing the model are incumbency, in all cases, 
and party support, in most cases.  While coming from a rural county, using my 5% 
threshold, is significant in the overall models, it falls out when we break the model down by 
state type.  This is quite significant because it tells us that, while hometown status may be 
relevant to candidate emergence, for senatorial races it is no longer relevant to winning if 
the candidate can make it to the general election.  This is contrary to Gimpel  et al.’s 
conclusion that “…small town boys and girls generally do not make good—unless they first 
resettle in a big city to launch their political bids” (2011: 30) 
In the gubernatorial model, we see that incumbency is statistically significant for all 
state types, while party support is significant only in some of the state types.  The race 
control is also significant in about half of the state types.  Finally, the rural county, 5% 
measure, is significant for rural, concentrated, dispersed and rural-concentrated classified 
states, indicating that geography may have some influence in gubernatorial races.  The 
effect of my rurality measure is positive, which suggests that candidates from rural counties 
have an advantage and are more likely to win.   For gubernatorial candidates, in rural states, 
the probability of winning goes from .23 to .50 moving from a non-rural to a rural county, 
holding all else at its mean; in concentrated states, the probability of winning goes from .50 
to .50 moving from a non-rural to a rural county, holding all else at its mean; in dispersed 
classified states, the probability of winning goes from .46 to .52 moving from a non-rural to 
a rural county, holding all else at its mean;  and in rural-concentrated states, the probability 
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of winning goes from .38 to .53 moving from a non-rural to a rural county, holding all else at 
its mean.  Thus, especially in rural classified states and rural-concentrated states, coming 
from a rural county can significantly increase your likelihood of winning.   
Thus, the win-loss models did provide some new insights to the impact that one’s 
hometown may have on winning.  The impact of incumbency and party support are 
undeniable.  Most other factors fall out of significance, especially when compared to the 
candidate emergence models.  The impact of the significance of the rurality control in 
gubernatorial elections is particularly noteworthy, especially when one considers that 
variables like income and electoral concentration are not significant.  In the next chapter, I 
will summarize the main findings and discuss the implications of such, as well as suggest 
avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS and PROPOSALS 
 This study has shown that the question to candidates, “Where are you from?” is not 
without merit.  While this investigation did not directly survey voters to see why the 
associations drive their vote or how such may influence potential candidates, it did provide 
evidence that geography does matter, both the candidate emergence and success.  Indeed, 
geography does matter.   Indeed, there is a reason behind many candidates selling 
themselves based upon his or her hometown.  It is because, in some cases, hometown 
matters.   
 This exploration began with a consideration of both the geographic and the non-
geographic factors influencing candidate emergence and success and moved into my 
discussion of my typology of states.  For anyone who has traveled the United States, it is 
quite clear that beyond the physical borders from state-to-state there are also cultural 
idiosyncrasies.  The latter has been the foundation for much of the debate focusing on the 
differences between rural and urban states and communities and, for some, rather such 
even exists.  There, though, has been little scholarly attention on the impact that these 
biases may have on our political landscape.  We know that incumbency matters.  We know 
that party influence is critical.  What we do not know, though, is if there something 
systematically influencing those to throw their hat into the ring?  The results of this study 
show that geography should be a factor considered.  Geography should be considered 
beyond the framework of localism.  It is not a simple calculation of distance decay and voter 
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preference; the forthcoming discussion of the findings show that rurality does matter and 
has implications on political behavior.   
 To begin, once I deconstructed Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s data on my state typology, 
there were differences in outcomes, indicating that statewide geography does influence 
candidate emergence (2011).  I found that candidate emergence from rural areas was less 
likely in urban classified states than rural and dispersed classified states for senatorial 
nominees; this is especially true for urban classified states.  It is essentially impossible for a 
senatorial candidate from a rural area to springboard in urban classified states.   This is 
more notable for gubernatorial candidates in urban classified states.  In urban classified 
states, gubernatorial candidates just do not come from rural counties.  For other state 
types, there is no significant impact in gubernatorial races.   While rural emergence does 
not have an impact in concentrated states for Senate nominees, there is an impact in 
dispersed states.  The lesson from this examination is that, if you are a rural candidate, you 
are better off running in a gubernatorial than a senate race, assuming you do not live in an 
urban classified state; in which case, it is highly improbable you will be elected as a 
candidate with rural roots. 
 In Chapter 6, I expanded upon Gimpel et al.’s data by expanding the scope of the 
candidates from 1996-2006 (Gimpel et al’s data) to 1948-2008.  I replicated his model with 
my data.  I also explored the impact that coding may have by providing two distinct coding 
constructs, ADULT, where the “alien,” non-state native candidate lived when he or she ran, 
and RAISED, where the “alien” was raised.  The latter would—quite obviously—be code 
within a different state in which the candidate was running.  The findings suggest that 
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Gimpel et al.’s original findings regarding the impact of rurality are overinflated.  For 
gubernatorial races, the only state type holding significance is urban states using the RAISED 
classification with 64% drop in rural candidate emergence as compared to the 100% drop 
predicted by Gimpel et al.  For senate races, the RAISED model predicts a 55% drop in 
emergence if the candidate is rural based, as compared to Gimpel et al.’s model where this 
variable did not hold significance.  In my ADULT model, for senate candidates, all state types 
were significant except for concentrated classified states.  This indicates that truly looking at 
where the candidate was raised will eliminate some of the skew that occurs in Gimpel et al. 
and ADULT models.  The main takeaway is that, having a rural hometown is not a negative 
predictor for candidate emergence in most state types, with urban states being the 
exception.   
 Finally, I explored the impact that rurality may have on winning.  Relative to senate 
races, if candidates can get into the race, the negative effects of hometown lose 
significance. Interestingly, in gubernatorial races, coming from a rural area, actually 
increases the likelihood of getting elected rural, concentrated, dispersed, and rural-
concentrated classified states.  These considerations are even more impactful when one 
considers that the only other factors of significance are incumbency, party support and the 
race control (only in some cases).  Clearly, geography matters and, based upon these 
findings, rurality can actually give candidates a boost.  This makes those quintessential barn 
political advertisements in Missouri make some much more sense now.  It seems that the 
positive influence of rurality has not been lost on political consultants. 
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 So, where do we go from here?  Future scholarship would be wise to consider the 
impact geography, specifically rurality, has on political behavior and outcomes.  Keeping this 
in mind, the manner in which one captures this concept can be illusive.  As the discussion 
relative to ADULT and RAISED highlights, it does indeed matter how the data is coded and, 
as my typology highlights, how models are constructed.  Rurality influences candidate 
emergence and success in different ways, but, clearly, it has an impact and should not be 
ignored or dismissed.   
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Table 1.1. Rural versus Urban State Typology, Relative to Each State’s Population 
Concentration 
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Table 1.2. Rural-Urban Index Correlations 
Variable Number of 
Observations 
Sign Item-Rest 
Correlation 
Inter-item 
Correlation 
Correlation Alpha 
Restrictions 
On Abortion 
50 + 0.54 0.43 0.56 0.92 
US House, 
Conservatism 
Score 
50 + 0.79 0.73 0.50 0.90 
% Mass Public 
Conservative 
50 + 0.86 0.81 0.49 0.90 
% Households with 
Gun 
50 + 0.90 0.86 0.48 0.89 
Metro Area, % 50 - 0.67 0.58 0.53 0.91 
State Opinion on 
Gay Rights 
50 - 0.86 0.81 0.49 0.90 
Vote for Bush, 
2000 
50 + 0.93 0.90 0.48 0.89 
 
Frequent Church 
Goers, % 
37 + 0.63 0.53 0.53 0.91 
Population per Sq. 
Mile 
50 - 0.73 0.65 0.52 0.91 
Per Capita Energy 
Consumed BTU, 
1991 
50 + 0.58 0.48 0.55 0.92 
Test Scale     0.51 0.91 
*All measures are from the year 2000, unless otherwise specified.  
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Table 1.3. State-by-State Categorization 
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New 
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Rural Alabama 
Arkansas 
Idaho 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
North 
Carolina 
North 
Dakota 
Ohio 
South 
Carolina 
South 
Dakota 
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Texas 
Virginia 
West 
Virginia 
 
Georgia 
Nebraska 
Utah 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Kentucky 
Oklahoma 
 
Distribution of Population in Urban Areas 
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Table 1.4. Population Concentrations by State (Percentages in Parenthesis) 
State Urban Counties Typology 
California Los Angeles (28), Orange (8), San Diego (8), Santa Clara (5), San 
Bernardino (5), Riverside (5) 
UD 
New York Kings (13), Queens (12), New York (8), Bronx (7), Nassau (7), Suffolk (7), 
Westchester (5), Erie (5) 
UD 
Florida Miami-Dade (14), Broward (10), Palm Beach (7), Orange (6), Pinellas (6), 
Hillsborough (6), Duval (5) 
UD 
Maine Cumberland (21), York (15), Penobscot (11), Kennebec (9), Androscoggin 
(8), Aroostook (6) 
UD 
Michigan Wayne (21), Oakland (12), Macomb (8), Kent (6) UD 
Nevada Clark (69), Washoe (17) UD 
New Mexico Bernalillo (31), Dona Ana (10), Santa Fe (7), San Juan (6), Sandoval (5) UD 
Oregon Multnomah (19), Washington (13), Clackamas (10), Lane (9), Marion (8), 
Jackson (5) 
UD 
Pennsylvania Philadelphia (12), Allegheny (10), Montgomery (6), Bucks (5) UD 
Washington King (29), Pierce (12), Snohomish (10), Spokane (7), Clark (6) UD 
Delaware New Castle (64), Sussex (20), Kent (16) UC* 
Rhode Island Providence (59), Kent (16), Washington (12), Newport (8), Bristol (5) UC* 
Arizona Maricopa (60), Pima (16) UC 
Colorado Denver (13), Jefferson (12), El Paso (12), Arapahoe (11), Adams (8), 
Larimer (6), Boulder (6) 
UC 
Connecticut Fairfield (26), Hartford (25), New Haven (24), New London (8), Litchfield 
(5), Middlesex (5) 
UC 
Illinois Cook (43), DuPage (7), Lake (5) UC 
Maryland Montgomery (16), Prince George's (15), Baltimore (14), Baltimore City 
(12), Anne Arundel (9), Howard (5) 
UC 
Massachusetts Middlesex (23), Worcester (12), Essex (11), Suffolk (11), Norfolk (10), 
Bristol (8), Hampden (7), Plymouth (7) 
UC 
Minnesota Hennepin (23), Ramsey (10), Dakota (7), Anoka (6) UC 
New 
Hampshire 
Hillsborough (31), Rockingham (22), Merrimack (11), Strafford (9), 
Grafton (7), Cheshire (6), Belknap (5) 
UC 
New Jersey Bergen (11), Middlesex (9), Essex (9), Hudson (7), Monmouth (7), Passaic 
(6), Morris (6), Union (6), Ocean (6), Camden (6), Burlington (5) 
UC 
Vermont Chittenden (24), Washington (10), Rutland (10), Windsor (9), Franklin (7), 
Windham (7), Addison (6), Bennington (6), Caledonia (5), Orange (5) 
UC 
Alabama Jefferson (15), Mobile (9), Madison (6), Montgomery (5) RD 
Arkansas Pulaski (14), Benton (6), Washington (6) RD 
Idaho Ada (23), Canyon (10), Kootenai (8), Bonneville (6), Bannock (6), Twin 
Falls (5) 
RD 
Indiana Marion (14), Lake (8), Allen (5) RD 
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Iowa Polk (13), Linn (7), Scott (5) RD 
Kansas Johnson (17), Sedgwick (17), Shawnee (6), Wyandotte (6) RD 
Louisiana Orleans (11), Jefferson (10), East Baton Rouge (9), Caddo (6) RD 
Mississippi Hinds (9), Harrison (7), Jackson (5) RD 
Missouri St. Louis (18), Jackson (12), St. Louis City (6), St. Charles (5) RD 
Montana Yellowstone (14), Missoula (11), Cascade (9), Flathead (8), Gallatin (8), 
Lewis and Clark (6) 
RD 
North Carolina Mecklenburg (9), Wake (8), Guilford (5) RD 
North Dakota Cass (19), Burleigh (11), Grand Forks (10), Ward (9) RD 
Ohio Cuyahoga (12), Franklin (9), Hamilton (7), Montgomery (5), Summit (5) RD 
South Carolina Greenville (9), Richland (8), Charleston (8), Spartanburg (6), Lexington 
(5), Horry (5) 
RD 
South Dakota Minnehaha (20), Pennington (12), Brown (5) RD 
Tennessee Shelby (16), Davidson (10), Knox (7), Hamilton (5) RD 
Texas Harris (16), Dallas (11), Tarrant (7), Bexar (7) RD 
Virginia Fairfax (14), Virginia Beach (6) RD 
West Virginia Kanawha (11), Monongalia (5), Wood (5), Cabell (5) RD 
Kentucky Jefferson (17), Fayette (6)  RC 
Oklahoma Oklahoma (19), Tulsa (16), Cleveland (6) RC 
Georgia Fulton (10), DeKalb (8), Gwinnett (7), Cobb (7) RC 
Nebraska Douglas (27), Lancaster (15), Sarpy (7) RC 
Utah Salt Lake (40), Utah (17), Davis (11), Weber (9) RC 
Wisconsin Milwaukee (18), Dane (8), Waukesha (7) RC 
Wyoming Laramie (17), Natrona (13), Sweetwater (8), Campbell (7), Fremont (7), 
Albany (6), Park (5), Sheridan (5) 
RC 
*All counties within state are classified as urban, meaning they meet, or go beyond, the 5% 
threshold. 
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Table 4.1. State-by-State Score on the Rurality Index 
State Index Score-
Urban 
State Index Score-
Rural 
Rhode Island -1.60685 Ohio 0.02363 
Massachusetts -1.55662 Wisconsin 0.032674 
New Jersey -1.40239 Virginia 0.064524 
New York -1.23432 Iowa 0.171288 
Connecticut -1.21191 Georgia 0.264046 
Maryland -1.04593 Missouri 0.277535 
California -0.90415 West Virginia 0.303566 
Vermont -0.75421 Texas 0.39857 
Washington -0.64307 North Carolina 0.408869 
Delaware -0.6281 Indiana 0.452491 
Oregon -0.60115 Tennessee 0.476579 
Illinois -0.53059 Arkansas 0.523408 
Florida -0.44188 South Carolina 0.622588 
New Hampshire -0.38418 Utah 0.625594 
Colorado -0.33278 Nebraska 0.627254 
New Mexico -0.29926 Alabama 0.641146 
Pennsylvania -0.22211 Kansas 0.701165 
Maine -0.21141 Oklahoma 0.74659 
Arizona -0.13747 Montana 0.769675 
Minnesota -0.11741 South Dakota 0.844054 
Nevada -0.10291 North Dakota 0.847899 
Michigan -0.06218 Kentucky 0.865035 
  Louisiana 0.963014 
  Mississippi 1.015725 
  Wyoming 1.016421 
  Idaho 1.11142 
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Table 4.2. Data Sources 
Candidate Names 
and  
Vote Totals,  
1948-1990 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Candidate 
and Constituency Statistics of Elections in the United States, 1788-1990 
[Computer file]. ICPSR07757-v5. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1994. 
doi:10.3886/ICPSR07757 
Candidate Names 
and  
Vote Totals,  
1990-2008 
David Leip’s Atlas of Elections, http://www.uselectionatlas.org/ 
This sources provided vote totals for both the candidates themselves, as 
well as the party support variable.  I personally updated all candidate 
voting data from 1991-2008. 
Home County 
Information 
Winning candidate biographies, as noted in Biographical Directories of the 
Governors in the United States, provided much of the information.  I also 
did online research searching for candidate biographical information.  
This included Political Graveyard, http://politicalgraveyard.com/, and 
state government websites.  I attempted in all cases to cross-reference 
the information provided.   
Population Levels 
and Statewide 
Classification 
Measures 
The data for the state-level rurality index were obtained from Dr. Brady 
Baybeck and Dr. David Kimball.  Their sources include Erikson, et al. 1993, 
Newport 2009, Pollack 2006, Rentfrow, et al. 2008, "Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program,"  , Lax and Phillips 2009, "Official Energy Statistics 
from the U.S. Government,"  2009, and Wingfield and Marcus 2007.  
 
Statewide County 
Measures 
These measures were pulled from Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe’s data, which 
were generously provided to me by the Dr. Gimpel (2011). 
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Table 4.3. Description of Variables  
Variable  Collapsed 
By Group 
# of 
Obs. 
Range  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES      
Emerging candidate count, Gimpel 
et al.’s model (Senator) 
 3140 0, 8 .12 .60 
Emerging candidate count, Gimpel 
et al.’s model (Governor) 
 3140 0, 6 .10 .35 
Emerging candidate count, Gimpel 
et al.’s model replicated (Senator)* 
ADULT 
RAISED 
3140 
3140 
0, 32 
0, 38 
.65 
.64 
2.24 
2.12 
Emerging candidate count, Gimpel 
et al.’s model replicated  
(Governor) 
ADULT 
RAISED 
3140 
3140 
0, 45 
0, 43 
.56 
.56 
2.01 
1.83 
Count of winning candidates 
(Senator) 
ADULT 
RAISED 
3140 
3140 
0, 17 
0, 19 
.33 
.32 
1.32 
1.26 
Count winning candidates 
(Governor) 
ADULT 
RAISED 
3140 
3140 
0, 22 
0, 24 
.28 
.28 
1.09 
1.02 
Count of winning candidates, not 
collapsed 
Senator 
Governor 
2049 
1781 
0, 1 
0, 1 
.51 
.49 
.50 
.50 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES—County Level Models  
 
Electoral Concentration % of 
population relative to the state  
Senator 
Governor 
3137 
3137 
0, 36 
0, 36 
.80 
.80 
2.04 
2.08 
% High Income relative to the state  Senator 
Governor 
3137 
3137 
-5, 14 
-5, 14 
8.06e-
09 
-1.73e-
08 
1.56 
1.57 
% Self-employed population  Senator 
Governor 
3137 
3136 
0, 45 
0, 46 
9.65 
9.60 
4.87 
4.91 
Rural Locations, all non-metro 
counties with fewer than 10,000 
people (Gimpel et al.’s rural 
measure) 
Senator 
Governor 
3140 
3140 
0, 1 
0, 1 
.21 
.21 
.40  
.40 
State Capital 
 
Senator 
Governor 
3137 
3137 
0, 1 
0, 1 
.02 
.02 
.12 
.12 
Number of Counties per State 
 
Senator 
Governor 
3140 
3140 
3, 254 
3, 254* 
97  
97 
57 
57 
Number of Elections per election 
period  
Senator 
Governor 
3140 
3140 
3, 254 
6, 318 
97 
173 
57 
70 
Party Support, Vote Total for 
Candidate’s Party in Previous 
Presidential Race+ 
Senator 
Governor 
2016 
1731 
13, 87 
10, 94 
48 
48 
10 
10 
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Percentage Black Senator 
Governor 
2043 
1773 
0, .73 
0, .69 
.12 
.11 
.15 
.14 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES—Individual Level Models  
Incumbency, the candidate was an 
incumbent 
Senator  
Governor 
2051 
1784 
0, 1 
0, 1 
.37 
.28 
.48 
.45 
Non-Native Status, the candidate 
was not native to that state (he or 
she was not raised in the state he 
or she was running) 
Senator  
Governor 
2051 
1784 
0, 1 
0, 1 
.21 
.20 
.41 
.40 
Rural Designated County, below 5% 
of Population Threshold 
Senator  
Governor 
2051 
1784 
0, 1 
0, 1 
.56 
.45 
.50 
.50 
*FIPS is the accepted abbreviation for Federal Information Processing Standards, which 
provides a unique code for states and counties.  ADULT codes these candidates hometown 
as where they were living when they ran, whereas RAISED codes “alien” born candidates to 
their birth state and county, keeping all others as their ADULT classification. 
**There was a coding issue noted with Gimpel et al.’s data relative to the number of 
counties for the gubernatorial data.  The variable was corrected and my models all include 
the corrected version.  There was no coding error found in the senatorial data. 
+ Data entered directly from county data set and not provided by Gimpel et al. 
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Table 5.1. US Senate Comparison of the State Typology on Gimpel, Lee, and Thorpe’s 
Model 
Variable Name Gimpel’s 
Model25 
Gimpel’s Model 
Replicated26 
Urban States Rural States Concentrated  Dispersed 
Electoral 
Concentration 
(% of state) 
.30*** 
(.04) 
[1.35] 
.30*** 
(.04) 
[1.36] 
36% 
.21*** 
(.04) 
[1.23] 
23% 
.45*** 
(.06) 
[1.57] 
57% 
.20*** 
(.05) 
[1.22] 
22% 
.42*** 
(.06) 
[1.53] 
53% 
Percent High 
Income 
(Relative to State 
Average) 
.24*** 
(.02) 
[1.27] 
.24*** 
(.03) 
[1.27] 
27% 
.23*** 
(.03) 
[1.26] 
26% 
.25*** 
(.05) 
[1.28] 
28% 
.19*** 
(.04) 
[1.20] 
21% 
.24*** 
(.03) 
[1.27] 
27% 
Percent Self-
Employment 
 
-.08** 
(.03) 
[.92] 
-.08** 
(.04) 
[.92] 
-8% 
-.12** 
(.05) 
[.89] 
-11% 
-.05 
(.05) 
 
-.18** 
(.06) 
[.83] 
-17% 
-.037 
(.043) 
Non-Metro 
Rural 
 
-2.03** 
(.68) 
[.13] 
-2.33** 
(.77) 
[.10] 
-90% 
-45.41*** 
(2.07) 
[1.90e-20] 
-100% 
-2.10** 
(.81) 
[.12] 
-88% 
-1.73* 
(1.07) 
 
-2.48** 
(1.06) 
[.08] 
-92% 
State Capital 
 
 
1.59*** 
(.21) 
[4.9] 
1.59*** 
(.19)  
[4.9] 
391% 
1.38*** 
(.39) 
[3.97] 
297% 
1.36*** 
(.27) 
[3.89] 
289% 
1.28*** 
(.33) 
[3.58] 
258% 
1.63*** 
(.25) 
[5.10] 
410% 
Number of 
Counties 
(per state) 
-.0068** 
(.0025) 
[.9932] 
-.0068** 
(.0026) 
[.9932] 
-0.7% 
-.0169*** 
(.0036) 
[.9833] 
-1.7% 
-.0067** 
(.0030) 
[.9933] 
-0.7% 
-.0111*** 
(.0035) 
[.9889] 
-1% 
-.0059** 
(.0028) 
[.9941] 
-.6% 
Number of 
Elections 
(per election 
period) 
.0081*** 
(.0787) 
[1.008] 
.0085 
(.1025) 
 
-- -.0009 
(.1086) 
.0373 
(.1313) 
.1919 
(.2489) 
N 3137 3136 844 2264 939 2169 
α 1.87† 1.86† 1.58† 1.53† 1.50† 1.62† 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-744.27 -743.26 -285.74 -428.00 -250.75 -465.04 
Note:  All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in 
parenthesis.  Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients.  
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1  (two tailed test)  
†α is statistically significant 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Gimpel used the following:  ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 (two-tailed test). 
26
 The category Gimpel’s model represents the outcomes when I reran his model.  The outcomes are nearly 
identical, as is noted by the comparison to the column directly to the left.   
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Table 5.2. Gubernatorial Comparison of the State Typology on Gimpel, Lee, and Thorpe’s 
Model 
Variable Name Gimpel’s 
Model27 
Gimpel’s Model 
Replicated28 
Urban States Rural States Concentrated  Dispersed 
Electoral 
Concentration 
(% of state) 
.24*** 
(.04) 
[1.29] 
.25*** 
(.04) 
[1.29] 
29% 
.20*** 
(.05) 
[1.27] 
23% 
.37*** 
(.06) 
[1.44] 
44% 
.16*** 
(.05) 
[1.18] 
18% 
.35*** 
(.06) 
[1.42] 
42% 
Percent High 
Income 
(Relative to State 
Average) 
.15*** 
(.02) 
[1.16] 
.15*** 
(.03) 
[1.16] 
16% 
.16*** 
(.03) 
[1.17] 
17% 
.12** 
(.06) 
[1.13] 
13% 
.14** 
(.04) 
[1.15] 
15% 
.13*** 
(.04) 
[1.14] 
14% 
Percent Self-
Employment 
 
-.08** 
(.03) 
[.92] 
-.08** 
(.03) 
[.92] 
-8% 
-.11 * 
(.07) 
 
-.09** 
(.04) 
[.92] 
-8% 
-.16** 
(.06) 
[.85] 
-15% 
-.06 
(.04) 
Non-Metro 
Rural 
 
-.57 
(.43) 
-.59 
(.41) 
 
-31.35*** 
(1.70) 
[2.41e-14] 
-100% 
-.21  
(.42) 
 
.10 
(.64) 
 
-.72 
(.54) 
 
State Capital 
 
 
1.36*** 
(.24) 
1.36*** 
(.23)  
[3.88] 
288% 
1.22** 
(.42) 
[3.38] 
238% 
1.13** 
(.36) 
[3.08] 
208% 
1.09*** 
(.33) 
[2.98] 
198% 
1.52*** 
(.32) 
[4.57] 
357% 
Number of 
Counties 
(per state) 
-.0031** 
(.0009) 
[.9969] 
-.0062** 
(.0011) 
[.9938] 
-0.6% 
-.0112** 
(.0043) 
[.9944] 
-0.6% 
-.0065** 
(.0029) 
[.9936] 
-0.6% 
-.0105** 
(.0033) 
[.9896] 
-0.5% 
-.0038 
(.0024) 
 
Number of 
Elections 
(per election 
period) 
.18*** 
(.04) 
[1.11] 
.18** 
(.07) 
[1.19] 
19% 
.20* 
(.08) 
[1.22] 
22% 
.17 
(.17) 
.22** 
(.08) 
[1.24] 
24% 
.04 
(.20) 
N 3138 3136 844 2264 939 2169 
α 1.98
† 1.97† 1.53† 2.14† 1.27† 2.10† 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-720.19 -720.07 -259.21 -433.18 -239.59 -452.62 
Note:  All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in 
parenthesis.  Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients.  
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1  (two tailed test) 
†α is statistically significant 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 Gimpel used the following:  ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 (two-tailed test). 
28
 The category Gimpel’s model represents the outcomes when I reran his model.  The outcomes are nearly 
identical, as is noted by the comparison to the column directly to the left.  A data error was noted in the 
“Number of Counties” variable, which was corrected.  This accounts for the slight variation in the outcomes in 
that variable; all other estimates stayed nearly identical.   
Myers, Cassie, 2015, UMSL, p. 124 
 
Table 6.1a. Number of Alien Candidates by State Type (Senatorial), by ADULT and RAISED 
(1948-2008). Winning percentage in parenthesis. 
    
 
R
e
la
ti
ve
 t
yp
e
 
o
f 
St
at
e 
 Dispersed Concentrated Totals 
Urban 124-ADULT (43%) 
120-RAISED (34%) 
157-ADULT (47%) 
79-RAISED (72%) 
281-ADULT (45%) 
199-RAISED (49%) 
Rural 116-ADULT (45%) 
111-RAISED (57%) 
43-ADULT (49%) 
32-RAISED (75%) 
159-ADULT (46%) 
143-RAISED (61%) 
Totals 240-ADULT (44%) 
231-RAISED (45%) 
200-ADULT (48%) 
111-RAISED (73%) 
440-ADULT (45%) 
342-RAISED (54%) 
Distribution of Population in Urban Areas 
 
 
 
Note:  These are winning percentages by state type, so the rows will not add up to 100%. 
 
Table 6.1b. Number of Alien Candidates by State Type (Gubernatorial), by ADULT and 
RAISED (1948-2008). Winning percentage in parenthesis. 
    
 
R
e
la
ti
ve
 t
yp
e
  
o
f 
St
at
e 
 Dispersed Concentrated Totals 
Urban 101-ADULT (50%) 
108-RAISED (66%) 
143-ADULT (58%) 
121-RAISED (34%) 
244-ADULT (55%) 
229-RAISED (49%) 
Rural 82-ADULT (61%) 
127-RAISED (45%) 
34-ADULT (38%) 
53-RAISED (34%) 
116-ADULT (54%) 
180-RAISED (42%) 
Totals 183-ADULT (55%) 
235-RAISED (54%) 
177-ADULT (54%) 
174-RAISED (34%) 
360-ADULT (54%) 
409-RAISED (48%) 
Distribution of Population in Urban Areas 
 
 
 
Note:  These are winning percentages by state type, so the rows will not add up to 100%. 
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Table 6.2a. Number of Alien Candidates Compared to All Candidates by State Type and 
Relative to all Candidates (Senatorial), 1948-2008. Percentages in parenthesis. 
Note:  These are the number of alien candidates by state type, so the rows will not add up 
to 100%.  The first number in each cell is the number of alien candidates in that type of 
state. The second number in the first row each in cell is the total number of candidates in 
each state type.  The second number in the second row in each cell is the total number of 
candidates in the sample.  The first row within each cell is the percentage of aliens for only 
that state type, while the second row within each cell is the percentage of aliens relative to 
all candidates in the sample.  
 
Table 6.2b. Number of Alien Candidates Compared to All Candidates by State Type and 
Relative to all Candidates (Gubernatorial), 1948-2008. Percentages in parenthesis. 
    
 
R
e
la
ti
ve
 t
yp
e
  
o
f 
St
at
e 
 Dispersed Concentrated Totals 
Urban 136/456 (30%) 
136/2266 (6%) 
180/624 (29%) 
180/2266 (8%) 
316/1080 (29%) 
316/2266 (14%) 
Rural 100/864 (12%) 
100/2266 (4%) 
49/322 (15%) 
49/2266 (2%) 
149/1186 (13%) 
149/2266 (7%) 
Totals 236/1320 (18%) 
236/2266 (10%) 
229/946 (24%) 
229/2266 (10%) 
465/2266 (21%) 
 
Distribution of Population in Urban Areas 
 
 
 
Note:  These are the number of alien candidates by state type, so the rows will not add up 
to 100%.  The first number in each cell is the number of alien candidates in that type of 
state. The second number in the first row each in cell is the total number of candidates in 
each state type.  The second number in the second row in each cell is the total number of 
candidates in the sample.  The first row within each cell is the percentage of aliens for only 
that state type, while the second row within each cell is the percentage of aliens relative to 
all candidates in the sample.  
 
 
 
    
 
R
e
la
ti
ve
 t
yp
e 
 
o
f 
St
at
e 
 Dispersed Concentrated Totals 
Urban 121/409 (30%) 
121/2032 (6%) 
156/510 (31%) 
156/2032 (8%) 
277/919 (30%) 
277/2032 (14%) 
Rural 116/807 (14%) 
116/2032 (6%) 
43/306 (14%) 
43/2032 (2%) 
159/1113 (14%) 
159/2032 (8%) 
Totals 237/1216 (19%) 
237/2032 (12%) 
199/816 (24%) 
199/2032 (10%) 
436/2032 (21%) 
 
Distribution of Population in Urban Areas 
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Table 6.3. Candidate Emergence Senatorial Comparison of Gimpel, ADULT and RAISED,  
Urban and Rural State Comparison (1948-2008) 
Variable 
Name 
Gimpel’s 
Model 
Replicated 
By ADULT By RAISED Urban 
States-
Gimpel 
Urban 
States-
ADULT 
Urban 
States-
RAISED 
Rural 
States-
Gimpel 
Rural 
States-
ADULT 
Rural 
States-
RAISED 
Electoral 
Concentra
tion 
(% of 
state) 
.25** 
(.04) 
[1.29] 
29% 
.40*** 
(.04) 
[1.48] 
48% 
.37*** 
(.04) 
[1.45] 
46% 
.21** 
(.04) 
[1.23] 
23% 
.29*** 
(.05) 
[1.33] 
33% 
.24*** 
(.04) 
[1.27] 
27% 
.45** 
(.06) 
[1.57] 
57% 
.52*** 
(.53) 
[1.68] 
68% 
.51*** 
(.06) 
[1.67] 
67% 
Percent 
High 
Income 
(Relative 
to State 
Average) 
.15** 
(.03) 
[1.16] 
16% 
.10*** 
(.03) 
[1.10] 
10% 
.11*** 
(.02) 
[1.11] 
11% 
.23** 
(.03) 
[1.26] 
26% 
.11*** 
(.03) 
[1.12] 
12% 
.14*** 
(.03) 
[1.14] 
15% 
.25** 
(.05) 
[1.28] 
28% 
.07*** 
(.04) 
[1.08] 
8% 
.08* 
(.04) 
[1.08] 
8% 
Percent 
Self-
Employme
nt 
 
-.08* 
(.03) 
[.92] 
-8% 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
 
-.02 
(.01) 
 
 
-.12* 
(.05) 
[.89] 
-11% 
-.06** 
(.03) 
[.93] 
-6% 
-.11*** 
(.03) 
[.89] 
-11% 
-.05 
(.05) 
 
-.01 
(.02) 
 
-.01 
(.02) 
 
Non-
Metro 
Rural 
 
-.59 
(.41) 
 
-.43** 
(.19) 
[.65] 
-35% 
-.20 
(.18) 
 
-45.41** 
(2.07) 
[1.90e-20] 
-100% 
-.84* 
(.48) 
[.446] 
-57% 
-.81* 
(.46) 
[.45] 
-56% 
-2.10* 
(.81) 
[.12] 
-88% 
-.37* 
(.21) 
[.69] 
-31% 
-.14 
(.20) 
 
State 
Capital 
 
 
1.36** 
(.23)  
[3.88] 
288% 
.80*** 
(.17) 
[2.23] 
123% 
.69*** 
(.20) 
[1.99] 
99% 
1.38** 
(.39) 
[3.97] 
297% 
.88*** 
(.23) 
[2.40] 
142% 
.54** 
(.23) 
[1.71] 
71% 
1.36** 
(.27) 
[3.89] 
289% 
.58* 
(.28) 
[1.78] 
78% 
.49 
(.31) 
 
Number 
of 
Counties 
(per state) 
-.0031* 
(.0011) 
[.9969] 
-0.3% 
-.0055*** 
(.0012) 
[.995] 
-0.5% 
-.0052*** 
(.0011) 
[.9948] 
-0.5% 
-.0169** 
(.0036) 
[.9833] 
-1.7% 
-.0168*** 
(.0034) 
[.9834] 
-2% 
-.0158*** 
(.0032) 
[.9844] 
-2% 
-.0067* 
(.0030) 
[.9933] 
-0.7% 
-.0058*** 
(.0014) 
[.9941] 
-0.6% 
-.0055*** 
(.0013) 
[.9945] 
-0.6% 
Number 
of 
Elections 
(per 
election 
period) 
.18* 
(.07) 
[1.19] 
19% 
.09 
(.08) 
 
-.08 
(.08) 
 
-- -- 
 
-- 
 
-.0009 
(.1086) 
-.1076 
(.0875) 
-.0883 
(.0796) 
N 3136 3136 3136 844 844 844 2264 2264 2264 
α 1.97† 3.53† 3.46† 1.58† 2.27† 2.16† 1.53† 3.80† 3.83† 
Log 
pseudo-
likelihood 
-720.07 -2436 -2547 -285.74 -792.03 -824.07 -428.00 -1607 -1681 
Note:  All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors 
in parenthesis.  Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant 
coefficients.  ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT 
classifies “alien” candidates’ hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other 
“non-alien” candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they 
spent the majority of their childhood.  The RAISED model codes the “alien” born candidates 
to their birth state and county.  All other “non-alien” candidates in the RAISED model were 
coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the 
ADULT classification. 
†α is statistically significant 
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Table 6.4. Candidate Emergence Gubernatorial Comparison of Gimpel, ADULT and RAISED,  
Urban and Rural State Comparison (1948-2008) 
Variable 
Name 
Gimpel’s 
Model 
Replicated 
By ADULT By RAISED Urban 
States-
Gimpel 
Urban 
States-
ADULT 
Urban 
States-
RAISED 
Rural 
States-
Gimpel 
Rural 
States-
ADULT 
Rural 
States-
RAISED 
Electoral 
Concentra
tion 
(% of 
state) 
.25*** 
(.04) 
[1.29] 
29% 
.31*** 
(.03) 
[1.37] 
37% 
.29*** 
(.03) 
[1.33] 
33% 
.20*** 
(.05) 
[1.27] 
23% 
.26*** 
(.04) 
[1.30] 
30% 
.21*** 
(.04) 
[1.24] 
24% 
.37*** 
(.06) 
[1.44] 
44% 
.40*** 
(.05) 
[1.49] 
49% 
.39*** 
(.05) 
[1.48] 
48% 
Percent 
High 
Income 
(Relative 
to State 
Average) 
.15*** 
(.03) 
[1.16] 
16% 
.06** 
(.03) 
[1.06] 
6% 
.09*** 
(.03) 
[1.06] 
9% 
.16*** 
(.03) 
[1.17] 
17% 
.11*** 
(.03) 
[1.12] 
12% 
.14*** 
(.03) 
[1.15] 
15% 
.12** 
(.06) 
[1.13] 
13% 
-.01 
(.04) 
 
.00 
(.04) 
 
Percent 
Self-
Employme
nt 
 
-.08** 
(.03) 
[.92] 
-8% 
-.03** 
(.01) 
[0.97] 
-3% 
-.04** 
(.01) 
[0.96] 
-4% 
-.11 * 
(.07) 
 
-.1*** 
(.03) 
[.91] 
-9% 
-.11*** 
(.03) 
[0.90] 
-10% 
-.09** 
(.04) 
[.92] 
-8% 
-.03 
(.02) 
 
-.03** 
(.02) 
[0.97] 
-3% 
Non-
Metro 
Rural 
 
-.59 
(.41) 
 
-.19 
(.18) 
 
-.25 
(.18) 
 
-31.35*** 
(1.70) 
[2.41e-14] 
-100% 
-.52 
(.40) 
 
-1.01** 
(.49) 
[0.36] 
-64% 
-.21  
(.42) 
 
-.17 
(.21) 
 
-.14 
(.20) 
 
State 
Capital 
 
 
1.36*** 
(.23)  
[3.88] 
288% 
1.1*** 
(.15) 
[3.01] 
201% 
.85*** 
(.16) 
[2.33] 
133% 
1.22** 
(.42) 
[3.38] 
238% 
1.05*** 
(.24) 
[2.86] 
186% 
.68** 
(.25) 
[1.97] 
97% 
1.13** 
(.36) 
[3.08] 
208% 
1.04*** 
(.22) 
[2.83] 
183% 
.86*** 
(.23) 
[2.37] 
137% 
Number 
of 
Counties 
(per state) 
-.0062** 
(.0011) 
[.9938] 
-0.6% 
-.0049*** 
(.0011) 
[.9951] 
-0.5% 
-.0040*** 
(.0010) 
[.9960] 
-0.4% 
-.0112** 
(.0043) 
[.9944] 
-0.6% 
-.0152*** 
(.0030) 
[.9849] 
-1.5% 
-.0130*** 
(.0030) 
[.9871] 
-1.3% 
-.0065** 
(.0029) 
[.9936] 
-0.6% 
-.0053*** 
(.0012) 
[.9947] 
-0.5% 
-.0038*** 
(.0012) 
[.9962] 
-0.4% 
Number 
of 
Elections 
(per 
election 
period) 
.18** 
(.07) 
[1.19] 
19% 
.10** 
(.04) 
[1.11] 
11% 
.05 
(.04) 
 
.20* 
(.08) 
[1.22] 
22% 
.16** 
(.05) 
[1.17] 
17% 
.08* 
(.05) 
[1.08] 
8% 
.17 
(.17) 
.01 
(.07) 
.02 
(.07) 
N 3136 3136 3136 844 844 844 2264 2264 2264 
α 1.97† 2.63† 2.61† 1.53† 1.91† 2.10† 2.14† 2.69† 2.56† 
Log 
pseudo-
likelihood 
-720.07 -2372 -2503 -259.21 -741.66 -800.73 -433.18 -1594 -1670 
Note:  All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors 
in parenthesis.  Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant 
coefficients.  ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT 
classifies “alien” candidates’ hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other 
“non-alien” candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they 
spent the majority of their childhood.  The RAISED model codes the “alien” born candidates 
to their birth state and county.  All other “non-alien” candidates in the RAISED model were 
coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the 
ADULT classification. 
†α is statistically significant 
 
 
 
Myers, Cassie, 2015, UMSL, p. 128 
 
Table 6.5. Candidate Emergence Senatorial Comparison of Gimpel, ADULT and RAISED,  
Concentrated and Dispersed State Comparison (1948-2008) 
Variable 
Name 
Gimpel’s 
Model 
Replicated 
By ADULT By RAISED Concentra
ted -
Gimpel 
Concentra
ted-
ADULT 
Concentra
ted-
RAISED 
Dispersed-
Gimpel 
Dispersed-
ADULT 
Dispersed-
RAISED 
Electoral 
Concentra
tion 
(% of 
state) 
.25** 
(.04) 
[1.29] 
29% 
.40*** 
(.04) 
[1.48] 
48% 
.37*** 
(.04) 
[1.45] 
46% 
.20** 
(.05) 
[1.22] 
22% 
.27*** 
(.04) 
[1.31] 
31% 
.23*** 
(.04) 
[1.26] 
26% 
.42** 
(.06) 
[1.53] 
53% 
.51*** 
(.05) 
[1.66] 
66% 
.50*** 
(.06) 
[1.64] 
65% 
Percent 
High 
Income 
(Relative 
to State 
Average) 
.15** 
(.03) 
[1.16] 
16% 
.10*** 
(.03) 
[1.10] 
10% 
.11*** 
(.02) 
[1.11] 
11% 
.19** 
(.04) 
[1.20] 
21% 
.06 
(.04) 
 
.07** 
(.03) 
[1.07] 
7% 
.24** 
(.03) 
[1.27] 
27% 
.11*** 
(.03) 
[1.11] 
11% 
.12*** 
(.03) 
[1.13] 
13% 
Percent 
Self-
Employme
nt 
 
-.08* 
(.03) 
[.92] 
-8% 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
 
-.02 
(.01) 
 
 
-.18* 
(.06) 
[.83] 
-17% 
-.04* 
(.02) 
[.96] 
-4% 
-.09*** 
(.02) 
[.91] 
-9% 
-.037 
(.043) 
-.00 
(.02) 
-.001 
(.017) 
Non-
Metro 
Rural 
 
-.59 
(.41) 
 
-.43** 
(.19) 
[.65] 
-35% 
-.20 
(.18) 
 
-1.73 
(1.07) 
 
-.24 
(.34) 
 
.02 
(.33) 
 
-2.48* 
(1.06) 
[.08] 
-92% 
-.45** 
(.23) 
[.63] 
-36% 
-.20 
(.22) 
 
State 
Capital 
 
 
1.36** 
(.23)  
[3.88] 
288% 
.80*** 
(.17) 
[2.23] 
123% 
.69*** 
(.20) 
[1.99] 
99% 
1.28** 
(.33) 
[3.58] 
258% 
.86*** 
(.27) 
[2.36] 
136% 
.68** 
(.28) 
[1.98] 
98% 
1.63** 
(.25) 
[5.10] 
410% 
.82*** 
(.22) 
[2.27] 
128% 
.67** 
(.25) 
[1.94] 
95% 
Number 
of 
Counties 
(per state) 
-.0031* 
(.0011) 
[.9969] 
-0.3% 
-.0055*** 
(.0012) 
[.995] 
-0.5% 
-.0052*** 
(.0011) 
[.9948] 
-0.5% 
-.0111** 
(.0035) 
[.9889] 
-1% 
-.0112*** 
(.0025) 
[.9889] 
-1% 
-.0103*** 
(.0023) 
[.9897] 
-1% 
-.0059* 
(.0028) 
[.9941] 
-.6% 
-.0047*** 
(.0013) 
[.9953] 
-.5% 
-.0044*** 
(.0012) 
[.9956] 
-.4% 
Number 
of 
Elections 
(per 
election 
period) 
.18* 
(.07) 
[1.19] 
19% 
.09 
(.08) 
 
-.08 
(.08) 
 
.0373 
(.1313) 
.0312 
(.1024) 
.0591 
(.0981) 
.1919 
(.2489) 
-.2475 
(.1536) 
.0133 
(.1456) 
N 3136 3136 3136 939 939 939 2169 2169 2169 
α 1.97† 3.53† 3.46† 1.50† 2.75† 2.54† 1.62† 3.43† 3.49† 
Log 
pseudo-
likelihood 
-720.07 -2436 -2547 -250.75 -808.11 -835.62 -465.04 -1600 -1678 
Note:  All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors 
in parenthesis.  Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant 
coefficients.  ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT 
classifies “alien” candidates’ hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other 
“non-alien” candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they 
spent the majority of their childhood.  The RAISED model codes the “alien” born candidates 
to their birth state and county.  All other “non-alien” candidates in the RAISED model were 
coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the 
ADULT classification. 
†α is statistically significant 
 
 
 
Myers, Cassie, 2015, UMSL, p. 129 
 
Table 6.6. Candidate Emergence Gubernatorial Comparison of Gimpel, ADULT and RAISED,  
Concentrated and Dispersed State Comparison (1948-2008) 
Variable 
Name 
Gimpel’s 
Model 
Replicated 
By ADULT By RAISED Concentra
ted-
Gimpel 
Concentra
ted-
ADULT 
Concentra
ted-
RAISED  
Dispersed-
Gimpel 
Dispersed-
ADULT 
Dispersed-
RAISED 
Electoral 
Concentra
tion 
(% of 
state) 
.25*** 
(.04) 
[1.29] 
29% 
.31*** 
(.03) 
[1.37] 
37% 
.29*** 
(.03) 
[1.33] 
33% 
.16*** 
(.05) 
[1.18] 
18% 
.21*** 
(.03) 
[1.23] 
23% 
.17*** 
(.03) 
[1.18] 
18% 
.35*** 
(.06) 
[1.42] 
42% 
.41*** 
(.05) 
[1.51] 
51% 
.40*** 
(.05) 
[1.49] 
49% 
Percent 
High 
Income 
(Relative 
to State 
Average) 
.15*** 
(.03) 
[1.16] 
16% 
.06** 
(.03) 
[1.06] 
6% 
.09*** 
(.03) 
[1.06] 
9% 
.14** 
(.04) 
[1.15] 
15% 
.06* 
(.03) 
[1.06] 
6% 
.06 
(.04) 
 
.13*** 
(.04) 
[1.14] 
14% 
.06 
(.04) 
 
 
.10** 
(.04) 
[1.11] 
11% 
Percent 
Self-
Employme
nt 
 
-.08** 
(.03) 
[.92] 
-8% 
-.03** 
(.01) 
[0.97] 
-3% 
-.04** 
(.01) 
[0.96] 
-4% 
-.16** 
(.06) 
[.85] 
-15% 
-.04 
(.02) 
 
-.06** 
(.02) 
[0.94] 
-6% 
-.06 
(.04) 
-.04** 
(.02) 
[.96] 
-4% 
-.04** 
(.02) 
[.96] 
-4% 
Non-
Metro 
Rural 
 
-.59 
(.41) 
 
-.19 
(.18) 
 
-.25 
(.18) 
 
.10 
(.64) 
 
-.39 
(.26) 
 
-.35 
(.25) 
 
-.72 
(.54) 
 
.03 
(.23) 
 
-.06 
(.23) 
 
State 
Capital 
 
 
1.36*** 
(.23)  
[3.88] 
288% 
1.1*** 
(.15) 
[3.01] 
201% 
.85*** 
(.16) 
[2.33] 
133% 
1.09*** 
(.33) 
[2.98] 
198% 
1.1*** 
(.25) 
[3.01] 
201% 
.86*** 
(.27) 
[2.37] 
138% 
1.52*** 
(.32) 
[4.57] 
357% 
1.15*** 
(.19) 
[3.17] 
217% 
.88*** 
(.18) 
[2.41] 
141% 
Number 
of 
Counties 
(per state) 
-.0062** 
(.0011) 
[.9938] 
-0.6% 
-.0049*** 
(.0011) 
[.9951] 
-0.5% 
-.0040*** 
(.0010) 
[.9960] 
-0.4% 
-.0105** 
(.0033) 
[.9896] 
-0.5% 
-.0106*** 
(.0018) 
[.9895] 
-1.1% 
-.0119*** 
(.0017) 
[.9882] 
-1.2% 
-.0038 
(.0024) 
 
-.0036** 
(.0011) 
[.10] 
-0.4% 
-.0023** 
(.0011) 
[.10] 
-0.2% 
Number 
of 
Elections 
(per 
election 
period) 
.18** 
(.07) 
[1.19] 
19% 
.10** 
(.04) 
[1.11] 
11% 
.05 
(.04) 
 
.22** 
(.08) 
[1.24] 
24% 
.11** 
(.05) 
[1.12] 
12% 
.04 
(.04) 
 
.04 
(.20) 
-.04 
(.09) 
-.06 
(.09) 
N 3136 3136 3136 939 939 939 2169 2169 2169 
α 1.97† 2.63† 2.61† 1.27† 1.74† 1.48† 2.10† 2.65† 2.75† 
Log 
pseudo-
likelihood 
-720.07 -2372 -2503 -239.59 -762.58 -783.51 -452.62 -1578 -1678 
Note:  All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors 
in parenthesis.  Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant 
coefficients.  ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT 
classifies “alien” candidates’ hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other 
“non-alien” candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they 
spent the majority of their childhood.  The RAISED model codes the “alien” born candidates 
to their birth state and county.  All other “non-alien” candidates in the RAISED model were 
coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the 
ADULT classification. 
†α is statistically significant 
 
 
 
Myers, Cassie, 2015, UMSL, p. 130 
 
Table 6.7. Win/Loss Counts Senatorial Comparison ADULT and RAISED, by State Type 
(1948-2008) 
Variable 
Name 
By ADULT By 
RAISED 
Urban 
States-
ADULT 
Urban 
States-
RAISED 
Rural 
States-
ADULT 
Rural 
States-
RAISED 
Concentr
ated-
ADULT 
Concentr
ated-
RAISED  
Disperse
d-ADULT 
Disperse
d-RAISED 
Electoral 
Concentra
tion 
(% of 
state) 
.39*** 
(.05) 
[1.47] 
47% 
.36*** 
(.05) 
[1.43] 
43% 
.29*** 
(.05) 
[1.33] 
34% 
.24*** 
(.06) 
[1.27] 
27% 
.52*** 
(.08) 
[1.68] 
68% 
.48*** 
(.09) 
[1.62] 
62% 
.27*** 
(.05) 
[1.22] 
22% 
.21*** 
(.05) 
[1.23] 
23% 
.50*** 
(.07) 
[1.65] 
65% 
.47*** 
(.08) 
[1.61] 
61% 
Percent 
High 
Income 
(Relative 
to State 
Average) 
.06* 
(.03) 
[1.06] 
6% 
.10*** 
(.03) 
[1.11] 
11% 
.11** 
(.04) 
[1.11] 
11% 
.13** 
(.04) 
[1.14] 
14% 
-.03 
(.07) 
 
.08 
(.06) 
 
-.02 
(.05) 
 
.05 
(.05) 
 
.09** 
(.04) 
 
 
.14** 
(.04) 
[1.15] 
15% 
Percent 
Self-
Employme
nt 
 
-.01 
(.02) 
 
-.01 
(.02) 
 
-.07* 
(.04) 
[.93] 
-7% 
-.10** 
(.05) 
[0.90] 
-10% 
.00 
(.03) 
 
.01 
(.03) 
 
-.05 
(.03) 
 
-.09** 
(.03) 
[0.91] 
-9% 
.01 
(.03) 
.02 
(.03) 
 
Non-
Metro 
Rural 
 
-.49* 
(.28) 
[.61] 
39% 
-.26 
(.27) 
 
-.52 
(.71) 
 
-.57 
(.61) 
 
-.58* 
(.32) 
[.56] 
-44% 
-.32 
(.31) 
 
-.12 
(.44) 
 
.12 
(.43) 
 
-.59 
(.37) 
 
-.33 
(.36) 
 
State 
Capital 
 
 
.84*** 
(.26) 
[2.32] 
132% 
.70** 
(.26) 
[2.01] 
101% 
.74** 
(.29) 
[2.09] 
109% 
.68 
(.30)** 
[1.97] 
97% 
.77* 
(.42) 
[2.16] 
116% 
.33 
(.44) 
 
1.02*** 
(.31) 
[2.39] 
140% 
.72** 
(.30) 
[2.06] 
106% 
.81** 
(.37) 
[2.26] 
126% 
.58 
(.37) 
 
Number 
of 
Counties 
(per state) 
-.0050** 
(.0018) 
[.995] 
-0.5% 
-.0056** 
(.0018) 
[.9944] 
-0.6% 
-.0016*** 
(.0049) 
[.9833] 
-1.7% 
-.0162*** 
(.0048) 
[.9839] 
-1.6% 
-.0053** 
(.0020) 
[.9947] 
-0.5% 
-.0061** 
(.0021) 
[.9940] 
-0.6% 
-.0123*** 
(.0033) 
[.9950] 
-0.5% 
-.0116*** 
(.0032) 
[.9885] 
-1.1% 
-.0039** 
(.0019) 
[.9960] 
-0.4% 
-.0047* 
(.0020) 
[.10] 
-0.5% 
Number 
of 
Elections 
(per 
election 
period) 
-.02 
(.11) 
 
.03 
(.10) 
 
-- -- 
 
-.04 
(.11) 
.02 
(.10) 
.12 
(.14) 
 
.05 
(.13) 
 
-.30 
(.27) 
.12 
(.20) 
N 3136 3136 844 844 2264 2264 939 939 2169 2169 
α 10.20† 10.71† 5.20† 5.08† 13.08† 14.25† 6.29† 7.15† 11.90† 12.09† 
Log 
pseudo-
likelihood 
-1525 -1579 -522.90 -541.22 -977.95 -1007 -541.97 -548.75 -964.99 -1011 
Note:  All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors 
in parenthesis.  Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant 
coefficients.  ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT 
classifies “alien” candidates’ hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other 
“non-alien” candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they 
spent the majority of their childhood.  The RAISED model codes the “alien” born candidates 
to their birth state and county.  All other “non-alien” candidates in the RAISED model were 
coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the 
ADULT classification. 
†α is statistically significant 
 
 
 
Myers, Cassie, 2015, UMSL, p. 131 
 
Table 6.8. Win/Loss Counts Gubernatorial Comparison ADULT and RAISED, by State Type  
(1948-2008) 
Variable 
Name 
By ADULT By 
RAISED 
Urban 
States-
ADULT 
Urban 
States-
RAISED 
Rural 
States-
ADULT 
Rural 
States-
RAISED 
Concentr
ated-
ADULT 
Concentr
ated-
RAISED  
Disperse
d-ADULT 
Disperse
d-RAISED 
Electoral 
Concentra
tion 
(% of 
state) 
.28*** 
(.03) 
[1.32] 
32% 
.25*** 
(.03) 
[1.29] 
29% 
.24*** 
(.04) 
[1.27] 
27% 
.18*** 
(.03) 
[1.20] 
20% 
.31*** 
(.05) 
[1.37] 
37% 
.33*** 
(.06) 
[1.39] 
39% 
.20*** 
(.04) 
[1.22] 
22% 
.16*** 
(.03) 
[1.17] 
17% 
.36*** 
(.05) 
[1.43] 
44% 
.35*** 
(.05) 
[1.42] 
42% 
Percent 
High 
Income 
(Relative 
to State 
Average) 
.05* 
(.03) 
[1.05] 
5% 
.08** 
(.03) 
[1.08] 
8% 
.10** 
(.04) 
[1.11] 
11% 
.14** 
(.04) 
[1.14] 
14% 
-.02 
(.05) 
 
-.02 
(.05) 
 
.03 
(.04) 
 
.04 
(.04) 
 
.05 
(.04) 
 
 
.09** 
(.04) 
[1.10] 
10% 
Percent 
Self-
Employme
nt 
 
-.03* 
(.02) 
[0.97] 
-3% 
-.04** 
(.02) 
[0.96] 
-4% 
-.14*** 
(.04) 
[.87] 
-13% 
-.14** 
(.04) 
[0.87] 
-13% 
-.02 
(.02) 
 
-.03 
(.02) 
 
-.05 
(.04) 
 
-.08** 
(.03) 
[0.92] 
-8% 
-.03 
(.03) 
-.03 
(.03) 
 
Non-
Metro 
Rural 
 
-.22 
(.24) 
 
-.32 
(.24) 
 
-1.05 
(.71) 
 
-1.42** 
(.69) 
[0.24] 
-76% 
-.22 
(.27) 
 
-.24 
(.27) 
 
-.41 
(.35) 
 
-.55 
(.37) 
 
-.01 
(.31) 
 
-.10 
(.30) 
 
State 
Capital 
 
 
1.11*** 
(.19) 
[3.05] 
205% 
.81*** 
(.20) 
[2.26] 
126% 
.92** 
(.35) 
[2.51] 
151% 
.38 
(.31) 
 
1.24*** 
(.25) 
[3.46] 
247% 
1.00*** 
(.27) 
[2.71] 
171% 
.87** 
(.33) 
[2.39] 
140% 
.62** 
(.30) 
[1.86] 
86% 
1.29*** 
(.24) 
[3.63] 
263% 
.97*** 
(.25) 
[2.64] 
164% 
Number 
of 
Counties 
(per state) 
-.0049** 
(.0016) 
[.9951] 
-0.5% 
-.0043** 
(.0014) 
[.998] 
-0.2% 
-.0174*** 
(.0036) 
[.9828] 
-1.7% 
-.0161*** 
(.0036) 
[.9840] 
-1.6% 
-.0054** 
(.0018) 
[.9946] 
-0.5% 
-.0039** 
(.0016) 
[.9961] 
-0.4% 
-.0100*** 
(.0025) 
[.9900] 
-1% 
-.0118*** 
(.0023) 
[.9883] 
-1.2% 
-.0034** 
(.0017) 
[.9967] 
-0.3% 
-.0026* 
(.0015) 
[.9974] 
-0.3% 
Number 
of 
Elections 
(per 
election 
period) 
.11** 
(.06) 
[1.11] 
11% 
.04 
(.06) 
 
.17** 
(.07) 
[1.18] 
18% 
.01 
(.08) 
 
.06 
(.10) 
.07 
(.10) 
.13** 
(.06) 
[1.13] 
13% 
.00 
(.06) 
 
-.07 
(.14) 
-.04 
(.13) 
N 3136 3136 844 844 2264 2264 939 939 2169 2169 
α 4.61† 4.89† 2.61† 3.20† 5.57† 5.60† 2.28† 2.33† 5.62† 5.84† 
Log 
pseudo-
likelihood 
-1554 -1632 -493.97 -542 -1030 -1065 -520.45 -519.87 -1011 -1085 
Note:  All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors 
in parenthesis.  Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant 
coefficients.  ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT 
classifies “alien” candidates’ hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other 
“non-alien” candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they 
spent the majority of their childhood.  The RAISED model codes the “alien” born candidates 
to their birth state and county.  All other “non-alien” candidates in the RAISED model were 
coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the 
ADULT classification. 
†α is statistically significant 
 
 
Myers, Cassie, 2015, UMSL, p. 132 
 
Table 6.9. Win/Loss Model, Senatorial Elections—By State Type (1948-2008), by ADULT 
Variable Name All State 
Types 
Urban  Rural Concentr
ated 
Disperse
d 
UC RC UD RD 
Incumbent 2.42*** 
(.12) 
2.12*** 
(.16) 
2.72*** 
(.18) 
2.31*** 
(.19) 
2.47*** 
(.15) 
2.17*** 
(.23) 
2.63*** 
(.35) 
2.02*** 
(.24) 
2.73*** 
(.20) 
Non-Native 
Candidate 
-.14 
(.14) 
-.21 
(.17) 
-.04 
(.23) 
-.03 
(.21) 
-.22 
(.18) 
-.06 
(.23) 
-.19 
(.46) 
-.34 
(.26) 
-.00 
(.26) 
Party Support .03*** 
(.01) 
.03*** 
(.01) 
 
.03*** 
(.01) 
 
.04*** 
(.01) 
 
.02** 
(.01) 
 
.04*** 
(.01) 
 
.05*** 
(.01) 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
.02** 
(.01) 
 
Electoral 
Concentration 
(% of state) 
.00 
(.01) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
-.02 
(.03) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
-.01 
(.05) 
 
.00 
(.02) 
 
-.01 
(.06) 
 
Percentage Black .41 
(.39) 
.73 
(.71) 
.19 
(.51) 
.46 
(.81) 
.39 
(.46) 
1.09 
(.94) 
2.53 
(2.10) 
.65 
(1.3) 
.36 
(.54) 
Percent High 
Income 
(Relative to State 
Average) 
.00 
(.02) 
 
.03 
(.03) 
 
-.05 
(.07) 
 
-.01 
(.04) 
 
.02 
(.03) 
 
.00 
(.04) 
 
-.09 
(.15) 
 
.07* 
(.04) 
 
-.06 
(.09) 
 
Percent Self-
Employment 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
-.01 
(.04) 
 
 
.02 
(.03) 
 
 
.01 
(.04) 
 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
 
.02 
(.06) 
 
 
.01 
(.06) 
 
 
-.05 
(.06) 
 
 
.02 
(.03) 
 
 
Non-Metro Rural 
 
.09 
(.29) 
 
1.07 
(.76) 
 
-.17 
(.35) 
 
.22 
(.49) 
 
.03 
(.36) 
 
1.30 
(1.30) 
 
-.05 
(.60) 
 
.70 
(.81) 
 
-.27 
(.45) 
 
State Capital 
 
 
.25 
(.15)  
 
.30 
(.22) 
 
.34 
(.23) 
 
.38 
(.24) 
 
.16 
(.21) 
 
.40 
(.28) 
 
.62 
(.54) 
 
.07 
(.46) 
 
.24 
(.26) 
 
Number of 
Counties 
(per state) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
-.00 
(.01) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
 
Number of 
Elections 
(per election 
period) 
.03 
(.09) 
 
-- 
 
.07 
(.10) 
 
.06 
(.13) 
 
-.03 
(.20) 
 
--  .26 
(.18) 
 
-- 
 
.05 
(.22) 
 
Rural County .29** 
(.15) 
.21 
(.22) 
 
.21 
(.25) 
 
.42* 
(.25) 
 
.26 
(.20) 
 
.33 
.33 
 
.19 
(.53) 
 
.20 
(.31) 
 
.14 
(.34) 
 
N 1999 908 1091 811 1188 505 306 403 785 
Pseudo R2 .2227† .1843† .2630† .2373† .2174† .2085† .3016† .1684† .2540† 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-1076 -513.35 -556.54 -428.68 -643.95 -277.06 -148.05 -232.28 -405.13 
Note:  All entries are logistic regression estimates with robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. The dependent variable, winning, is scored 1 if the candidate won and 0 if the 
candidate lost.  The model labeled ADULT classifies “alien” candidates’ hometowns as 
where they were living when they ran; all other “non-alien” candidates in the ADULT model 
were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood.   
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test) 
†Chi-2 is statistically significant 
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Table 6.10. Win/Loss Model, Senatorial Elections—By State Type (1948-2008), by RAISED 
Variable Name All State 
Types 
Urban  Rural Concentr
ated 
Disperse
d 
UC RC UD RD 
Incumbent 2.42*** 
(.12) 
2.12*** 
(.17) 
2.63*** 
(.17) 
2.19*** 
(.19) 
2.51*** 
(.16) 
2.o3*** 
(.23) 
2.45*** 
(.32) 
2.20*** 
(.26) 
2.68*** 
(.20) 
Non-Native 
Candidate 
-.14 
(.14) 
-.22 
(.19) 
-.13 
(.22) 
-.08 
(.23) 
-.17 
(.19) 
-.04 
(.28) 
-.45 
(.47) 
-.43 
(.30) 
-.02 
(.26) 
Party Support .03*** 
(.01) 
.03** 
(.01) 
 
.03*** 
(.01) 
 
.04*** 
(.01) 
 
.02** 
(.01) 
 
.03** 
(.01) 
 
.06*** 
(.01) 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
.02** 
(.01) 
 
Electoral 
Concentration 
(% of state) 
.00 
(.01) 
 
-.00 
(.01) 
 
.02 
(.02) 
 
.01 
(.01) 
 
.01 
(.01) 
 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
.06* 
(.03) 
 
.00 
(.02) 
 
.02 
(.03) 
 
Percentage Black .41 
(.39) 
.22 
(.69) 
.47 
(.52) 
.31 
(.77) 
.14 
(.48) 
.86 
(.04) 
-3.13 
(2.02) 
-1.22 
(1.24) 
.41 
(.57) 
Percent High 
Income 
(Relative to State 
Average) 
.00 
(.02) 
 
.03 
(.03) 
 
-.06 
(.06) 
 
.00 
(.04) 
 
-.00 
(.03) 
 
.03 
(.04) 
 
-.14 
(.15) 
 
.02 
(.04) 
 
-.06 
(.08) 
 
Percent Self-
Employment 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
.00 
(.04) 
 
 
.02 
(.03) 
 
 
.02 
(.04) 
 
 
.00 
(.03) 
 
 
.00 
(.05) 
 
 
.07 
(.06) 
 
 
.01 
(.06) 
 
 
.00 
(.03) 
 
 
Non-Metro Rural 
 
.09 
(.29) 
 
1.15 
(.78) 
 
-.16 
(.36) 
 
.39 
(.48) 
 
-.13 
(.21) 
 
1.82 
(1.41) 
 
-.20 
(.64) 
 
.74 
(.93) 
 
-.27 
(.47) 
 
State Capital 
 
 
.25 
(.15)  
 
.39* 
(.22) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
 
.27 
(.23) 
 
.15 
(.21) 
 
.55* 
(.29) 
 
.04 
(.49) 
 
.25 
(.39) 
 
.15 
(.26) 
 
Number of 
Counties 
(per state) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
.01 
(.00) 
 
.01 
(.01) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
 
Number of 
Elections 
(per election 
period) 
.03 
(.09) 
 
.03 
(.25) 
 
.06 
(.11) 
 
.19 
(.13) 
 
-.12 
(.15) 
 
.79 
(.56) 
.40** 
(.18) 
 
-- 
 
-.08 
(.17) 
 
Rural County .29** 
(.15) 
-.13 
(.22) 
 
.28 
(.23) 
 
.36 
(.25) 
 
.18 
(.20) 
 
.47 
(.33) 
 
.16 
(.44) 
 
-.20 
(.32) 
 
.26 
(.27) 
 
N 1999 857 1079 784 1152 469 315 386 764 
Pseudo R2 .2227† .1845† .2530† .2365† .2212† .1938† .3157† .1874† .2437† 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-1076 -484.43 -557.60 -420.29 -621.45 -262.03 -149.38 -217.26 -399.30 
Note:  All entries are logistic regression estimates with robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. The dependent variable, winning, is scored 1 if the candidate won and 0 if the 
candidate lost. The RAISED model codes the “alien” born candidates to their birth state and 
county.  All other “non-alien” candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the 
county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification. 
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test) 
†Chi-2 is statistically significant 
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Table 6.11. Win/Loss Model, Gubernatorial Elections—By State Type (1948-2008), by 
ADULT 
Variable Name All State 
Types 
Urban  Rural Concentr
ated 
Disperse
d 
UC RC UD RD 
Incumbent 1.44*** 
(.12) 
1.47*** 
(.17) 
1.41*** 
(.17) 
1.52*** 
(.19) 
1.40*** 
(.15) 
1.58*** 
(.22) 
1.34*** 
(.36) 
1.35*** 
(.26) 
1.46*** 
(.20) 
Non-Native 
Candidate 
.31** 
(.14) 
.34** 
(.17) 
.29 
(.23) 
.35* 
(.20) 
.26 
(.19) 
.52** 
(.23) 
-.40 
(.44) 
.05 
(.27) 
.51* 
(.28) 
Party Support .01** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
 
.02** 
(.01) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
.01** 
(.01) 
 
.01 
(.01) 
 
.02 
(.01) 
 
-.04** 
(.01) 
 
.03*** 
(.01) 
 
Electoral 
Concentration 
(% of state) 
.01 
(.01) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
-.01 
(.03) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
.02 
(.02) 
 
-.00 
(.01) 
 
.00 
(.04) 
 
.00 
(.02) 
 
-.00 
(.07) 
 
Percentage Black 1.12** 
(.42) 
1.40* 
(.75) 
.89 
(.55) 
1.29* 
(.76) 
1.18** 
(.55) 
1.60 
(1.00) 
-.06 
(1.7) 
1.77 
(1.46) 
1.24* 
(.67) 
Percent High 
Income 
(Relative to State 
Average) 
-.03 
(.03) 
 
-.02 
(.03) 
 
-.03 
(.07) 
 
-.04 
(.04) 
 
-.02 
(.04) 
 
-.02 
(.04) 
 
-.13 
(.11) 
 
-.02 
(.05) 
 
.01 
(.09) 
 
Percent Self-
Employment 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
-.02 
(.04) 
 
 
.01 
(.03) 
 
 
-.00 
(.04) 
 
 
.01 
(.03) 
 
 
-.03 
(.06) 
 
 
.02 
(.06) 
 
 
-.03 
(.07) 
 
 
.01 
(.03) 
 
 
Non-Metro Rural 
 
-.17 
(.29) 
 
-1.23 
(.92) 
 
-.15 
(.32) 
 
.01 
(.54) 
 
-.21 
(.33) 
 
-.42 
(1.42) 
 
-.62 
(.71) 
 
-1.60 
(1.07) 
 
-.11 
(.37) 
 
State Capital 
 
 
-.02 
(.00) 
 
.16 
(.21) 
 
.30 
(.24) 
 
-.10 
(.22) 
 
.14 
(.23) 
 
-.09 
(.27) 
 
.31 
(.48) 
 
-.42 
(.44) 
 
.34 
(.30) 
 
Number of 
Counties 
(per state) 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
Number of 
Elections 
(per election 
period) 
.02 
(.03) 
 
.05 
(.04) 
 
.08 
(.13) 
 
.01 
(.04) 
 
.07 
(.14) 
 
.01 
(.05) 
 
.28 
(.29) 
 
-.10 
(.30) 
 
.14 
(.17) 
 
Rural County29 .41** 
(.16) 
.19 
(.25) 
 
.63** 
(.26) 
 
.51* 
(.29) 
 
.48** 
(.21) 
 
-.05 
(.39) 
 
1.08** 
(.53) 
 
.44 
(.33) 
 
.60 
(.38) 
 
N 1715 821 894 720 996 489 231 332 663 
Pseudo R2 .0805† .0880† .0834† .0866† .0779† .1072† .1163† .0906† .0964† 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-1093 -518.96 -567.63 -454.83 -635.83 -302.61 -141.45 -209.23 -414.94 
Note:  All entries are logistic regression estimates with robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. The dependent variable, winning, is scored 1 if the candidate won and 0 if the 
candidate lost.  The model labeled ADULT classifies “alien” candidates’ hometowns as 
where they were living when they ran; all other “non-alien” candidates in the ADULT model 
were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood.   
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test) 
†Chi-2 is statistically significant 
 
                                                          
29
 The Non-Metro Rural county measure was used by Gimpel et al. and is all non-metro counties with fewer 
than 10, 000; whereas, my Rural county variable is a relative measure for state type.  It was coded 1 if the 
county had less than 5% of the state’s population.  The two measures had a  VIF score of 1.08. 
Myers, Cassie, 2015, UMSL, p. 135 
 
Table 6.12. Win/Loss Model, Gubernatorial Elections—By State Type (1948-2008), by  
RAISED 
Variable Name All State 
Types 
Urban  Rural Concentr
ated 
Disperse
d 
UC RC UD RD 
Incumbent 1.44*** 
(.12) 
1.58*** 
(.17) 
1.37*** 
(.17) 
1.56*** 
(.20) 
1.41*** 
(.15) 
1.71*** 
(.24) 
1.31*** 
(.35) 
1.42*** 
(.26) 
1.41*** 
(.20) 
Non-Native 
Candidate 
.31** 
(.14) 
.40** 
(.19) 
.21 
(.23) 
.25 
(.23) 
.20 
(.18) 
.26 
(.28) 
.40 
(.52) 
.36 
(.28) 
.11 
(.28) 
Party Support .01** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
 
.01* 
(.01) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
.01** 
(.01) 
 
.02 
(.01) 
 
-.02 
(.01) 
 
-.02 
(.01) 
 
.02** 
(.01) 
 
Electoral 
Concentration 
(% of state) 
.01 
(.01) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
-.00 
(.02) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
.02 
(.02) 
 
-.00 
(.01) 
 
.01 
(.03) 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
-.00 
(.03) 
 
Percentage Black 1.12** 
(.42) 
1.18 
(.74) 
1.12** 
(.54) 
1.30* 
(.78) 
1.24** 
(.52) 
1.49 
(.10) 
1.28 
(1.76) 
1.38 
(1.17) 
1.41** 
(.65) 
Percent High 
Income 
(Relative to State 
Average) 
-.03 
(.03) 
 
-.01 
(.03) 
 
-.04 
(.07) 
 
.01* 
(.04) 
 
.01 
(.04) 
 
-.06 
(.05) 
 
-.16 
(.10) 
 
.02 
(.05) 
 
.03 
(.08) 
 
Percent Self-
Employment 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
-.04 
(.05) 
 
 
.02 
(.03) 
 
 
.01 
(.04) 
 
 
.01 
(.03) 
 
 
-.03 
(.07) 
 
 
.02 
(.06) 
 
 
-.07 
(.07) 
 
 
.01 
(.03) 
 
 
Non-Metro Rural 
 
-.17 
(.29) 
 
-.33 
(.94) 
 
-.20 
(.33) 
 
-.13 
(.56) 
 
-.04 
(.35) 
 
.04 
(1.4) 
 
-.84 
(.68) 
 
-.65 
(1.23) 
 
-.07 
(.38) 
 
State Capital 
 
 
-.02 
(.00) 
 
.17 
(.22) 
 
.33 
(.23) 
 
-.25 
(.23) 
 
.21 
(.21) 
 
-.33 
(.30) 
 
.28 
(.46) 
 
-.01 
(.36) 
 
.43 
(.28) 
 
Number of 
Counties 
(per state) 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
Number of 
Elections 
(per election 
period) 
.02 
(.03) 
 
-.01 
(.04) 
 
.18 
(.11) 
 
-.03 
(.05) 
 
.15** 
(.08) 
 
-.02 
(.06) 
 
.33 
(.27) 
 
.09 
(.10) 
 
.23* 
(.13) 
 
Rural County .41** 
(.16) 
.23 
(.25) 
 
.68** 
(.23) 
 
.10 
(.30) 
 
.68*** 
(.20) 
 
.58 
(.42) 
1.02** 
(.52) 
 
.81** 
(.35) 
 
.68** 
(.28) 
 
N 1715 784 886 656 1014 428 228 356 658 
Pseudo R2 .0805† .0992† .0806† .0937† .0856† .1191† .1089† .1013† .0904† 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-1093 -489.52 -564.35 -412.06 -642.46 -260.62 -140.19 -221.25 -414.85 
Note:  All entries are logistic regression estimates with robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. The dependent variable, winning, is scored 1 if the candidate won and 0 if the 
candidate lost. The RAISED model codes the “alien” born candidates to their birth state and 
county.  All other “non-alien” candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the 
county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification. 
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test) 
†Chi-2 is statistically significant 
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Figure 1.1. Urban States and Counties of Concentration 
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Figure 1.2. Rural States and Counties of Concentration 
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Figure 1.3. Illinois Winner versus Loser Count Comparison, Urban Concentrated State 
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Figure 1.4. Washington Winner versus Loser Count Comparison, Urban Dispersed State 
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Figure 1.5. Oklahoma Winner versus Loser Count Comparison, Rural Concentrated State 
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Figure 1.6. Missouri Winner versus Loser Count Comparison, Rural Dispersed State 
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Figure 5.1.  Probability of zero candidates based upon electoral concentration, for Rural,  
Concentrated and Dispersed Classified states (Senate Elections) 
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Figure 5.2.  Probability of zero candidates based upon electoral concentration, for Urban, 
Rural, Concentrated and Dispersed Classified states (Gubernatorial Elections) 
 
